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Abstract 
This thesis describes research into the problem of transmission congestion management. The 
causes, remedies, pricing methods, and other issues of transmission congestion are briefly 
reviewed. This research is to develop market-based approaches to cope with transmission 
congestion in real-time, short-run and long-run efficiently, economically and fairly. Extended 
OPF techniques have been playing key roles in many aspects of electricity markets. The 
Primal-Dual Interior Point Linear Programming and Quadratic Programming are applied to 
solve various optimization problems of congestion management proposed in the thesis. 
A coordinated real-time optimal dispatch method for unbundled electricity markets IS 
proposed for system balancing and congestion management. With this method, almost all the 
possible resources in different electricity markets, including operating reserves and bilateral 
transactions, can be used to eliminate the real-time congestion according to their bids into the 
balancing market. Spot pricing theory is applied to real-time congestion pricing. 
Under the same framework, a Lagrangian Relaxation based region decomposition OPF 
algorithm is presented to deal with the problems of real-time active power congestion 
management across multiple regions. The inter/intra-regional congestion can be relieved 
without exchanging any information between regional ISOs but the Lagrangian Multipliers. 
In day-ahead spot market, a new optimal dispatch method is proposed for congestion and 
price risk management, particularly for bilateral transaction curtailment. Individual revenue 
adequacy constraints, which include payments from financial instruments, are involved in the 
original dispatch problem. An iterative procedure is applied to solve this special optimization 
problem with both prinlal and dual variables involved in its constraints. 
An optimal Financial Transmission Rights (FTR) auction model is presented as an approach 
to the long-term congestion management. Two types of series F ACTS devices are 
incorporated into this auction problem using the Power Injection Model to maximize the 
auction revenue. Some new treatment has been done on TCSC's operating limits to keep the 
auction problem linear. 
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Principal Symbols and Abbreviations 
Symbols 
Superscript and subscript: 
i,j,/,m,n 
lj 
A,B 
k 
/ 
s 
t 
+ 
index of network buses, 
bilateral contract or branch flow from bus i to bus}, 
index of regions, 
index of iteration, 
index of branches, 
slack bus, 
transpose, 
incremental adjustment on generators or loads in the balancing market, 
decremental adjustment on generators or loads in the balancing market, 
max upper limit, 
min lower limit, 
o current value or scheduled value, 
Res operating reserves, 
Rep replacing procurement for used operating reserves, 
En energy, 
Cap capacity, 
average value. 
v 
Sets: 
D the set of consumers, 
G the set of generators, 
L the set of branches, 
the set of demand buses, 
the set of generation buses, 
Q set of buses in the whole system, 
set of buses in region A, 
set of buses which have direct connection with buses in region A, 
e. 
I set of buses which have branches connected with bus i and flows on the 
branches are flowing to bus i. 
Variables: 
V bus voltage magnitude, 
() bus voltage angle, 
t transformer turning ratio, 
P active power, 
Q reactive power, 
A, f.1 Lagrangian multiplier, 
p Locational marginal price or nodal spot price, 
CjD MW amount of a Contract for Differences, 
FTR MW an10unt of a Financial Transmission Right, 
R profit of individual market participant, 
VI 
power injection of FACTS devices, 
reactance of series compensator, 
phase shifter angle. 
PrefIX: 
change of variables based on scheduled points, 
a partial derivative. 
Functions: 
C(e) active power cost or bidding functions, 
active power bid functions of consumers in the spot market, 
h(e) equality constraints, 
gee) inequality constraints, 
LF(e) piece-wise linear loss functions of branches. 
Parameters: 
Xij reactance of branch ij, 
B linearized active power Jacobian matrix, 
H matrix of branch power flow constraint coefficient, 
M mapping matrix of FTRs in the auction, 
MB mapping matrix of FTRs in the base case, 
connection matrix of FACTS devices, 
PB matrix ofFTR injection in the base case, 
b, W, r bidding prices. 
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Abbreviations 
AGC Automatic Generation Control 
ATC Available Transmission Capability 
BCM Bilateral Contract Market 
CBM Capacity Benefit Margin 
cm Contracts for Differences 
DTS Dispatch Training Simulator 
ED Economic Dispatch 
EMS Energy Management System 
FACTS Flexible AC Transmission System 
FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
FGR Flowgate Transmission Rights 
FTR Financial Transmission Rights 
ISO Independent System Operator 
IT Information Technology 
LTR Link-based Transmission Rights 
LMP Locational Marginal Price 
LOLP Loss of Load Probability 
VOLL· Value of Lost Load 
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NETA New Energy Trading Arrangement 
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National Grid Company 
Open Access Same-Time Information System 
Optimal Power Flow 
Power Injection Model 
Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection 
Pool Day-ahead Ancillary Services Auction Market 
Physical Bilateral Contract 
Pool Day-ahead Energy Auction Market 
Pool Purchase Price 
Pool Selling Price 
Power Transfer Distribution Factor 
Public Utility Holding Company Act 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act 
Power Exchange 
Real-time Balancing Market 
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System Marginal Price 
Short Run Marginal Pricing 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Aims of the Thesis 
1.1.1 Background to the Research 
There has been a worldwide trend towards restructuring and deregulation of the power 
industry over the last decade. The competition in the wholesale generation market and the 
retail market together with the open access to the transmission network can bring many 
benefits to the end consumers, such as lower electricity prices and better services. However, 
this competition also brings many new technical problems and challenges to the operation of 
power system, which was regarded as "natural monopoly" due to the special characteristics of 
electricity as a commodity. On the other hand, this means real opportunities and challenges to 
power engineers and researchers [1-2, 6-8]. 
An important driving force behind this significant reform is the recent development of 
technology. At the end of the 20th century, many technological innovations are emerging. In 
all sectors of the electric power industry, these innovations lead to changes or even 
revolutions. Some of the most prominent developments are [11]: 
• Generation technology. New power generation technologies with higher efficiencies and 
lower emissions are being developed. Coal gasification and small gas turbine (from 1 MW 
down to lKW) technologies are progressing steadily. Mass production and market 
penetration of such installations may tum the current network design philosophy 
completely upside down. The concept of distributed generation can easily incorporate 
power generation from renewable sources [2]. 
• Transmission technology. New technologies in transmission and distribution may have a 
tremendous impact on the power industry. High-efficiency transformers, ultra-high-
voltage transmission lines (1,500KV or even higher) and eventually the application of 
superconducting materials will reduce power losses between power plants and consumers 
[6]. 
1 
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Control technology. Advanced network control technologies enhance the optimal 
allocation of transmission lines, improve the stability of power systems, and may 
eventually open the transmission sector to competition. The most promising development 
is the replacement of the present lo",:-speed control electronics by a new branch of control 
devices, the Flexible AC Transmission System (FACTS). With FACTS devices it is 
possible t6 control power flow through transmission lines, to regulate voltage, phase angle 
and line impedance [4]. 
• Metering technology. The development of new metering systems is indispensable for the 
implementation of an electricity market. Due to the price of electricity varying with time 
in the market, metering must be time-dependent in order to bill the consumers the correct 
prices. Advanced techniques for automatic meter reading are being developed, either by 
reading the meter data from·a distance radiographically, or by meter communicating with 
the supply company through the telecommunication or the power grid. 
• Information technology (IT). Advances in IT, driven by the doubling of the 
microprocessor power every 18 months, the exponential growth of information storage 
capacity and the fast growth of the Internet, have a tremendous impact on the many 
aspects of electricity markets, such as bidding systems, billing systems, market 
information publishing systems, etc. 
Transmission plays a key role in making the competitive market work while the transmission 
operator is a vital entity to maintain grid reliability. More and more free bilateral trades of 
electricity are making the existing transmission system become a scarce resource and 
transmission congestion occurs more frequently. Congestion management is a crucial function 
of any system operator and is the process that ensures the security and reliability of market 
operation [12, 14]. Traditional mandatory dispatching actions (adjust fast-responded 
generators, curtail loads, etc.) are easy to implement and maybe still necessary in the worst 
situation, but they are not encouraged in a competitive electricity market as they are not 
transparent and may prevent the market from further development. With all the new 
technologies mentioned above, market-based approaches are needed urgently to cope with 
transmission congestion efficiently, economically, fairly, and transparently. 
1.1.2 Aims of the Research 
The primary aim of the research presented in this thesis is to develop market-based 
approaches to transmission congestion management with extended Optimal Power Flow 
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(OPF) techniques. The congestion problems should be managed in different time scales 
ranging from real-time dispatching through short-term scheduling up to long-term planning. 
First, an efficient approach to congestion management through real-time balancing market is 
proposed. This approach deals with the real-time imbalance and congestion problems caused 
by unexpected contingencies and unpredictable load fluctuation. The aim of this part of work 
is to use all the possible resources in unbundled electricity markets according to the various 
bids from market participants to eliminate the real-time congestion and then to find an 
accurate pricing method for it. 
Since a modem power system is usually a large interconnected system with multiple control 
regions and system operators, the real-time operation and congestion management needs the 
coordination between these system operators, particularly when congestion occurs on the tie 
lines between regions. The second part of this research is to fmd a feasible and fast way to 
implement this coordinated operation without exchanging a huge amount of data between 
regIOns. 
In the short term spot market, the Locational Marginal Price (LMP) [13] has been used for 
congestion management and pricing. To hedge against high price risk caused by congestion, 
some pure financial instruments have been introduced into electricity markets. The purpose of 
market participants to trade electricity is to make a profit, thus those participants suffering 
from high prices will be willing to reduce their transactions to protect their individual revenue 
adequacy. The third part of this research in this thesis is to eliminate congestion by 
considering the individual revenue adequacy constraints of market participants. 
To avoid the appearance of transmission congestion, the limited transmission capacity should 
be allocated to the users who value it best in the long run. Financial transmission rights (FTR) 
have been proven as an efficient and flexible approach to transmission capacity reservation. 
The last part of this research work of this thesis is to implement an optilnal auction for FTR to 
maxilnize the revenue from the use of transmission system by controlling FACTS devices in 
the grid. 
1.2 The Restructuring of Electricity Industry 
Before restructuring, the electricity industry in the world was either a private-owned 
monopoly like the United States (US) or a state-owned monopoly like the United KingdOln 
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(UK). Although their background and the detailed restructuring processes are different, the 
common goal is to introduce competition into the electricity industry and to provide 
customers with their choices of power supplier. In the following section, the evolution of the 
UK electricity industry [24,178] and the US electricity industry [6,15] will be introduced 
respectivel y. 
1.2.1 The Evolution of the UK Electricity Industry 
Public electricity supply in the UK dates from 1881 when Siemens began operation of a small 
hydro-electric generating plant in GodaIming, Surrey. Firstly promoted by Joseph 
Chamberlain in 1881, the Electric Lighting Act of 1882 allowed local authorities to break up 
streets for the laying of cables or to give their consent to private companies to do so. 
As the technology of the industry progressed, some consolidation of the industry into large 
connected units was required. The Central Electricity Board (CEB) was established in 1926 
with responsibility for constructing a high-voltage national electricity grid. This was the first 
atten1pt to create a national executive body capable of integrating disparate local supply 
networks. The CEB developed a grid control system and encouraged construction of large 
capacity and more thermally efficient generating plant. 
Originally nationalized in 1947 as a response to a shortage of capacity left after World War II, 
the UK electricity system remained goven1ffient controlled until privatization and 
restructuring began in April 1, 1990. A White paper called Privatizing Electricity, which was 
unveiled in early 1988, became the core of the Electricity Act of 1989. The first stage of 
instituting a new regulatory authority (to replace the Central Electricity Generating Board 
(CEGB) created in 1957) came shortly after the Electricity Act in the form of the Office of 
Electricity Regulation (OFFER), now the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM). 
The Electricity Act of 1989 has provided the basic framework for competition among 
generators. The major provisions of the act include the privatization of area boards, 
converting them into regional electricity companies (RECs), with a separation of 
infrastructure (wires) and power sales and purchases. The CEGB was ordered to separate into 
three parts: National Power, PowerGen, and a monopolized transmission c Olnp any, the 
National Grid Company (NGC). A power pool was created to set wholesale prices, accepting 
bids from power generators. Retail con1petition was planned to phase in over time, reaching 
the goal of full retail competition by 1998. 
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The Competitive Act of 1998, which took full effect in March 2000, includes two guiding 
principles: the prohibition of agreements that prevent, restrict, distort competition; and the 
prohibition of the abuse of a dominant business position. The Electricity Act of 1989 was 
significantly amended in 2000 by the Royal assent of the Utilities Act, which removes the 
distinction between private and public electric supplier franchise areas. 
The New Electricity Trading Arrangement (NETA) began in 1997, when a review of the 
arrangements in force since 1989, the Pool, found that the system was flawed, uncompetitive 
and susceptible to manipulation. NETA "went live" on March 27,2001. The aim of NET A is 
to bring about a more competitive wholesale market, bringing downward pressure on the price 
of bulk electricity and ultimately prices to all consumers. The primary tenets of NET A are: 
• Forward and futures markets, 
• Balancing mechanism administered by NGC, 
• Settlement process for recouping system operator costs. 
Essentially, NET A opens the way for a variety of bilateral contracts between entities buying, 
selling, producing, or consuming electricity. NGC will still act as System Operator and 
Transmission Owner, but not market operator any longer. Optimistically, OFGEM states: 
"Under NETA there will be less opportunity to manipulate the market." 
1.2.2 The Evolution of the US Electricity Industry 
The US modem electricity industry could date back to the early 1880s with the opening of 
- Thomas Edison's Pearl Street station in Manhattan in the United States, which initially 
supplied 59 customers with direct-current. (DC) electricity. Because of the inefficiency of DC 
transmission, George Westinghouse proposed a better idea of alternating current (AC). With 
AC systems, electricity can be transmitted at high voltages much more efficiently. By 1896, 
AC lines delivered electricity from generators at Niagara Falls to Buffalo, about 20 miles 
away. The AC transmission grid was born. From then, the power industry in the US went 
through an incredible expansion and formed large interconnected power systems generally. 
Electric power was a natural monopoly. Centralized systems with large generators that 
reduced costs and attracted business customers were clearly more efficient than specialized 
generators and nlasses of wires. After the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) of 
1935 passed by Congress, electric utilities were established as vertically integrated natural 
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monopolies serving captive markets. Utilities and regulators determined the allowable 
expenses, which were used to set rates consumers had to pay. Until the early 1970s the 
vertical monopoly structure provided a stable basis for building an extensive and reliable 
system. Electric rates were steadily decreasing while electricity demand increased 
significantly at rates of seven to eight percent each year. Generally speaking, power systems 
comprise four main components: generation, transmission, distribution and consumption. The 
integrated utility built the generators that supplied electricity, built the wires that transported 
the electricity to each community and to each individual consumer, and directly billed the 
consumer for this bundled service. 
However, change came suddenly to this fully regulated system, starting from the dramatic 
increase of fossil-fuel prices during and after the 1973-1974 oil embargo, along with high 
inflation and some other events. As a result, the electric rates stopped decreasing but started to 
increase regularly. Meanwhile, Congress passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 
1978 (PURP A) to respond to political concerns, including US independence on foreign oil 
and interest in alternative generation technologies such as solar, wind, waste, or geothermal. 
PURP A mandated that each investor-owned utility had to purchase power at its avoided cost 
from a new class of generation, known as qualifying facilities (QF), located in its service 
territory. PURP A therefore introduced competition into the generation section of the industry. 
QFs became a threat to the generation side of this monopoly. However, the utility still 
maintained its monopoly as it was in control of the method of distributing the product to the 
consumer: the transmission and distribution systems. 
If the industry were to move towards a' truly competitive marketplace, the access to the 
transmission grid has to be opened. The first step toward this was another legislative act, the 
1992 Energy Policy Act. This was followed in 1996 by orders from the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC): FERC Order 888 (Promoting wholesale competition 
through open access non-discriminatory transmission services by public utilities) and 889 
(Open Access Same-Time Information System, OASIS). 
Since then open access transmission and the opening of wholesale competition in the electric 
industry have brought many changes in the past several years, which include divestiture by 
many integrated utilities of some or all of their generating assets; increases in the number of 
new participants in the industry in the form of both independent and affiliated power 
marketers and generators as well as independent power exchanges; increases in the volume of 
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trade in the industry, particularly sales by marketers; state efforts to introduce retail 
competition; and new and different uses of the transmission grid. 
So far, electricity industries are still in the midst of this revolutionary restructuring with more 
and more emerging challenges and opportunities. The general restructuring process is shown 
in Figure 1.1. An ideal fully deregulated power industry should have competitive generation 
and retail markets along with the regulated transmission and distribution networks. 
Generation 
System Operation 
Transmission 
Distribution 
Merchant 
~ 
Consumer 
Vertically Bundled Power Industry 
------------ ------------
Fully Unbundled Power Industry 
Competitive 
Regulated 
Competitive 
Figure 1.1 Restructuring electricity industry 
1.2.3 Effects of Industry Restructuring on System Reliability 
Maintaining reliability involves two sets of operations: normal operations and emergency 
operations. Markets can do much to maintain reliability and prevent outages (by preparing 
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resources for use in emergencies) during normal operations. Markets alone may be much less 
effective during actual emergencies [9]. 
Response time is the key factor that will determine whether the independent actions of 
participants in competitive markets can perform some reliability functions or whether 
technical standards and direct control will be required. Roughly speaking, competition is 
likely to work well for actions that occur half an hour or more in the future. Given this lead 
time, buyers and sellers can fmd the price level for each service that will balance supply and 
demand. For shorter time periods, however, system control is still likely to be required. 
Technical standards may be needed to specify the amount of each service that is required and 
to establish metrics for jUdging the adequacy of service delivery; markets can then determine 
the least-cost ways to deliver the required services. Disturbance response and generation 
planning provide useful examples of the two ends of the temporal spectrum. 
The system operator must have the ultimate authority to compel actions needed to maintain 
reliability in real time and to restore the system quickly and safely after an outage occurs, 
although after-the-fact disputes may occur over who pays for what. If the system operator 
deemed it necessary to reduce flows on a particular transmission line, to take a line out of 
service, to reduce output at a particular generator, or to increase output at another generator, 
the operators of those pieces of equipment would be required to comply with the orders from 
the system operator. Such real-time operating authority is necessary to ensure system security 
in the future, as in the past, although these services may be obtained in a market-based means. 
Providing for system adequacy, however, may be different in the future than in the past. For 
example, generation planning will be entirely different from its past practice. Historically, 
utilities planned for and built power plants to meet a predetermined reserve criterion, typically 
a I-day-in-10-years loss-of-Ioad probability or a minimum installed reserve margin. The 
regulator then determined the extent to which the utility would recover the costs of these 
generators through rates charged to the utility's retail customers. In addition, these costs were 
generally reflected in embedded-cost rates that did not vary from hour to hour. In the future, 
in a market-based model for providing adequate generation resources, decisions on retirement 
or repowering of existing generators and the construction of new units are likely to be made 
by investors with n1uch less regulatory involvement. Of course, governments will still oversee 
the siting and environmental consequences of these decisions. But with retail choice of 
generation suppliers, markets (investors and consumers), rather than economic regulators, will 
decide which supplies are needed and economical. 
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These decisions will be made on the basis of trends in market prices and proj ected revenues 
from the sale of electricity relative to the construction and operating costs of the unit in 
question. Generators will be built when projected market prices of electricity are high enough 
to yield a profit. Prices in the future are likely to vary from hour to hour throughout the year, 
based on the units in operation each hour and the balance between unconstrained demand and 
supply online. When demand begins to exhaust the available supply, prices will rise, 
sometimes sharply, which in tum will suppress demand and induce investment in new supply. 
Spot prices will stop rising only when constrained demand is brought down, supply is 
increased, or both. Although these spot prices are likely to be quite low for most hours, they 
may be very high for a few hours each year. It is the level, frequency, and duration of these 
high prices that will signal markets to build more generating capacity, rather than the 
decisions of planners in vertically integrated utilities. This price volatility will also signal 
customers on the benefits of managing their loads in real time. 
In electricity markets, customer response to real-time pricing signals could also help to 
improve reliability. High prices will encourage the construction of new generating units and 
the prompt restoration to service of existing units that are off-line. Similarly, with real-time 
price information, consumers can decide whether they want to conserve or reduce their usage 
at times of high prices. Together, these supply and demand responses to price will reduce the 
need to maintain expensive generating capacity that is only rarely used. Thus, economics can 
substitute for engineering to maintain real-time reliability when demand would otherwise 
exceed supply. The challenge of restructuring the electricity industry is to find an appropriate 
mix of economic' incentives and performance standards that maintain reliability at the lowest 
reasonable cost. 
1.3 The Deregulated Electricity Markets 
1.3.1 Market Models 
From the point of view of competition, in the product market, there are only four fundamental 
models of structuring the industry, although there are many possible variations on each. The 
four models correspond to varying degrees of monopoly, competition, and choice in the 
industry. 
• Model 1: monopoly at all levels. Generation is not subject to competition and no one has 
any choice of supplier. A single company has the monopoly of producing electricity and 
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delivering it over the transmission and distribution networks to final consumers. This is 
the model for traditional power industry. 
• Model 2: purchasing agency. A single buyer, which is the purchasing agency, chooses 
from a number of different generators to encourage competition in generation sector. 
Access to transmission grid is not permitted for sales to final consumers. The purchasing 
agency has a monopoly on transmission networks and on sales to final consumers. 
• Model 3: wholesale competition. Distribution or retail companies buy electricity directly 
from a producer and deliver it over transmission networks. But the distribution/retail 
companies still have a monopoly over final consumers. There is open access to 
transmission grid. 
• Model 4: retail competition. All consUlners can choose their suppliers. There is open 
access to transmission and distribution networks. The distribution is separate from the 
retail activity which is fully competitive. Most likely, this model is the world of the future 
of power industry. Retail competition makes the most competitive forces by bringing all 
final consumers into the market. However, it also greatly increases transaction costs due to 
requiring more complex trade arrangements and metering. 
The four models will lead to very different types of trading arrangements. A brief comparison 
between them is given in Table 1.1 
Table 1.1 Comparison between Four Fundamental Market Models 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Model of 
Electricity Market Monopoly Purchasing Wholesale Retail Agency Competition Competition 
Competition in X .,/ .,/ .,/ Generation Sector 
Choice for X X .,/ .,/ Retailers 
Choice for final X X X .,/ Consumers 
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1.3.2 Bilateral Markets versus Pool Markets 
In a wholesale competitive nlarket, there are two basic ways to arrange trades between buyers 
and sellers. They can make bilateral trades directly between one buyer and one seller, or they 
can trade through an intermediary. Both bilateral and mediated markets can have several 
variations, which are shown in Figure 1 !2. 
Less organized 
Search 
Bulletin-board 
Bilateral 
Models 
I Mediated 
Models 
More centralized 
Figure 1.2 Variations of bilateral and mediated market models 
Markets often use a nlixture of all these models. For example, the used car market is a Inixture 
of direct search, bulletin board, and dealer markets. The New York Stock Exchange is 
normally an exchange using an auction, but it beconles a dealer market when the market is 
thin. Here the tenn "pool" has a special meaning with regards to electricity markets. Before 
deregulation, some utilities have organized their production into "tight" power pools which 
used centralized dispatch. In a deregulated electricity market, a pool is an exchange in which 
the supply bids are complex and the ISO carries out a complex calculation to select winning 
bids. Auction is an important fornl of exchange and a simple method to implement 
competition. 
Exchanges and pools are more centralized while bilateral markets are less organized. An 
exchange can have a number of advantages over a bilateral market. It can reduce trading 
costs, increase competition, produce a publicly observable price and facilitate the detection of 
market power. Under sonle circumstances it Inay facilitate market collusion. On the other 
hand, a bilateral market can provide Inore flexibility than an exchange and it needs little 
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designing. Power Inarketers often favor bilateral markets because without an exchange there 
is more room for them to earn cOffilnission fees as brokers. 
Very often electricity markets can utilize both approaches. In real-time, organization is crucial 
and something like a pool is needed. Far in advance of real-time, there is no need for such 
coordination, and less organized markets can playa useful role. Of course, there will also be a 
place for centralized futures exchanges. The only real controversy is if the day-ahead market 
should be a pool, a bilateral market, or a set of private deal markets and exchanges. UK, P JM, 
and many other electricity markets adopted pool-based model as day-ahead markets while 
.. 
California adopted a combination of public exchange (Power Exchange) and private 
exchanges and dealers (Scheduling Coordinators). 
Different market models will have different market rules and behaviors. But due to the special 
characteristics of electric power as a commodity, at least a centralized dispatching function is 
necessary for the real-time operation. 
1.3.3 The Independent System Operator (ISO) and Its Functions 
Regardless of the market structures that may emerge in various parts of the world, one fact 
seems to be always true is that transmission and generation services will be unbundled from 
one another. The generation market will become fully competitive with many market 
participants who will be able to sell their energy services (or delnand side managen1ent). On 
the other hand, the operation of transmission system is expected to remain a regulated 
monopoly whose function is to allow open, non-discriminatory and comparable access to all 
suppliers and consumers of electrical energy. This function can be implemented by an entity 
called the Independent Systen1 Operator (ISO) [10, 14]. 
Although electricity Inarkets Inay have many different ISO designs and approaches all over 
the world, there are nonetheless elen1ents that are necessary to all types of ISOs in order to 
meet their common basic requirements. Basically, the ISO has responsibility for the reliability 
functions in its region of operation and for assuring that all the participants have open and 
nondiscriminatory access to transmission services through its planning and operation of the 
power translnission systeln. The ISO should conduct all of its functions in an ilnpartial 
n1anner so that all participants are treated equitably. The main functions of the ISO can be 
categorized into reliability-related functions and Inarket-related functions. 
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1.3.3.1 Reliability-Related Functions of the ISO 
The reliability-related functions include two aspects: 
• System operation and coordination. The ISO should perform system security monitoring 
functions and redispatch generation as necessary to eliminate real-time transmission 
congestion and to maintain system reliability, including taking all necessary emergency 
actions to maintain the security of the system in both normal and abnormal operating 
conditions. 
• Transmission planning and construction. The ISO should carry out reliability studies and 
planning activities in coordination with the transmission owners and other market 
participants to assure the adequacy of the transmission system. The ISO should publish 
data, studies and plans relating to the adequacy of the transmission system. Data might 
include locational congestion prices and planning studies that identify options for actions 
that might be taken to remedy reliability problems on the grid and cost data for some of 
these actions. 
1.3.3.2 Market-Related Functions of an ISO 
First of all, an ISO must be a market enabler with no commercial interest in the competitive 
generation market. The market-related functions of an ISO must be carried out according to 
transparent, understandable rules and protocols. The following operational functions are 
necessary to enable a competitive generation market: 
• Determine Available Transmission Capability (ATC) for all paths of interest within the 
ISO region. 
• Receive and process all requests for transmission service within and through the ISO 
region from all participants, including transmission owners. 
• 
• 
• 
Schedule all transactions it has approved. 
Operate or participate in an Open Access Same Time Information system (OASIS) for 
information publishing. 
Establish a clear ranking of transmission rights of all the participants on the ISO 
transmISSIon system. Facilitate trading of transmission rights on its grid among 
participants. 
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Manage transmission congestion in accordance with established rules and procedures for 
generation redispatch and its cost allocation. 
Assure the provision of ancillary services required to support all scheduled delivery 
transactions. 
• Market settlement and billing functions. 
The minimum functions of the ISO should include the operation and coordination of power 
system to ensure the security. In this case, a separate market operator (for example, the Power 
Exchange in California) is needed to perform the market-related functions. On the other hand, 
the maximum functions of the ISO will include all the reliability-related and Inarket-related 
functions mentioned above and in addition the ISO is the transmission owner (for example, 
the National Grid Company of UK). The functions of the ISO at various sizes and time scales 
are shown in Figure 1.3. 
Transmission planning 
/ 
Transmission Rights Allocation / .. . ··:.<c: .· ~.""·,, ., Energy Auction ... 
TransmlsslOll PriCIng •.. , : . ":i: .,: 
Market Information System ' 
Anciliary se.-vices Scheduling 
~EnCrgy futu~e 
Grid construction 
Transmission Owner 
Figure 1.3 Functions of the ISO at various sizes and time scales 
1.3.4 Electricity Spot Market and Pricing 
The wholesale electricity market, like any well-functioning commodity market, will include 
diverse cOlnmercial and financial arrangements, including contracts of various types and 
duration, vertical integration where allowed, short-term trading and so on. The core of these 
conunercial arrangelnents will be a spot market in which physical electricity is priced and 
traded. A spot Inarket will be developed for any commodity. However, the special 
characteristics of electricity increase the ilnportance of the spot market in designing a 
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framework to support competition. According to Hogan [13], A spot market in electricity has 
two principal functions: 
• Maintain efficient short-term operation. A spot market coordinates short-term 
operations of separately owned entities to assure that demand is met economically and 
reliably given the production facilities actually available on the day, largely independent 
of longer-term contract arrangements. 
• Facilitate long-term contracts. A spot market reduces the risks of long-term contracts by 
allowing participants to buy and sell adjustments to n1eet their obligations at least cost or 
highest profits. 
An electricity spot market can work much like any other wholesale markets in which buyers 
and sellers make bids and offers, determine the prices at which supply equals demand and 
trade the product at those prices. Some special market arrangements are needed to deal with 
the special characteristics of electricity. The basic model of electricity spot market can be 
fOffi1ulated as a bid-based security-constrained economic dispatch problem. 
The system n1arginal price in the spot market can be obtained at the market clearing point or 
market equilibrium, which is the intersect of the generation bidding curve and demand 
bidding curve. According to Schweppe's theory of spot pricing, generally speaking the 
locationallnarginal price (LMP) or nodal spot price consists of three components: the system 
Inarginal price, losses-related price and congestion-related price, shown in Figure 1.4. 
Figure 1.4 Three components of locational marginal price in the spot market 
1.3.5 Market Power 
The econOlnic definition of market power is "the ability to alter profitably prices away from 
cOlnpetitive levels". The competitive price level is implicitly assumed to be the price level if 
both the supply and delnand side of the market behaved cOlnpetitively. When exercised on the 
supply side, market power is called monopoly power, while on the demand side, it is called 
Inonopsony power. The econon1ic definition covers both. To know if the market price has 
been raised it is necessary to have a standard for the normal price, which is the cOlnpetitive 
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equilibrium price. This is consistent because this equilibrium is defined in terms of "price 
taking" firms, who take the market price as unalterable and so do not try to affect it. A simple 
example of market power caused generation withholding is given in Figure 1.5. The market 
power leads to the market price Pm higher than the competitive price pc which equals the 
marginal cost. 
The primary inefficiency caused by market power is not productive inefficiency but 
inefficiency of consumption. Consumers could buy less because market power raises price 
above marginal cost, so consequently they under consume. Of course the primary concern 
with market power is not inefficiency but simply the transfer of income from consumers to 
producers caused by the higher price. 
Insufficient transnlission can cause bottlenecks and local market power while additional 
transmission can expand the size of the market and reduce market power. On the other hand, 
well-designed transmission congestion management can limit the market power. 
Price 
Generation 
Bids ..,."" 
Marginal cost 
Pm 
Pc 
Pm Pc Max capacity MW 
"-y-' 
Monopoly withholding 
Figure 1.5 Example of market power caused by monopoly generation withholding 
1.3.4 New Requirement on Software Systems in Electricity Markets 
New software systems are needed for generators, retailers, the ISO and other nlarket 
participants to meet the operating, scheduling, planning, and financial requirements in the 
emerging competitive market enviromnent. For example, generation companies may need 
new bidding systems to decide their bidding strategies and to conununicate their bidding 
infornlation with the Inarket operator; the retailers and distribution companies may need new 
billing systems and new load managelnent system to meet the time varying spot prices. 
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The most complex requirement on software systen1s will come from the ISO, who is in charge 
of the secure operation of the power system and may even run a few markets for energy 
auction, ancillary services procurement, and transmission rights auction, etc. Historically, the 
main software system in the control center of power system is the well-known Energy 
Management System (EMS), which consists of four major elements [16]: 
• Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), including data acquisition, control, 
alarm processing, online topology processor, etc. 
• Generation scheduling and control applications, including Automatic Generation Control 
(AGC), Economic Dispatch (ED), Unit Commitment (UC), hydrothermal coordination, 
short term load forecast, interchange scheduling, etc. 
• Network analysis application, including topology processor, state estimator, power flow, 
contingency analysis, Optimal Power Flow (OPF), security enhancement, voltage and 
reactive power optimization, stability analysis, etc. 
• Dispatch Training Simulator (DTS), including all the three above components but in a 
separate off-line environment. 
The EMS is still needed by the ISO in the electricity market, but SOlne of its functions will 
change to meet the new requirement [17]. For example, some generation scheduling 
applications might be removed or redesigned to be something like energy Inarket trading 
applications while some other network analysis application, like OPF, should be extended to 
be able to perform new functions. DTS is also facing significant changes. It must include all 
the market applications and power system applications. 
Besides EMS, son1e new software systen1s will be needed in the ISO [18]. These new systems 
may include: 
• Market long-term planning subsystem, including applications like a plan for future 
translnission expansion, long-term A TC determination, maintenance of transmission 
facilities, etc. This subsystem needs coordination between the ISO and transmission 
owners; 
• Market trading subsystem, including all the possible functions associated with market 
adn1inistration roles of the ISO or a separate market operator. These functions could be a 
day-ahead energy auction to Inatch supply offers and delnand bids (a spot market), 
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electricity futures trading, ancillary services procurement, transmission rights auction, 
etc.; 
_______ 1 
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Figure 1.6 Overview of software systems in the competitive electricity market 
• Market operation planning subsystem, including power system scheduling function, short-
term ATC determination, short-run transmission related services pricing, congestion 
management, etc.; 
• Market real-time dispatching subsystem, including power system dispatch function, 
system balancing, real-time ATC determination, real-time congestion Inanagement, etc.; 
• Market settlement and billing subsystem, determining deviations from the schedules and 
bilateral contracts, determining payments to suppliers and ancillary services providers, 
determining payments to financial instrument holders; 
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Market information subsystem. All ISOs are expected to provide a system of open 
communication for information related to power system operations. In the US, some of 
this information will be published on the FERC mandated OASIS. The Information that 
would assist with the efficiency and security of system operation should include: system 
information on transmission congestion, locational market clearing prices, need and bid 
for ancillary services and their prices, and all applicable ATCs, etc. 
These new software subsystems are linked tightly with each other and must coordinate with 
the existing systems in the control room to support the implementation of electricity market. 
Therefore, besides the development of new applications, there are still enormous works on 
software system integration to be done. An overview of possible software systems in the 
competitive market environment and the relationship between them are given in Figure 1.6. 
1.3.5 Contents of the Thesis 
The thesis first reviews existing approaches to transmission congestion management and 
existing methodologies for OPF. Using extended OPF techniques, the thesis is to develop 
efficient market-based methods for congestion management in different time scales. The 
contents of the thesis are described in more detail in this section. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the transmission sector and its congestion management in electricity 
markets. Some important issues about the transmission sector in the deregulated environment 
are analyzed, including the physical transmission limits which may cause congestion, the 
impact of transmission congestion, the role of the ISO in congestion relief, and a brief review 
of transmission pricing methods. Three fundamental methodologies for congestion 
management are discussed in detail and then an overall congestion management approach is 
suggested. To price transmission congestion correctly, the Locational Marginal Price (LMP) 
is recommended while other alternatives are also introduced. To hedge the price risks brought 
about by congestion the Financial Transmission Rights (FTR) are introduced. At the end of 
this chapter, a comparison of market models and congestion management approaches between 
five typical electricity markets in the world is presented. 
In Chapter 3, a general fonnulation of OPF problem is introduced with various objective 
functions, constraints and control variables. The existing methodologies for OPF solution are 
reviewed briefly. They are classified into five categories: gradient method, quadratic 
progranllning method, Newton-based method, linear programming method, and interior point 
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method. Then the conventional applications of OPF and OPF's potential roles in deregulated 
electricity markets are discussed respectively. Since interior point linear programming and 
quadratic programming are used in this thesis to solve extended OPF problems, the general 
procedure of successive linear progralnming method for OPF is presented and a brief 
description of the second order primal-dual predictor-corrector method for interior point linear 
and quadratic programming is given. 
Chapter 4 proposes a framework for real-time coordinated optimal dispatch in electricity 
markets, which includes two main tasks: system balancing and congestion management. The 
real-time balancing market is the core of the framework. Various contracts, such as bilateral 
contracts, pool energy contracts,· and ancillary services contracts, can submit their adjustnlent 
bids to the balancing market for real-time dispatching. A modified P-Q decoupled OPF is 
appled to solve this problem. Real-titne pricing for system balancing and congestion 
management is also analyzed. The comparison between Primal-Dual Interior Point Linear 
Programming (PDIPLP) and Revised Simplex Linear Programming (RSLP) shows that the 
PDIPLP is Inuch more efficient to deal with large systems with huge number of control 
variables. 
Chapter 5 particularly deals with the real-titne congestion management problem across 
multiple interconnected regions. Since each regional ISO cannot obtain the full network 
operating data of other regions, one of the main difficulties is how to implement the 
congestion management coordinatedly without a huge amount of information exchange 
between regions. A new approach is proposed to decompose an OPF problem by applying 
Augmented Lagrangian Relaxation (LR) in order to implement the multi-regional active 
power 'congestion ll1anagement under the framework presented in Chapter 4. Using this 
approach, it can be ilnplelnented as an iterative procedure. The ISO of each region does not 
need to know any information of other regions but the corresponding Lagrangian multipliers, 
thus the dispatching independence of the ISO is preserved. Optimal transaction prices on all 
the interconnecting lines are the by-product of the multi-regional congestion nlanagement. 
In Chapter 6, short-term congestion management during the scheduling of the spot market is 
discussed. Some new individual revenue adequacy constraints are introduced into the typical 
spot Inarket dispatch model to produce a nlore reasonable result for bilateral contract delivery 
under a transmission congestion situation. First, the basic nlodel of optinlal dispatch in the 
spot Inarket and the fundanlental of Locational Marginal Pricing theory are presented. In 
particular, the ilnpact of lilnits of bus generation and load on nodal prices are emphasised 
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from the analysis of different forms of nodal price. The concepts of two pure financial 
instruments, Contracts for Differences (CfDs) and Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) and 
how they work together to hedge against price risks are analyzed. A new dispatch model with 
individual revenue adequacy constraints is proposed to mitigate congestion using the natural 
incentive of market participants. This complex problem with dual variables in constraints of 
the primal problem can be solved by an iterative procedure. 
Chapter 7 describes the optimal FTR auction model as a long-term congestion management 
approach. A new method is proposed to incorporate some FACTS devices into the FTR 
optimal auction model to enlarge the transfer capability of the existing network by eliminating 
the parallel flow and loop flow problems. The objective of this auction model is to maximize 
the revenues from transmission grid use. Two types of series FACTS devices, which are 
Thyristor Controlled Series Compensators (TCSC) and Thyristor Controlled Phase Shifters 
(TCPS) are modeled into the proposed FTR auction with Power Injection Model. Interior 
Point Linear Programming is applied to solve this optimization problem. The solution of this 
FTR optimal auction consists of the feasible sold FTRs and their prices and the optimal 
control parameters of FACTS devices. 
In Chapter 8 the main conclusions of the thesis are presented, and proposals for the future 
work are made. 
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Chapter 2. Transmission Congestion Management in 
Electricity Markets 
2.1 Introduction 
Transmission network plays a key role in making the competitive electricity market work. 
The flrst important step of power industry restructuring is the transmission open access. 
Transmission services have been unbundled as separate businesses from generation. However 
regarded as a natural monopoly, the transmission sector remains more or less regulated to 
permit a competitive environment for generation and retail services. The operating and 
planning of transmission network and the pricing of the transmission services are still retained 
as challenges on both theoretical and practical aspects in the development of electricity 
markets. 
Transmission Congestion is deflned as the condition where there is insufflcient transmission 
capability to simultaneously implement all preferred transactions in electricity markets. 
Unlike many other commodities, electricity can not be stored easily, and the delivery of 
electricity is constrained by some physical transmission limits which have to be satisfled all 
the time to keep the operating security of the power system. Without transmission limits, the 
deregulation of the power industry would be much easier. Therefore, congestion management 
is a major function of any type of ISOs in any type of electricity markets. It is so important 
that if not implemented properly it can impose a big barrier to trading electricity. 
The purpose of this chapter is to present an overall review and a discussion about the 
transmission congestion management in electricity markets. First, some important issues 
about transmission sector in the deregulated environment are analyzed, including the physical 
transmission limits which may cause congestion, the impact of transmission congestion, the 
role of the ISO in congestion relief, and a brief review of transmission pricing methods. Then, 
three fundamental methodologies for congestion management are discussed in detail and an 
overall congestion management approach is suggested. To price transmission congestion 
correctly, the Locational Marginal Price (LMP) is recommended while other alternatives are 
also introduced. To hedge the price risks brought about by congestion the Financial 
Translnission Rights (FTR) are introduced. Then, a comparison of market models and 
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congestion management approaches between several typical electricity markets in the world is 
presented. Finally, a brief literature survey on congestion management is presented. 
2.2 Transmission in Electricity Markets 
2.2.1 Transmission System 
Historically, vertically integrated electric utilities designed and operated integrated 
transmission and generation systems. The primary historical transmission function was to 
connect the utility's generators to the utility's customers and to operate the system reliably. 
Utilities interconnected their transmission systems with other utilities' systems to increase 
reliability and share reserves, as well as take advantage of economic exchanges. When 
transmission congestion required generation to be redispatched to support reliability or 
economic transactions, the utility was able to evaluate generation and transmission 
implications (and even occasionally load-reduction options) in both a real-time basis and for 
long-term planning purposes, if needed. A solution for new transmission facilities, based on 
current conditions as well as expectations for load growth and future electricity prices and 
availability, could be developed and presented to the regulator for approval, subject to a 
number of constraints relating to siting and cost issues. The selected strategy could then be 
implelnented and the costs passed on to customers. Investment decisions were made by 
utilities and regulators with prudent investment and operational costs borne by customers. 
As competition is introduced through power industry reforms around the world, transmission 
assumes new strategic importance in supporting market trading between individual buyers and 
sellers. However, despite the widespread experience of restructuring during the past decade, 
important issues remain open about the best way to operate transmission to support reliability 
management and market trading. With the development of a competitive power market, there 
are more and more bilateral transactions which could stress the existing transmission network 
heavily. It nlakes the transmission congestion management one of the toughest problelTIs in 
electricity nlarket design and operation. 
2.2.2 Physical Transmission Limits 
To design an efficient congestion management approach, the possible causes for transmission 
congestion should be investigated first. Transmission limits are conlplex but there are at least 
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the following physical transmission limits that should be of concern in congestion 
management. 
• 
• 
Thermal limits - Power flow causes a loss of electrical power which heats power lines 
and causes the line sag. Beyond a certain temperature the overloaded line will be 
permanently damaged. It is caused not only by real power flow but also by reactive power 
flow. 
Voltage magnitude limits - Voltage constraints defme operating bounds which can limit 
the amount of power flowing on transmission lines. Voltage constraints inevitably require 
attention to both the real and reactive power loads and transfers in the AC transmission 
system. Consumption of reactive power tends to make the voltage sag. Often this must be 
corrected by injecting reactive power locally because reactive power is not easily 
transmitted over long distances. 
• Stability limits on power lines - Power flows through AC power lines because the 
voltage at the generator end reaches its maximum slightly ahead of the voltage at the load 
end. The amount by which the generation voltage is ahead is called the "phase angle." 
Beyond 90 degrees, power flow decreases and becomes completely unstable. This is the 
line's physical stability limit. Angle stability can be classified into two categories: small-
signal stability, which is the ability of the system to maintain synchronism under a small 
disturbance; transient stability, which is the ability to maintain synchronism when 
subjected to a severe transient disturbance [180]. 
• Voltage stability limits - Voltage stability is the ability of a power system to maintain 
steady acceptable voltages at all buses in the system under normal conditions or after 
being subjected to a disturbance [180]. The main factor causing voltage instability is the 
inability of the power system to meet the denland for reactive power. The heart of the 
problem is usually the voltage drop that occurs when active power and reactive power 
flow through inductive reactance associated with the transmission grid. 
Besides the four physical limits listed above, contingency constraints should also be 
considered for transmission congestion. Contingency constraints are a fundamental element of 
economy-security control. Contingency analysis identifies potential emergencies through 
extensive "what if?" sinlulations on the power systelTI network. A more conservative 
estimation of transmission capability will be obtained after considering the post-contingency 
constraints [50]. 
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In the research of this thesis, only the first two types of limits are considered in the congestion 
management. 
The above physical transmission limits decide the Total Transfer Capability (TTC) and the 
Available Transfer Capability (ATC), which is very important system information to be 
published in any electricity market. According to the definitions in [19], TTC determines the 
amount of electric power that can be transferred over the interconnected transmission network 
in a reliable manner based on the following conditions. For the. existing or planning system 
configuration, and with normal (pre-contingency) operating procedures in effect, all facility 
loadings must be within normal ratings and all voltages must be within normal limits. The 
electric systems must be capable of absorbing the dynamic over swings, and remain stable, 
following a disturbance that results in the loss of any single electric system element, such as a 
transmission line, transformer, or generating unit. With this very general definition, the TTC 
is a function of systen1 thermal, voltage, and stability limits and is given by 
TTC = min {thermal limits, voltage limits, angle stability limits, voltage stability limits}. 
Transmission Reliability Margin (TRM) is the amount of transfer capacity necessary to ensure 
that the interconnected transmission network is secure under a reasonable range of system 
conditions. This measure reflects the effect of various sources of uncertainty in the system and 
in system operating conditions. Capacity Benefit Margin (CBM) is the amount of transfer 
capability reserved by load-serving entities to ensure access to generation from interconnected 
neighboring systems to meet generation reliability requirements. 
A TC is then defined to be a measure of transfer capability remaInIng In the physical 
transmission network for further cOIDlTIercial activity over and above already committed uses: 
ATC = TTC - TRM - CBM - existing transmission commitments. 
The A TC information should be calculated and posted for the next hour, month, and for the 
following 12 months. 
2.2.3 Transmission Congestion 
In the absence of congestion and operational reliability problems, there is no need to invest in 
transmission expansion; the existing systelTI is adequate to handle all desired transactions on a 
reliable basis. In theory, such a system can allow for a minimum-cost dispatch of generation 
and load curtailn1ent. Congestion results when there is a desire, for either reliability or 
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commercial reasons, to move more power through a transmission line (or an interface) than 
the transmission line ( or interface) can accommodate. A consequence of a congested interface 
is that it creates a bottleneck which prohibits delivery of economic energy supplies to 
consumers on the high-cost side of the bottleneck. This means that these consumers pay more 
for their power than they would if there was sufficient transmission capacity to carryall 
economic transactions. In other words, energy costs are genuinely location dependent, given 
transmission constraints. 
Presuming that congestion results in economic inefficiencies, the option to relieve congestion 
through transmission enhancements is desirable where cost-effective. In any particular 
circumstance, there are usually several alternatives to relieve congestion and the goal should 
be to devise systems of incentives that produce cost-effective means to reduce such 
congestion where it is economical to do so. From the respect of planning side, effective relief 
methods can include installation and/or operation of large or small scale generation in the 
congested area for energy production, for voltage support, to enhance stability, or to reduce 
flows on specific lines. Transmission-based solutions can include construction of new lines or 
facilities, upgrading of lines or facilities, installation of voltage support (capacitors, inductors, 
voltage regulating transformers, static condensers, or static V Ar compensators), or installation 
of flow-control devices (phase angle regulators or FACTS devices), and power system 
stabilizers at generating stations. The technologies allow more power to be delivered over a 
line or to operate the system more reliably. Load management approaches (including bidding 
interruptible load in response to different market clearing prices) can also provide congestion 
relief under certain circumstances. The incentives (and moreover, disincentives) for a 
particular type of relief depend on various e"conomic, technical, informational, and regulatory 
elements. 
2.2.4 ISO and Congestion Relief 
As discussed in Chapter 1, ISO has been proposed as a way to facilitate competitive 
generation markets in an environment where some power-system facilities and functions 
remain inherently monopolistic. Where ISOs have been established as the means to assure 
non-discriminatory access to transmission for all generators in a region's wholesale (and 
retail) power markets, functions that require allocation of existing scarce monopoly resources, 
such as existing translnission capacity, mnong competing parties in an agreed manner should 
be under the control of the ISO. With market rules in place an ISO can then determine how 
best to operate the transmission system to reliably accommodate as many users as possible on 
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a non-discriminatory basis, and allow competitive markets to function. Congestion 
management can be designed that solicit and select among generation redispatch, demand-
side solutions, or transaction curtailment as ways of dealing with specific congestion, both on 
a long-term planning basis and in real-time operational markets. 
Two fundamental problems arise, however, when trying to decide whether it is desirable to 
make capital investments of one sort or another to alleviate congestion. The first problenl is 
that there is no agreement on the appropriate way to price "use-of-transmission" from the 
point of view of creating efficient price signals for investment (generation) or use (demand). 
The second problem is that competing options for relieving congestion operate in different 
. markets with different structures: generation and demand-side solutions operate primarily in 
competitive markets, while transmission remains largely a regulated monopoly service. When 
a generator is selling into both a competitive and a regulated market, it is difficult to 
unambiguously detennine the appropriate allocation of costs between those markets and to 
establish appropriate incentives for efficient investments (or product substitution) in those 
markets. Uncertainty may lead to under investment. 
The ISO should conduct planning and implementation for transmission enhancement, much as 
vertically integrated utilities do today and provide congestion-based signals so that markets 
might resolve congestion-related problems through market forces. 
An ISO would identify constraints where congestion was likely to impact reliability. It could 
then take a variety of actions. It might ask the local transmission company to build 
transmission, or it might request proposals to construct and/or own the needed facility. It 
Inight share pricing and other planning information with other market participants. The ISO 
nlight request proposals for solutions. Proposals could be generation, transmission or load 
based. The ISO could select the least-cost solution for the overall system and would support 
approval from the appropriate regulatory authority for investments made by others (e.g., 
generation developers or translnission owners), the requestor of firm transmission service that 
caused the need for new transmission enhancements, or the ISO itself. The solution could be 
implemented and the costs could be included in overall transmission rates. 
An ISO would also provide congestion-related pricing signals to transmission users when 
allocating access across constrained interfaces and through settlements on contracts following 
implenlentation of Ineasures to relieve reliability constraints. Transmission capacity 
constraints would be based upon reliability criteria and transmission loading. Market 
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participants themselves could decide whether and when to propose transmission investments. 
In the absence of investment, any resource which is fully interconnected with firm 
transmission rights would enjoy priority service during periods of congestion. 
2.2.5 Transmission Pricing 
Transmission pricing can be complex since electricity does not travel along predetermined 
paths that respect the terms of a supply contract. Power flows along the path of least 
resistance. In an integrated network, this means that power may flow through many parallel 
paths according to network status which can change from one moment to another and which is 
influenced by all users of the network. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as parallel 
flows. Parallel flows can cause increased losses and congestion. 
In order to reflect transmission costs and' network externalities correctly, transmission costs 
can be separated into three distinct components: sunk transmission costs, variable 
transmission costs (losses and congestion), and new investment recovery costs [1]. There are 
two main categories of charging structures - historical cost charging and marginal cost 
charging [3]. Historical cost mechanisms base prices on costs that have already occurred and 
include postage stamp pricing, contract path pricing, and megawatt-kilometer pricing [22]. 
Postage stamp pricing is the simplest approach and is based on the simple division of total 
network cost by total connected load. This yields a price that is based on the premise that the 
network provides similar service to all users. Congestion and loss costs would be charged to 
all users on a load-ratio share basis. Contract path pricing is similar to postage stamp but only 
uses the total cost of assets along the path between producer and consumer. The contract path 
approach does not take into account loop flows resulting in inefficiency problems. The 
megawatt-kilometer pricing method is based on the assumption that the length of the 
transmission route and the amount of power transmitted provide a reasonable proxy for 
transmission cost including losses and congestion. 
There are two marginal cost approaches in use - incremental cost related pricing [22] and 
Locational Marginal Pricing [20, 23]. The incremental cost related pricing approach calculates 
transmission costs by comparing total system costs before and after the transaction. The 
calculated costs could include or exclude investment costs associated with the transaction. 
LMP also known as Nodal Spot Pricing, was first proposed by Schweppe et al [1] and further , 
developed by Hogan [13][14]. The LMP approach is used in the United States, New Zealand 
and Australia. LMP is based on the theory of optimal electricity pricing: the efficient spot 
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price for energy delivered at a given electrical node should be the sum of (a) marginal energy 
cost at the swing bus, (b) marginal line loss, and (c) marginal congestion cost of transmission. 
As (a) is identical at all nodes, the efficient transmission rate should capture (b) and (c). If 
there is no transmission congestion, all nodes would pay the same energy cost plus marginal 
line losses. When congestion occurs, higher cost generation may have to be substituted for 
lower cost generation that would otherwise be used. Under the LMP approach, energy pricing 
would differ from place to place whenever congestion occurs, reflecting the real-time 
marginal cost of supplying energy at each point on the network. The energy price difference 
between two nodes can be considered to be the marginal congestion cost of transmission. 
It is widely recognized that marginal cost pricing will not recover the total revenue 
requirement of the transmission owners [21, 23]. Therefore, a common approach is to use a 
postage stamp charge in addition to marginal cost pricing. 
2.3 General Methodologies for Congestion Management 
Different market structures and market rules lead to different methods for congestion 
management [33, 34]. Basically, a proper approach for resolving transmission congestion in 
competitive electricity markets should at least have the following features: 
• Fair and non-discriminatory. For the same service, different users should pay the same 
price and should be treated equally. 
• Economically efficient. Individual behaviors of generation, demand and transmission 
operators should lead to the system optimum through relevant incentives, which could 
involve cost-reflective charges. 
• Transparent and non-ambiguous. The whole congestion management process should be 
clear to every market participant and should have enough consideration to prevent market 
gaming. Moreover, simplicity is also essential for all the players to understand the rules. 
• Feasible. Congestion management process must always have a feasible solution to 
maintain the system reliability. 
• Compatible with various types of contracts. The contracts will include contracts in spot 
market, real-time balancing market, ancillary services market and contracts in short-
term/long-term bilateral markets. 
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There are at least two main purposes for the transmission congestion management: 
• 
• 
Adjust the preferred transactions to keep the power system operating within its security 
limits; 
Collect congestion charge from market participants and pay it to transmission grid owners 
to compensate their investment on the grid. 
In this section, three fundamental methods for congestion management will be discussed in 
detail. They are transaction curtailment, transmission capacity reservation, and system 
redispatch. 
2.3.1 Transaction Curtailment 
The operation of an electricity market requires sufficient information about generation and 
loads within each control area as well as between theln in both day-ahead and real-time 
periods. Without this infonllation the ISO can not inform market participants of the possible 
transmission constraints and can not apply curative actions. The published TTC and ATC is 
the minimum infonnation which is required for market actors to evaluate the risks of seeing 
their transaction curtailed. A TC summarizes complex information and in many cases it nlay 
be ambiguous infonnation, although A TC is based on a clear definition. Therefore, an over-
silnplified use of this concept could lead to misunderstanding of market participants. 
Furthemlore, to help market agents manage the risk of transaction curtailment, A TC 
pUblication could include statistical uncertainty of published values and some other dependent 
information. 
This Inethod needs a set of priority rules to curtail transactions when the A TC values are 
reached. The three common rules are as follows: 
• Pro rata rationing. In this rule no real priority is defined. All transactions are carried out 
but the ISO curtails them in case of congestion according to the ratio: existing 
capacity/requested capacity. This rule is transparent but brings the participants to an 
economically inefficient use of the system. 
• Contribution based on physical flow. The ISO calculates the contribution of each 
transaction to the congestion to define its priority. The relative contribution to a 
transaction is the ratio between the flow induced by the transaction on the congested line 
and the volume of the transaction. The transactions will be curtailed in accordance with 
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this rank till congestion disappears. This rule is also transparent, but it is not a market-
based method. Its long term efficiency is not ensured, because this physical contribution 
factor varies with topology, generation and load patterns. 
Willing-la-pay. Transactions submit a price signal to the ISO to show how much they are 
willing to pay to ameliorate translnission curtailment imposed by the ISO during 
congestion period [35]. The ISO picks out some transactions to curtail starting from the 
one with the lowest will-to-pay bid price. It is a market-based rule for transaction 
curtailment, because it cOlnplies with the principle of "allocating the transmission capacity 
to the users who value it most highly". However, this method may not be efficient for 
curtailment against published A TC. More likely, it will be combined with some other 
congestion management approaches. 
With published ATC values and submitted demands for transmission services, the ISO can 
reject transactions that would cause overloads with a priority rule. One advantage of this 
curtailment method is that no additional costs are incurred, and therefore there is no cost 
allocation mechanism. The main drawback is that transaction curtailment based on A TC 
publication does not convey any economic incentive to the ISO, generators, retailers, or final 
consumers, and therefore does not promote efficient trade. 
2.3.2 Transmission Capacity Reservation 
When transmission becomes a scarce resource in the electricity markets, a natural approach to 
deal with transmission congestion is to allocate the limited transmission capacity in advance 
to the users who value it best [37]. Auction could be the basic market mechanism for 
transmission capacity reservation. In a transmission rights auction market, each transmission 
user submits a price for use of transmission. The bids are selected from the highest one to the 
lowest one until the capacity is completely used up. The clearing price of transmission market 
is calculated and all the participants pay at this price. In some circumstances, the counter-
flowing transactions should get paid since they make a contribution to relieve the congestion. 
The auction is efficient regarding competition. The bids reflect exactly the real market value 
as perceived by participants while the highest priority for access is granted to the one who is 
ready to pay the highest price. This method allows integrating long-term contracts with 
bilateral markets or even spot n1arkets. On the other hand, auction ilnplies supplementary 
complexity when a transaction is involved in more than one congestion or when parallel flows 
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are important. In these cases, transmission users will have to make bids for each bilateral 
transaction. 
The other alternative for transmission capacity reservation is the "first come, first served" 
method. The first reservation made for a given period of time has priority over the following 
reservations. This method encourages participants to make longer forecasts. Thus, it allows 
better and sooner security assessment for the ISO who knows accurately the volume of 
exchanges in advance. However, this method may not leave enough room for short-term 
trading, which is a requirement to ensure the success of market dynamics. This method is well 
suited for bilateral trades, but fails to provide an efficient priority mechanism for day-ahead or 
real-time pool transactions. 
2.3.3 System Redispatch 
System redispatch occurs when a central operator directs generation adjustlnents (incremental 
or decremental) to relieve congestion and avoid undesired transaction interruptions [35,36]. 
The cost of these adjustments may be allocated to the responsible participants with established 
tariff or shared equally among all the participants. This allows the transmission users to "buy 
through" the congestion without the need to enter into contracts with other parties for the 
redispatch. Financial instruments may be developed to provide transmission users with the 
opportunity to hedge against the possible high cost of congestion management. 
System redispatch is a real-time centralized method for congestion managelnent. It is 
necessary because the bulk power transmission grid is highly dynamic and predicting 
constraints well ahead of time is therefore difficult. The main advantage of this method is that 
due to the centralized nature of the dispatch, no delay occurs between the identification of a 
constraint and the implementation of redispatch to control the constraint. However, employing 
a bid-based auction makes it a market-based system, the congestion management is therefore 
accomplished based on market participants' offers and their indicated willing to buy through 
congestion to protect their transactions. 
Almost all the market participants can have their contribution in system redispatch. 
• Generators. Generators submit incrementaVdecremental adjustment bids to the ISO. The 
generators selected by the ISO to relieve transmission congestion will get paid for their 
contributions. 
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Consumers. Some adjustable loads can also provide redispatch service and make profit 
from it. Demand elasticity against spot price signals is an efficient way to alleviate 
congestion. 
Transmission companies. Many transmission devices, like transformers, FACTS devices, 
and reactors/capacitors, can be controlled by the ISO to eliminate congestion. 
Conventionally, these actions are regarded as free resources for system security. However, 
in a competitive market environment, they need to be priced properly to encourage 
transmission companies to improve the power grid. 
Power marketers. Power markets can adjust their transactions according to the ISO's 
redispatch commands. 
2.3.4 Overall Congestion Management Process 
In the real world in order to efficiently manage transmission congestion, market participants 
must have freedom to engage in various mechanisms to protect their business. The best 
solution might always be a conlbination of several of the basic methods for different time 
scales. In general, the overall transmission congestion management process, which is shown 
in Figure 2.1, could consist of three major steps: 
(1) Long-tenn transmission capacity reservation. The reservation of transmission capacity can 
be made yearly, monthly, weekly, or even daily. The latest stop time for transmission 
capacity auction should be no later than the morning of day-ahead. Users can obtain the 
translnission rights fronl the ISO through a centralized auction or exchange them through 
a secondary bilateral market. The transmission rights could be either physical or financial. 
After obtaining transmission rights, market participants can create new or revise existing 
bilateral transactions. 
(2) Short-ternl scheduling in day-ahead spot market. The day-ahead schedules are made with 
consideration of translnission constraints. The input data will include all the signed 
bilateral contracts and all the generation offers and demand bids in the spot market. Some 
bilateral contracts Inight be curtailed if congestion occurs. 
(3) Real-tilne redispatch in real-time balancing Inarket. Because of unpredictable events and 
fluctuating loads, even after the two previous steps, transmission congestion may still 
occur during the real-time operation of the market. A centralized balancing mechanism is 
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needed to relieve the real-time congestion problems. Although the real-time redispatch is 
also a market-bas~d method, the ISO can take any mandatory actions to maintain the 
system security in emergent cases. 
Bilateral 
Market 
Transmission 
Capacity Reservation 
Long-term 
Schedule with 
Transmission 
Constraints 
Short-term 
Figure 2.1 Overall congestion management process 
2.4 Congestion Pricing 
Real-time 
Balancing 
Market 
Redispatch 
Real-time 
Efficient congestion management needs a transparent commodity market, which must include 
an appropriate pricing approach. Although the costs imposed by congestion in an efficiently 
run system are quite low, badly designed congestion pricing can make the system 
unmanageable. This was proven by Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection 
(PJM) just before the official opening of its market when it instituted a form of average-cost 
congestion pricing that resulted in massive gaming of the pricing rules. According to FERC's 
Order2000 [27], a congestion pricing approach should seek to ensure that 
(1) the generators that are dispatched in the presence of transmission constraints are those 
who serve system load at least cost, and 
(2) limited transmission capacity is used by market participants that value the use most 
highly. 
Congestion pricing is an important part of transmission pricing. Some transmission pricing 
methods can be used to price congestion. In electricity markets, congestion pricing will be 
competitive pricing. The Locational Marginal Pricing approach is advocated by a number of 
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researchers and has been put into practice in PJM power market. The locational marginal 
prices are typically calculated as dual variables or Lagrangian Multipliers from Optimal 
Power Flow (OPF) or security-constrained economic dispatch. With LMP, the security-
constrained economic dispatch can produce prices for energy at each location of the system, 
incorporating the combined effect of generation, losses and congestion. The corresponding 
transmission price between location where power is supplied and where it is consumed can be 
determined as the difference between the energy prices at the two locations. Therefore the 
same framework is easily extended to include bilateral transactions. On the other hand, with 
LMP, the ISO coordinates the dispatch and provides price information for settlements through 
a bid-based economic dispatch. 
Under LMP, transmission users are assessed congestion charges consistent with their actual 
use of the system and actual redispatch amount that their transactions cause. This also 
provides an economic option to non-firm transmission users to self-curtail their use of the 
transmission system or pay congestion charges determined by the market. 
The accurate LMP signals for investment to reduce congestion may become even more 
important as distributed generation presents opportunities for small-scale, fine-tuned (with 
respect to both size and location) generation investn1ents to eliminate the transmission 
congestion, in place of large-scale transmission or generation investments. 
In addition, LMP can facilitate the creation of financial transmission rights, which enable 
users to pay known transmission rates and to hedge against potential high congestion charges. 
This will be discussed in detail in the following section. 
Although there is only one set of efficient congestion prices -which are set by the LMP 
approach, there are some other approaches that would in theory give these same prices, or a 
good approximation of them. Wu and Varaiya proposed the most extreme alternative to LMP 
[32]. In their "multi-lateral" approach, the systen1 operator would have no knowledge of the 
congestion prices. It would sitnply assign certain parties the right to use lines in a "reasonable 
but arbitrary way" that would prevent overuse of the lines. These parties would then either 
exercise their rights by using the lines or they would sell their rights to those who valued the 
lines more. If it worked efficiently as a con1petitive market, the market would then produce 
the exact same prices for the use of congested lines as the system operator would compute 
under LMP. 
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Congestion prices make money. The ISO charges users of transmission for a scarce resource, 
and this always has a positive value. The revenues collected are called the congestion rent. 
Because congestion prices are the same under any efficient system, so is the congestion rent. 
Under LMP, the system operator collects the congestion rent. Under the multi-lateral 
approach, some private party will collect these rents. This is at the heart of the controversy. 
2.5 Transmission Rights: Financial versus Physical 
Transmission rights are fundamental to an efficient design of competitive electricity markets 
[37-39]. However, the specification of transmission rights is complicated by externalities due 
to parallel flows. Since the actual power flows in an electrical network observe the physical 
laws known as Kirchhoffs Laws, the power flow paths generally diverge from the intended 
delivery paths, known as contract paths. These parallel flows, or loop flows, can cause the 
apparent costs of running generators to diverge from the real costs and make it difficult to 
determine the available transfer capabilities of the transmission system. This leads to 
misalignment between the private cost and the social cost in electricity transactions and 
causes a potentially costly dislocation of resources in the power market. 
In essence, a transmission right is a property right that allows its holder to access a portion of 
the transmission capacity. Generally, a property right consists of three possible components: 
(l) the right to receive fmancial benefits derived from use of the capacity, (2) the right to use 
the capacity, and (3) the right to exclude others from accessing the capacity. Since the 
transmission schedule is centrally controlled, transmission rights can be defined as any 
combination of these three components. Basically, there are two types of transmission rights: 
• Physical rights, which include the last two out of all three components, confer right or 
priority to physical delivery. 
• Financial rights, which provide market traders an instrument for price risk hedges as part 
of long-term energy contracts, only entitle owner payments without any requirement to 
actual power delivery. 
These two types of transmission rights reflect two different philosophies of forward trading. 
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2.5.1 Physical Transmission Rights 
Physical transmission rights may confer a scheduling priority, but unlike financial rights, they 
do not provide payments. They are only useful to those who are actually trading power. This 
approach seems straightforward, but it is difficult to implement it in a real system. Physical 
rights holders could exercise market power by withholding transmission capacity. In addition, 
if a system operator is excluded from accessing the withheld capacity, this approach may 
reduce system reliability and security. However, the system operator must take complete 
control of all transmission capacity in real-time, therefore withholding capacity must be 
forbidden. So the pure physical transmission rights may face difficulties in electricity markets. 
2.5.2 Financial Transmission Rights 
The concept of Financial Transmission Rights (FTR) is based on the LMP lTIodel. Assun1e 
that there is a spot market to provide balancing services. The combination of schedules and 
bids, which are submitted by market participants, forms an economic redispatch problem. The 
solution produces a set of inputs and outputs at every location with the different LMPs. 
Market participants who have chosen to buy and sell through the spot market settle these 
transactions at the corresponding LMP. Those who have scheduled deliveries between 
locations pay the opportunity cost of transmission defined as the difference in the locational 
prices at injection and withdraw locations. 
The FTR provides a disbursement of the congestion rents by defining a point-to-point contract 
to collect the difference between the locational prices. These rights could be options (one-
sided) or obligations (two-sided) as forward contracts. 
The FTRs provide long-term transmission rights that can be different from the actual dispatch 
of the system. Although it is in1possible to maintain a perfect match of long-term rights and 
the actual dispatch, it is possible to guarantee the financial payments to the FTR holders as 
long as the outstanding FTRs continue to pass the test of simultaneous feasibility. 
The concept of FTRs is by now well supported by practical experiences. It has been adopted 
by the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection (PJM) and New York, and 
embraced as a reform in New England. 
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2.5.3 Flowgate Rights 
The essential Inarket ingredients of FTR model outlined above include a coordinated spot 
market integrated with system operations to provide balancing services and congestion 
management. In principle, an alternative to central coordination would be a system of 
decentralized congestion management that used the same basic information as does the 
system operator but which could be handled directly by the market participants. 
The most prominent recent example of such a decentralized congestion management model is 
the so-called "flowgate" approach [38]. It is the procedure embraced by NERC as a principal 
market alternative to its disruptive administrative Transmission Loading Relief (TLR) 
procedures [175]. The basic idea of Flowgate Transmission Rights (FOR) is simple. It begins 
with the recognition that the contract path is flawed. Power does not flow over a single path 
from source to sink, and it is this fact that causes the problems that lead to the need for TLR in 
the first place. If a single contract path is not good enough, perhaps many paths would be 
better. Since power flows along many parallel paths, there is a natural inclination to develop a 
new approach to transmission services that would identify the key links or "flowgates" over 
which the power may actually flow, and to define transmission rights according to the 
capacities at these flowgates. This is a tempting idea with analogies in n1arkets for other 
commodities and echoes in the electricity industry MW -mile proposals or rated-path 
methodologies. 
Essentially, a systen1 of FORs builds on the simple principle that it is desirable to match the 
scheduled transactions and actual power flows as closely as possible. The system adopts a 
trading rule that en1bodies the power transfer distribution factor (PTDF) to translate the 
physical effects of each energy transaction into requirements of transmission rights and 
transmission loss coverage. 
W. Hogan pointed out some wrongs of the FOR model [174]. 1. Chandley proposed a hybrid 
market design seeking to combine the use of locational marginal pricing (LMP) in the real-
time market with the allocation and use of FORs in the forward markets [176]. However, the 
debate on FTR and FOR is still going on. 
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2.6 International Comparison of Congestion Management 
Approaches 
Different market structures and rules lead to different approaches to transmission congestion 
management and congestion pricing. Before any further research can be done, it is very 
important to see what has been happening in the real world by having an analysis on the 
existing congestion management approaches in some major electricity markets all over the 
world. This section will compare the congestion management methodologies between 5 
typical electricity markets, which are the UK, PJM (US), California (US), Norway and 
Sweden, and New Zealand, and point out their similarities and differences. A brief 
comparison between these 5 electricity markets is shown in Table 2.1 (p49). 
2.6.1 The UK Market 
The UK (England & Wales) market [24] had been a pool-based market since 1990 until the 
New Energy Trading Arrangement (NET A) [25] went live on March 27, 2001. The 
congestion management and some related issues will be discussed in the previous trading 
arrangement and NET A, respectively. 
2.6.1.1 Congestion Management in Previous Energy Trading Arrangement 
In the previous energy trading arrangement (PET A), almost all electricity supplied in England 
and Wales was traded through the Pool [40]. The Pool mechanism set the wholesale price and 
established the generation merit order to meet the forecast demand (plus a reserve margin) at 
the day-ahead stage. The National Grid Company (NGC) was responsible for the scheduling 
and dispatch of generation on the day to meet actual demand. The actual dispatch of plant 
might not match that anticipated at the day-ahead stage due to: transmission constraints, 
changes in plant availability and differences between actual and forecast denland. 
Pool prices were set on the basis of a competitive bidding process for generation. NGC 
produced a forecast of denland for each half-hour of the following day and then scheduled the 
generators' bids to meet this demand. This schedule was called Unconstrained Schedule. 
Generally, the price of the most expensive unit scheduled to Ineet forecast demand in each 
half-hour set the price for energy, called as the System Marginal Price (SMP). To the SMP 
was added a component called the Capacity Payment, which was provided to give an 
incentive to generators to maintain an adequate Inargin of generation over the level of demand 
for electricity in order to cover for unexpected demand and generator failures on the systenl. 
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This payment is the product of two factors: the Loss of Load Probability (LOLP) and the 
Value of Lost Load (VOLL). Together, SMP and the Capacity Payment constituted the Pool 
Purchase Price (PPP). PPP values are calculated the day-ahead, i.e. ex-ante. Unscheduled 
Availability Payments (USA V) were made to plant which were available but which were not 
included in the Unconstrained Schedule. Although not generating, these plants contribute to 
the security of the system since they can be called upon to generate if required. 
Constraints on the transmission system can cause the actual half-hourly generation produced 
by a unit to differ from that anticipated in the Unconstrained Schedule. Units which were 
scheduled before taking constraints into account might have their output reduced or 
withdrawn (called as "constrained-off'). Other units might have their output increased or be 
dispatched without being included in the Unconstrained Schedule (called as "constrained-
on"). The cost of transmission constraints was embedded in the Uplift costs, which was added 
to the PPP to work out the Pool Selling Price (PSP). 
The rights of access to the transmission system of participants were not well defined in the 
PET A. The access of generators is limited in their Supplemental Agreements to the Master 
Connection and Use of System Agreement (MCUSA) to their notified Maximum Export 
Capacities or Registered Capacities. Suppliers do not have specific access limits although the 
access of distribution network operators is limited to their notified Connection Site Demand 
Capabilities and this provides an upper bound on the aggregate access limits of all the 
suppliers within a distribution network. However, these limits can be reduced if NGC is 
prevented from transporting electricity due to transmission constraints that could not have 
been avoided. Thus, NGC's connection agreements ie. the Supplemental Agreements, do not 
confer firm access rights. Another issue related to access to the transmission system is the 
treatment of transmission losses. Suppliers pay for all losses on the transmission system on a 
uniform basis. Thus, neither generators nor suppliers are exposed to the short-term costs 
imposed by their choice of location. 
2.6.1.2 Congestion Management in NETA 
The NET A replaces the Pool with voluntary forwards markets for energy trading, a voluntary 
Balancing Mechanism for resolving energy and system imbalances close to real-time, and 
mandatory imbalance cash-out. Under NET A, there will be no unconstrained schedule but 
instead generators will be able to self-dispatch. Generators and suppliers will contract 
bilaterally until the Balancing Mechanism for a half-hour trading period opens and 
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notifications of contract volumes for the period have to be made. At this point, known as 
"Gate Closure", market participants will have to inform NGC, as System Operator, of their 
intended generation or consumption profiles for the relevant half-hour. The real-time 
transmission congestion will be mainly managed through the new balancing mechanism [25], 
which provides a basis whereby NGC can accept offers of electricity (generation increases 
and demand reductions) and bids for electricity (generation reductions and demand increases) 
at very short notice. Accepted offers will be paid for at the prices offered (and accepted bids 
will pay the prices bid). 
In addition, NGC will continue to be able to sign contracts with participants for the provision 
of specific services to aid in balancing the system. Generators and suppliers whose contract 
position does not match their metered volumes will be subject to energy imbalance payments 
based on the costs of the actions accepted by NGC in the Balancing Mechanism and relevant 
balancing services costs. 
In the latest document of Ofgem [177], it is preferred that transmission losses are charged by 
adjusting participants' metered volumes using estimated zonal loss factors. Of gem considers 
that the introduction of a market in firm access rights is likely to be the most effective way of 
meeting the objective for reform. A regime of firm access rights means that participants must 
purchase sufficient access rights to match the amount of electricity they wish to transmit 
across the transmission grid. To allocate these rights in a non-discriminatory way, which 
allows the value that participants place upon them to be revealed in an efficient manner, 
auctioning the transmission rights is believed to be an efficient means. 
Transmission constraints on the NGC system, including thermal constraints, voltage 
constraints, and stability constraints, are studied over time-frames from several years to the 
control room phase. Traditionally, these constraints have been analyzed in off-line studies 
using DC and AC loadflows and transient stability programs. NGC's on-line dispatch 
program (known as DISPATCH) runs every 5 minutes, and optimizes the generation dispatch 
over the next 2 hours by studying 6 linked time-steps, whilst respecting the transmission 
constraints. A project called CODA (Combined Dispatch Advisor) aims to achieve the on-line 
constraint management [186]. CODA takes data from the EMS and elsewhere and calculates 
the values of network constraints for actual and forthcoming conditions up to 2 hours ahead. 
The intention of this is to reduce transmission service cost by providing control engineers 
with up-to-the-minute constraint values and recommendations for control actions. The 
constraint limits calculated by CODA will eventually be passed to the DISPATCH. 
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2.6.2 The PJM Market in the US [42] 
PJM started as a Security Coordinator and Control Area Operator in 1927. It was initially a 
wholesale power exchange in 1997, and finally assumed the formal obligations of an ISO in 
January 1998. Though still evolving, it has been an example to represent one of the most 
stable electricity markets in the US. PJM retains the unit commitment model of daily price 
clearing and incorporates transmission constraints to the bid and scheduling basis. 
PJM includes a spot market coordinated by the ISO, who accepts both bilateral schedules and 
voluntary bids of the market participants. Using these schedules and bids, the ISO finds an 
economic, security-constrained dispatch for power flows and the associated LPMs. When the 
transmission system is constrained, the spot prices can differ substantially across locations. 
Sales through the spot market are settled at the LMPs. The transmission usage charge for 
bilateral transactions is the difference in the LMPs between origin and destination. An 
accompanying system of Fixed Transmission Rights provides financial hedges between 
locations. These Fixed Translnission Rights are the equivalent of perfectly tradable firm 
transnlission rights. 
The P JM LMP systenl was enlbraced after an experiment during 1997 with an alternative 
zonal pricing approach that proved to be fundamentally inconsistent with a competitive 
Inarket and user flexibility. According to PJM's experience, the earlier zonal pricing system 
allowed market participants the flexibility to choose between bilateral transactions and spot 
purchases, but did not simultaneously present them with the costs of their choices. The 
circulnstances created a false and artificial impression that savings of $10 per MWh or more 
could be achieved simply by converting a spot transaction into a bilateral schedule. By 
contrast, the locational pricing system avoids this perverse incentive. By construction, the 
LMPs equal systeln marginal costs. Every generator would be producing at its short-run profit 
maxilnizing output, given the prices. The market equilibrium would support the necessary 
dispatch in the presence of the transmission constraints. Spot market transactions and bilateral 
schedules would be compatible. Flexibility would be allowed and reliability maintained 
consistent with the choices of the nlarket participants. 
In P JM the system experienced transmission constraints, large differences in locational prices, 
and the opportunity cost of transmission was quite large. The lowest locational prices were 
sonletimes negative, reflecting the value of counterflow in the system where it would be 
cheaper to pay participants to take power at some locations and so relieve transmission 
constraints. The highest locational prices were larger than the marginal cost of the most 
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expensive plant running, reflecting the need to simultaneously increase output from expensive 
plants and decrease output from cheap plants, just to meet an increment of load at a 
constrained location. Over all hours in April 1998, for example, the low price was -$45 at 
1500 hours on April 18 at "JACK PS," and the highest price was $232 at 1100 hours on April 
16 at "SADDLEBR," both locations being in the Public Service Gas & Electric territory. 
PJM adopts a two-settlement systeln to enhance the robust and competition market and to 
provide increased price certainty to market participants. It consists of 2 markets, with separate 
accounting for each market: 
• Day-ahead market is a forward market in which hourly clearing prices are calculated for 
each hour of the next operating day based on generation offers, demand bids and bilateral 
schedules. The day-ahead schedule is developed using a least-cost security-constrained 
unit cOlnmitment and a security-constrained economic dispatch. Day-ahead congestion 
charges for bilateral transactions are based on the differences of LMPs between the source 
and sink. 
• Real-time market is an energy market in which hourly clearing prices are determined by 
security-constrained economic dispatch with actual systeln operating conditions described 
by state estilnation. Translnission customers pay congestion charges for bilateral 
transaction quantity deviations from day-ahead schedules. 
2.6.3 The California Market in the US [26, 41] 
On December 20, 1995, the California Public Utility Commission (CPUC) ruled to restructure 
the electric utility industry in California, to allow for competition in the wholesale and retail 
electricity markets, in an effort to lower electric rates. The decision requires that utilities forn1 
an Independent System Operator (ISO) to begin operation on January 1, 1998 to conduct 
system dispatch and transmission operations functions, and create a Power Exchange (PX), 
and file plans to voluntarily divest 50% of their fossil generation to mitigate the current utility 
market power. The new market structure mandates separating the wholesale PX from the 
ISO. The ISO manages three key markets - competitively procured ancillary services, a real-
time energy balancing market and a congestion management market. The PX operates three 
energy markets, a daily auction for each hour of the next day, an on-the-day market and a 
Block Forwards market. 
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In California, market participants can take part in the process of congestion managelnent 
through submission of "adjustment bids" to the ISO. ISO's congestion management process is 
accomplished in two time scales: day-ahead and hour-ahead. In both time periods, the ISO 
reschedules to eliminate potential congestion and minimizes rescheduling to allow market 
participants to voluntarily seek their lowest cost of delivered energy. Overall, the congestion 
management recognizes and separates each Schedule Coordinator (SC)'s portfolio of 
generation and load from other SCs while fmding the lowest rescheduling cost to maintain 
system reliability. 
To simplify the congestion pricing, California uses zones or geographical locations to define 
electrical characteristics of the power grid and determine a fmancial value for the ability to 
serve its energy needs. Zones are defined as areas where congestion is infrequent and can be 
easily priced on an average cost basis. The. California congestion pricing method uses the term 
"Interzonal" to describe congestion and pricing between zones and the term "Intrazonal" to 
describe congestion and pricing within a zone. Zones can be merged or added to if interzonal 
congestion becomes infrequent and inefficiently priced at marginal cost or intrazonal 
congestion becomes frequent and inefficiently priced at average cost. 
To mitigate the shortcoming of traditional transmission allocation methods, a mix of physical 
and financial rights was selected for implementation of the Finn Transmission Rights process 
in California starting February 1, 2000. In this model, Firm Transmission Rights provide 
scheduling priority as well as financial rights. Firm Transmission Rights that are not sold in 
the day-ahead market are released in the hour-ahead market, but the original owner will retain 
the financial rights. 
However, in 2000 California's electricity market has collapsed due to many reasons [29]. 
Besides the abnormal c1itnate, high gas prices, and strict environmental rules, some fatal flaws 
in market design, which caused market power and gaming, have also been severely criticized 
and the Federal Energy Regulatory COmInission (FERC) has proposed renledies for these 
problems. According to [30], one of the serious flaws is the poorly structured separation of the 
ISO from the PX. This separation allowed generators to "game" the Inarket by bidding only a 
portion of their capacity ahead of time into the PX, and then reaping exceptionally high prices 
when the ISO was forced to buy power in real-tilne to balance supply and demand. In 
addition, the frozen retail prices in California meant that rising wholesale prices could in no 
way be moderated by being passed on to consumers so as to reduce their demand. 
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2.6.4 The Norway and Sweden Market (Nord Pool) [31, 41] 
Deregulation in Norway was created by the Energy Act of June 1990. Market started in May 
1992. The principal restructuring was the removal of transmission ownership from Statkraft, 
the national utility, and the founding of the nationally owned company Statnett to be the 
transmission owner, market operator and ISO. Sweden passed deregulation legislation in 
October 1995 and joined the Norwegian market in January 1996. Transmission operation was 
removed from the national utility Vattenfall, which continues to operate generation while 
Svenksa Kraftnat, the national grid owner and ISO, was formed. Meanwhile, the Nord Pool, a 
market operator owned equally by Statnett and Svenksa Kraftnat, was founded and took over 
the operation of spot and future markets in both countries. 
Norway and Sweden have different philosophies of congestion management. Norway is using 
the spot market settlement process to prevent congestion efficiently. When transmission 
congestion is predicted, the ISO declares that the system is split into price zones as predicted 
by congestion bottlenecks. Bidders in spot Inarket must submit separate bids for each price 
zone where they have generation or load. If no congestion occurs, the market will be settled at 
one price. If congestion does happen, price zones are settled at different prices caused by 
binding transmission constraints. Zones with excess generation will have lower prices while 
zones with excess load will have higher prices. Revenue from this price difference is paid to 
the ISO, who uses it to reduce the capacity fee. Bilateral contracts that span price zones must 
pay for its load at the price in the zone of its load, in order to account for its contribution to 
congestion and to expose the contract to financial consequences of congestion. 
In contrast to Norway, Sweden is always only one price zone, because Sweden does not want 
the translnission systen1 to affect the Inarket solution. However, Sweden varies the capacity 
charge portion of its point tariff based on geography. Since power flow in Sweden is always 
from north to south, generation is charged more and load less, in the northern part of this 
country. This affects generation costs and thus the bids submitted to the n1arket, deferring 
some congestion. 
Congestion in real-time is eliminated by purchase of the adjustment of generation and load 
frOln the ISO regulatory markets, which is known as "buyback". Congestion has been 
infrequent in the Nord Pool Inarket. Despite using different approaches to congestion 
Inanagement, the Norwegian ISO and the Swedish ISO coexist successfully within one 
market. Because. Svenksa Kraftnat does not use price zone congestion n1anagement, the 
Swedish translnission systeln is always regarded as one price zone. Revenue to lnarket due to 
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congestion between Norway and Sweden is split equally by Statnett and Svenksa Kraftnat. No 
special fee is charged for energy transfers across national boundaries, and the two ISOs do not 
charge each other transmission tariffs at their connection points. 
2.6.5 The New Zealand Market [41, 43] 
On October 1, 1996, a wholesale electricity market in New Zealand commenced operation 
under the name Electricity Market Company (EMCO). This market is an ex post market and is 
not mandatory. There is separation between the power exchange, which is EMCO, and the 
system operator, which is Trans Power. The interconnecting transmission constraint from 
South Island to North Island has a significant impact upon the operation of the system. 
Transmission losses are also relatively high in New Zealand. 
New Zealand's wholesale electricity market is characterized by its adoption of full nodal 
pricing. Participating generators and purchasers submit offers and bids for each half-hour at 
the day-ahead stage. Bilateral contract volumes are notified to the system operator, and any 
deviations are settled at the prices emerging from the spot market. The marginal costs of 
transmission losses and constraints are reflected in the half-hourly ex post market prices 
calculated for each of the connection points on the network using actual flows. Constrained-
on payments are paid to scheduled generators whose offer prices tum o~t to be higher than the 
nodal ex post price. There are no constrained-off pa)'lnents to generators who did not run 
despite bidding below the ex post nodal price. The marginal pricing of losses and constraints 
within the spot market results in a surplus of funds being collected, which is passed on to 
Trans Power. Bilateral market participants trading outside the spot market pay Trans Power 
directly for losses and constraints via a charge based upon the volume of power traded and the 
price differential between the generation and supply nodes. Trans Power uses these funds to 
lower its use of system charges. 
2.7 Congestion Management Literature Survey 
Since transmission congestion management in electricity markets is a new problem emerging 
after the deregulation of power system, aln10st all the published papers about this topic are 
found later than 1990. Basically, these researches can be classified as two categories: 
Inethodological studies based on general market models and industrial experiences and 
researches based on SOlne specified n1arket models. 
46 
Chapter 2. Transmission Congestion Management in Electricity Markets 
Major pUblications of general methodological studies on congestion management are listed as 
follows. In [33], Singh, Hao and Papalexopoulos studied the approaches to transmission 
congestion management in the markets with pool model (nodal pricing framework) and 
bilateral model (cost allocation procedures) respectively. In [32], Wu and Varaiya proposed a 
decentralized optimal dispatch method with the objective of maximizing social welfare under 
the coordinated multilateral trade model. In [34-35, 156], David and Fang proposed 
mathematical models for pool dispatch, bilateral dispatch and multilateral dispatch. They also 
provided some useful curtailment strategies based on the purpose of minimizing deviations 
from transaction requests made by market participants in a structure dominated by bilateral 
and multilateral contracts. In [182], Glavitsch and Alvarado discussed four main concepts on 
congestion management: congestion pricing can lead to the same solution as an OPF, pricing 
needs not have cost information available, good estimates of nonlinear cost coefficients are 
necessary, .and pricing for congesti~n management is separable from pricing for the purpose 
of transmission revenue reconciliation. A tutorial review of how to calculate optimal bus 
prices and congestion costs using DC power flow approximation was given by Gedra in [181]. 
Some researches have been done on congestion management taking contingency-constrained 
limits, voltage stability limits, and transient stability limits into consideration. Alomoush and 
Shahidepour presented a procedure for minimizing the number of adjustments of preferred 
schedules to alleviate congestion with contingency-constrained limits in [157]. Singh and 
David investigated the impact of incorporating dynamic security consideration in congestion 
management in [183]. Transient stability and voltage stability constraints were incorporated 
into the market dispatch/pricing model by Chattopadhyay and Gan in [184]. 
Cadwalader, Harvey, Hogan, 'and Pope proposed a LR-based approach [148] to decompose 
the global congestion management problem into sub-problems corresponding to different 
regions. But full information of the whole system is still needed for every regional sub-
problems. Moreover, some other drawbacks of this method have been pointed out by Oren 
and Ross in [149], such as convexity problem. 
Hogan proposed a market model including well-defined point-to-point FTRs supported by a 
spot market [13]. Application of LMP and FTR to multi-zonal congestion management was 
illustrated by Alomoush and Shahidepour in [153]. The FTR auction model was presented by 
Hogan in [159] and was elaborated by Alomoush and Shahidepour in [160]. 
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Congestion management is one of the most important tasks of the ISO in an electricity 
market. Many electricity markets in the world have presented their experiences on this issue. 
Gribik et al presented California's zone-based congestion management protocol in [185], 
which includes inter/intra zonal congestion management. In [103] and [104], optimal 
scheduling methods were proposed for the power markets in New Zealand and New England 
of the USA, where the procurement of necessary operating reserves is coordinated with the 
procurement of the energy while the network constraints are taken into account. 
2.8 Summary 
In this chapter, the causes, remedies, and pricing methods of transmission congestion are 
discussed. Planning, constructing, maintaining, and operating of transmission grid are 
completely different in the competitive electricity market compared with the situation in the 
integrated power industry. Physical limits of transmission include steady limits, stability 
limits and contingency limits. All these limits decide the TTC and ATC of a system, which 
are crucial information for long-term and short-term congestion management. The ISO is 
playing a vital role in congestion relief, ranging from long-term planning down to real-time 
operating. 
There are many various approaches to congestion management. It depends on the market 
model, the policy, the technical development, and many other factors. Generally speaking, 
they can be classified into three fundamental categories: transaction curtailment, transmission 
capacity reservation, and system redispatch. However, the best solution might always be a 
combination of several of the basic methods for different time scales. 
Two main congestion pricing methods are analyzed. The LMP approach seems to be better, 
not only because it produces correct competitive prices for congestion but also because it can 
facilitate the creation of financial transmission rights, which enable users to pay known 
transmission rates and to hedge against potential high congestion charges. 
To fmd out what is going on in the real world, the congestion Inanagement approaches of 5 
typical electricity markets in the world are investigated. Every approach has its own 
advantages and disadvantages. However, none of thelTI is the final version. Continuous 
reforms are still taking place everywhere. Congestion management is widely open to power 
system researchers for further development. Finally, a brief literature survey on congestion 
n1anagen1ent is presented. 
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Table 2.1 Comparison of market models and congestion management approaches between major power markets 
Electricity Market UK PJM Nord Pool New Zealand E&W Pool NET A California Norway Sweden 
System Operator & Combined (NGC is Separate Combined Separate Separate Separate Market Operator the owner of grid) 
Energy Ex ante No pool pricing Ex ante Ex ante Ex ante Ex post Pricing 
Balancing Uplift Balancing Balancing market Balancing market Balancing market No Mechanism market 
Borne by all Zonal pricing- Zonal fee calcu- Recovered 
Losses suppliers on a Average zonal Moving towards loss application of loss lated from spot through grid Nodel pricing 
uniform basis. loss factors factor at each node factors at each node price and margi- charges 
nal loss factors uniformly 
Additional Recovered 
Congestion generation costs Imbalance Nodal pricing Zonal pricing Zonal pricing through grid Nodal pricing 
recoverd through settlement charges 
uplift to pool price uniformly 
Z Zonal charges Zonal charges Mixture of postage 0 calculated using stamp charges to Locational specific Locational Locational specific 
- calculated using Uniform C/'J 
C/'J Cost Recovery long run recover fixed costs transport and access capacity transport and access 
..... long run capacity charges ~ incremental costs incremental and location specific charges charges charges C/'J 
charges Z costs 
<r: Planning by Participants or 0::: Planning by NGC. Planning by system Coordinated planning Planning by f--o NGC. Published Planning by the system operator Published plan plan allows operator. Published by system operator, transmission the transmiss- identifies and Investment allows participants plan allows integrating utilities' ion owner and 
to assess capability participants to participants to assess plans into one region-
owner and ISO: ISO: Svenska funded by 
assess capability Statnett coalitions of 
available 
available capability available wide plan 
Kraftnat beneficiaries 
Moving to Firm Moving to 
Transmission No Transmission Financial 
Flow-based No Financial 
Rights Rights Transmission Rights transmission Rights Transmission 
Rights 
Only cm, no Encourage 
Bilateral Contract physical bilateral physical 
Allow physical Allow physical Allow physical bilateral contract Allow physical 
bilateral bilateral contract bilateral contract bilateral contract 
contract 
contract 
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Chapter 3. Optimal Power Flow (OPF) and Its Roles 
in Electricity Markets 
3.1 Introduction 
In 1962, Carpentier introduced a generalized nonlinear programming formulation of the 
economic dispatch (ED) problem including voltage and other operating constraints [44]. The 
problem was later named as the Optimal Power Flow (OPF) by Dommel and Tinney [45]. 
Since then, OPF has been playing a very important role in power system operation and 
planning. Today OPF has been extended to any problem that involves the determination of the 
instantaneous optimal steady state of power system. 
Historically, the solution of the ED by the equal incremental cost method was a precursor of 
the OPF. The appearance of the OPF ended the era of the "classical period of economic 
dispatch", which had developed for nearly 30 years [46]. Both ED and OPF are optimization 
problems, even with the same minimum cost objective. However, ED only considers real 
power generations and represents the power system by a single equality constraint (the system 
power balance equation) while OPF is an optimization problem with both active and reactive 
power variables and a full network model. 
Rapid development of the OPF in the last four decades with the evolving power systems has 
produced many different applications of it and thus many new forms of OPF problems with 
various objectives, constraints, and variables. Online implementations pose the most onerous 
requirements on the OPF technology. These requirements include response time, robustness 
with respect of starting point, infeasibility- detection and handling, discrete modeling, 
contingency constraints modeling, and so on. Some efforts have been made and are still being 
made to meet these requirements so that the OPF, as an online application of the Energy 
Management system (EMS), can be useful to operators [49]. 
The emerging competitive electricity markets bring more requirements and challenges to OPF 
[52]. As the only application with both economic concerns and full power network modeling 
in current EMSs, OPF becomes an ideal candidate tool for spot market clearing, energy and 
transmission pricing, transmission congestion management, optimal ancillary services 
50 
Chapter 3. Optimal Power Flow and Its Roles in Electricity Markets 
procurement, A TC evaluation and enhancement, and optimal allocation of transmission rights, 
etc. 
In this chapter, the general formulation of OPF problem is introduced with various objective 
functions, constraints and control variables. The existing methodologies for OPF solution are 
reviewed briefly. Then the conventional applications of OPF and OPF's potential roles in 
deregulated electricity markets are discussed respectively. Since linear programming and 
quadratic programming are used in this thesis to solve extended OPF problems, the general 
procedure of successive linear programming method for OPF is presented and finally a brief 
description about interior point linear and quadratic programming is given. 
3.2 The General Formulation of OPF Problem 
The OPF problem requires the solution of non-linear equations, which describe optimal and 
secure operation of a power system. The general nonlinear OPF problem can be formulated as 
(3-1). A full formulation of AC OPF problem can be found in Appendix A. 
Minimize F(x ,u) (3-1) 
subject to: g (x ,u) = 0 
hex ,u) < 0 
where g (x ,u) is a set of nonlinear equality constraints, and h (x ,u) is a set of nonlinear 
inequality constraints. The vector x consists of dependent variables and fixed parameters 
while the vector u consists of control variables. 
The dependent variables include bus voltage magnitudes and phase angles, as well as MV Ar 
output of generators performing bus voltage control. The fixed parameters are items like the 
reference bus angle, non-controlled generator MW and MV Ar outputs, non-controlled MW 
and MV Ar loads, fixed bus voltages, network branch parameters, and so on. 
The control variables might be: 
• real and reactive power generations, 
• real and reactive power loads (load shedding), 
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• control voltage settings 
• LTC transformer tap positions, 
• MW interchange, 
• DC transmission line flows, 
• phase shifter angles, 
• shunt capacitors and reactors, 
• static V AR compensators. 
The equality and inequality constraints include: 
• balance of generation and load, 
• power flow equations, 
• limits on all the control variables, 
• branch flow limits (MW, MVAr, MVA), 
• bus voltage limits, 
• transmission interface (corridor) limits, 
• system reserve li1nits. 
The objective of OPF problems has many different forms with different applications of OPF. 
The four most popular objectives of OPF are: 
• active power generation cost minimization, 
• active power losses minimization, 
• lninimization of control-shift, 
• ll1inill1ization of number of rescheduled controls. 
52 
Chapter 3. Optimal Power Flow and Its Roles in Electricity Markets 
3.3 Existing Methodologies for OPF 
The OPF development in the last 40 years has been following closely the progress in 
numerical optimization techniques and computer technology. Many different approaches have 
been proposed to solve the OPF problems [47-48]. These techniques can be classified into 6 
categories: 
• Gradient methods, 
• Quadratic Programming (QP), 
• Newton-based methods, 
• Linear Programming (LP), 
• Interior Point methods, 
• Heuristic optimization methods. 
In addition, there are two other important fields of OPF research which need to be mentioned 
here: 
• P-Q decoupled OPF, 
• Area decomposition OPF. 
3.3.1 Gradient Methods 
Historically speaking, this is the earliest efficient solution of OPF since Carpentier proposed a 
generalized reduced gradient method, which solves the OPF by the primal method [54]. In 
1968, Dommel and Tinney developed a nonlinear programming method to minimize fuel cost 
and active power losses [45]. This approach solves the Kuhn-Tucker equations using a 
combination of the gradient method for a fixed set of independent variables and penalty 
functions for violated dependent constraints. This work is regarded as the guiding pioneer for 
commercial OPF tools. 
Alsac and Stott proposed a reduced gradient method utilizing the Lagrange multiplier and 
penalty function techniques in 1974 [53]. Wu et al. solved the OPF in two stages, both by the 
gradient method [55]. This program has the capability of handling very large problems, but 
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often infeasible values remain upon completion. Since then some other works have been done 
on the development of the gradient method [56]. 
In a gradient method, the gradient will give the direction of maximum increase in the cost 
function as a function of the adjustment of each variable. However, the gradient method does 
not give any indication about how far we should move along the negative gradient direction. 
Therefore, the main problem with the gradient method lies in the fact that the direction of 
gradient must be changed very often and this may lead to a very slow convergence. 
3.3.2 Quadratic Programming 
Quadratic programming is a special form of nonlinear programming with quadratic objective 
function and linear constraints. Its applications for dispatching first appeared in 1973-1974 
[57-61]. In 1973, Reid and Hasdorf [60] presented a quadratic programming method to solve 
OPF problems. This method employs Wolfe's algorithm specialized to solve the ED problem 
which does not require penalty factors or the determination of the gradient step size. This 
method was developed purely for research purposes, so the model used is limited and employs 
the classic ED with voltage, real, reactive power as constraints. Another significant 
contribution in 1974 was presented by Wollenberg and Stadlin [61], in which two 
optimization processes for solving ED, Dantzig-Wolfe algorithm and Quadratic 
Programming, were compared. Using optimally ordered sparsity programmed matrix solution 
techniques, the proposed method is reliable and produces acceptable results and achieves a 
real-time solution. The method solves contingency constrained ED problems and serves as 
one of the pioneering works of decomposition algorithm for ED. 
More papers about applications of quadratic programming to the OPF solution appeared in 
1980s, including Giras and colleagues' method which employs a Quasi-Newton Technique 
based on Han-Powell algorithm [62], Aoki and Satoh's method which employs a parametic 
quadratic programming to overcome the problenl of dealing with transmission losses as a 
quadratic form of generator outputs [63], the method of EI-Kady et al. which solves the OPF 
problem for voltage control using a quadratic programming algorithm [64], and the method 
presented by Aoki et al. which formulates constrained load flow problems as Quasi-quadratic 
programming problems to satisfy nonlinear constraints and the MINOS technique is used 
[65]. 
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3.3.3 Newton-based Methods 
Generally speaking, in Newton-based methods the necessary conditions of optimality 
commonly referred to as the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are obtained. The solution of these 
nonlinear equations need iterative methods, among which the Newton method is favored for 
its quadratic convergence properties. The Newton method is a version of successive quadratic 
programming which implements the Lagrange-Newton solver to quadratic approximations of 
the original OPF problem. This method can efficiently solve highly nonlinear and non-
separable OPF problelns such as active power losses Ininimization and combined full 
optimization. OPF solution with Newton method has also been found to be very reliable in 
finding solution of feasible OPF problems, and has no problem in identifying the set of active 
constraints. 
Quasi-Newton methods were first used in conjunction with penalty methods in the late 
1960's. In these methods an approximation of the Hessian matrix is built up iteratively using 
efficient updating formulae. The development of the Han-Powell technique revived interest in 
quasi-Newton methods in the late 1970's to early 1980's. These methods [66-67] are useful 
only for problems of limited size or using a dense formulae, because they generate dense 
Hessians. 
Some well known commercial OPF packages have evolved along with MINOS frOln a 
gradient solver [56] to a quasi-Newton solver [68-69] to a Newton solver [70-71]. In 1984 the 
ESCA package [72] by Sun and colleagues implemented the Lagrange-Newton solver to 
sparse decoupled subproblems with penalty terms added to handle violated dependent 
constraints. The super-linear convergence to Kuhn-Tucker condition makes this method 
suitable for practical large systems. Since then the Newton method has been widely applied to 
in1plement OPF tools [73]. 
Handling inequality constraints is very difficult in either gradient or Newton approaches. The 
usual method is to form a quadratic constraint "penalty" function. Since Newton Method has 
the second derivative information built into it, it has good convergence features and it can 
handle the inequality constraints as well. The difficulty with Newton n1ethod arises in the fact 
that near the limit the penalty is small, so that the optimal solution will tend to allow the 
variable to float over its limit. When there are few lin1its to be concerned with, Newton 
Inethod is the best method for OPF. 
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3.3.4 Linear Programming 
The gradient and Newton methods suffer from the difficulties in handling inequality 
constraints. Linear Programming, however, is very good at dealing with inequality 
constraints, as long as the problem can be linearized without loss of accuracy. For many years 
linear programming has been recognized as a reliable and robust technique to solve a large 
subset of specialized OPF problems characterized by linear separable objective functions and 
linear constraints. 
In 1968, Wells [74] developed a linear programming approach to determine an economic 
schedule that is consistent with network security requirements for loading plants in a power 
system. The cost function and constraints were linearized and solved by the simplex method. 
In 1970, Shen and Laughton [75] presented a dual linear programming technique for the 
solution of power system load scheduling with security constraints. The solution was obtained 
using the revised simplex method. In 1978, Stott and Hobson [76] efficiently solved power 
system security control problelTIS by employing a linear iterative technique for network 
sparsity selection of binding constraints. In 1979, Stott and Marinho [77] presented a linear 
programming approach using a modified revised simplex technique for security dispatch and 
emergency control calculation on large power systems. In 1983, Irving and Sterling [78] 
presented a linear programming approach with an AC power flow to solve a economic 
dispatch of active power with constraints relaxation. Since then, the LP based OPF methods 
have been successfully implemented in solving active [79-82], as well as reactive power [80, 
83-85] scheduling problems and the active losses mininlization problelTI [51]. 
Successive linear programming has been used in quite a few OPF application to date. Khan 
[86] suggested the use of a linear programming subproblem in a nonlinear iterative loop, with 
special consideration to avoid oscillation of the iteration. Stott and Alsac present their 
experiences with successive linear programming in [51,80]. 
3.3.5 Interior Point Methods 
The current interest in interior point lTIethods was sparked by Karmarkar's projective scaling 
algorithm for linear programming [87]. Shortly after Karmarkar's algorithm became well-
known, Gill et al. [88] showed that under certain conditions, the projective scaling algorithm 
is equivalent to logarithmic barrier methods which has a long history in linear and nonlinear 
programming. This led to the development of Mehrotra's primal-dual predictor-corrector 
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method which is currently the most efficient interior point approach [89]. The main ideas 
behind these barrier methods are: 
• Convert functional inequalities to equalities and bound constraints using slack variables; 
• Replace bound constraints by adding them as additional terms in the objective function 
using logarithmic barriers; 
• Use Lagrange multipliers to add the equalities to the objective thereby transforming the 
problem into an unconstrained optimization problem; 
• Use Newton's method to solve the first order conditions for the stationary points of 
unconstrained problem. 
The application of interior point methods to power system optimization problems started 
slightly later. In 1991, Clements et al. [90] presented probably the first interior point research 
on power systems, which is solving state estimation by a nonlinear programming interior 
point technique. In the same year, Ponnambalam et al. [91] presented a newly developed dual 
affaine algorithm to solve the hydro-scheduling problem. In 1992, Vargas et al. [92] presented 
an interior point method to solve the economic dispatch problem. In 1993, Momoh et al. [93] 
used an extended quadratic interior point method to solve economic dispatch and V AR 
planning problems. 
Interior Point Methods can be applied to OPF problems in two ways. The first way is to use 
the successive linear programming technique and to employ an interior point method for 
solving the linear problems [94-97]. The other way is to directly apply interior point methods 
to nonlinear OPF formulation using the relation to barrier methods [98-102]. 
3.3.6 Heuristic Optimization Methods 
The optimization methods described above are essentially based on the idea of neighbourhood 
search (also called local search), which involves searching through the solution space. by 
moving to the neighbours of a known solution in a direction. The process is repeated at the 
new point until a local minimum is found. These methods rely on convexity to obtain the 
global optimum and as such are forced to simplify relationships in order to ensure convexity. 
However, the OPF problem is in general non-convex and as a result, many local optima may 
exist. Heuristic optimization methods can help to find the global optimum. The major ones 
include: Evolutionary Algorithm, Simulated Annealing, Tabu Search, Ant Colony, Neural 
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Network, and Fuzzy Programming. Essentially, these methods all approach optimization 
through the use of guided search techniques [5, 179]. For instance, genetic algorithms and 
simulated annealing solve conventional optimization problems by "randomly generating new 
solution and retaining better ones". These heuristic optimization methods have been applied to 
solve various problems in power systems, such as economic dispatch, unit commitment, 
generator maintenance scheduling, network planning, and so on. The major drawback of 
heuristic optimization methods is usually their poor computation efficiency. Due to the 
complexity of real world problems, hybridization of these optimization algorithn1s would be a 
way forward to develop more powerful approaches to produce SOlTIe particular properties. 
3.3.7 P-Q Oecoupled OPF 
The splitting of OPF into active and reactive subproblems has been quite common. This 
splitting of OPF is important to its online implementation especially. The advantages of a 
decoupled OPF include: 
• Decoupling greatly improves computational efficiency. 
• Decoupling makes it possible to use different optimization techniques to solve the active 
and reactive power OPF subproblems. 
• Decoupling makes it possible to have a different optimization cycle for each subproblem. 
In general, active power controls are scheduled frequently to satisfy economic 
requirements, while the reactive power controls are optimized less frequently to provide a 
secure post contingency voltage level or a voltageN AR dispatch which minimizes 
transmission losses. 
Dopazo was the first to solve a P-Q decomposition problem [116]. The proposed solution 
process used classical economic dispatch for active power and a minilTIUm loss objective for 
reactive power. Later publications used various solvers for both subproblems. Solvers 
included linear programlTIing [117, 122], quadratic programming [58, 118], gradient method 
[119-120]. A hybrid decoupled approach was presented in [121] using linear programming to 
solve an active power subproblem and quadratic programming to solve a reactive power 
subproblem. 
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3.3.B Area/period Decomposition OPF 
The original motivation to decompose a very large-scale OPF problem into several smaller 
problems by control areas or by time periods is to improve the computation speed. 
Decomposition strategies can also been found in solving the N+ 1 subproblems (base case and 
N contingency cases) independently for a contingency constrained OPF. Several common 
decomposition approaches have been applied to split OPF problems. These approaches 
include Benders decomposition [124,134], Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition [125-127], Cross 
decomposition (a combination of Benders decomposition and Lagrangian relaxation) [123], 
and Lagrangian decomposition and Augmented Lagrangian decomposition [127-133, 135-
136]. More discussion about an area decomposition OPF will continue in Chapter 5. 
3.4 Conventional Applications of OPF 
In electric utilities, the OPF can be seen as the tool to determine the possible optimal state of 
the network. For system operation, OPF can be used for real-time and study applications. In 
EMS, OPF is the most advanced on-line network analysis application. The off-line OPF-based 
tools are important for the planning department of an electric utility. It has been applied to 
long-term transmission planning and V Ar planning. Some major applications of OPF in 
electric utilities before deregulation will be described briefly in this section. 
3.4.1 OPF in EMS 
As a part of an EMS, the OPF function is designed to operate in real-tin1e mode or study 
mode, to schedule active or reactive power controls or both, and to optimize a defined 
operational objective function. The relationship between OPF and other applications in EMS 
is shown in Figure 3.1. 
In the study mode, the OPF obtains study cases (with violated constraints) from Power Flow 
or Contingency Analysis and produces optimal results with various objectives and eliminating 
all the violated constraints. These results are presented as recommendation to the dispatcher. 
In addition, OPF can help an instructor to create a patiicular scenario in Dispatch Training 
Simulator (DTS). For example, if an instructor wants to build a scenario that contains a few 
lines overloaded, OPF can help him to find ren1edial control actions for it. 
In real-tin1e Inode, the close loop control can be implemented via the SCADA systen1 of the 
EMS. Obtaining real-tin1e power flow data froln state estimation, OPF is run to get real-time 
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corrective controls (for example, automatic voltageN Ar control), which are sent to SCADA 
directly. Another online application of OPF is the OPF-ED-AGC control hierarchy. The 
overall objective is to impose the security constrained MW schedules produced by OPF to 
Automatic Generation Control (ATC) through ED. A promising approach is to install a 
Security Constrained Economic Dispatch (SCED) which plays the combined role of OPF and 
ED. In SCED, total generation cost is minimized while branch power flow limits and unit 
MW limits are used as constraints. 
SCADA 
AGe 
Economic 
Dispatch 
Controls 
Real-time Mode I Study Mode 
State 
I 
I 
Topology 
Processor 
I 
Load 
Forecast 
Power 
Flow 
Unit 
Commitment 
Contingency 
Analysis 
Dispatcher 
Training 
System 
Figure 3.1 The relationship between OPF and other main EMS applications 
3.4.2 OPF for System Planning 
Besides its real-time and short-term applications in EMS, off-line OPF-based tools, which use 
forecast system data, can be applied to medium term and long-term system planning, such as 
generation planning and transmission planning. The objective of long-term transmission 
expanSIOn planning is to determine possible alternatives which must present power 
transmission capacity satisfying the load forecast and generation planning. Using OPF-based 
tools, the problem is formulated considering both econon1ic objectives and a power 
transmission electrical law. Usually, the power flow accuracy is obtained including DC power 
flow model in this optimization problem. Another typical application of OPF to system V Ar 
planning is the optimal installation of capacitors. The size and location of new capacitors to 
ensure a certain level of stead-security for a given base-case operating condition is easily 
expressed and solved as a contingency constrained OPF problem. 
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Table 3.1 Applications of OPF in Electricity Markets 
Applications in .'~ , 
Electricity 4 Extended OPF Problems 
'I. 
Markets Objective Function Network Model Special Constraints Special Controls 
Spot Market ramp-rate constraints 
Supply offers and 
Clearing and 
maximize the social demand bids (mostly 
DCIAC and reserve-related 
welfare piece-wise linear Pricing constraints 
bidding functions) 
Transmission 
minimize generation 
Contingency Generation, load, and 
cost/maximize DCIAC 
Pricing constraints F ACTS devices 
consumer net benefit 
Incremental and 
minimize the cost of 
Operating constraints, 
decremental 
Congestion Contingency 
congestion DC(AC adjustment, FACTS 
Management constraints, stability 
management devices, curtailment 
constraints 
on bilateral contracts 
Contingency 
ATC Evaluation Maximize the TTC AC 
constraints, stability 
F ACTS devices 
constraints, stochastic 
operating constraints 
Ancillary Services Minimize the cost of reserve-related 
Reserve capacity 
DC from generation and 
Procurement ancillary services constraints 
demand 
Maximize the Bids-related Injections and 
Transmission revenue of 
DC 
constraints, withdraws for bids of 
Rights Allocation transmission rights contingency transmission rights, 
auction constraints F ACTS devices 
3.5 Applications of OPF in Electricity Markets 
In competitive electricity markets, some of the conventional application of OPF may still be 
useful, like OPF in AGC and OPF in Voltage/V AR control, etc. However, the competition 
and transmission open access have brought about many new potential applications and 
technical challenges to the OPF. Transmission system, which appears to have characteristics 
of a natural monopoly, is the major source of technical complication in a competitive 
electricity market. OPF techniques enter the scene with their explicit recognition of network 
characteristics within the broader context of power system optimization. The potential roles of 
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OPF in electricity markets is shown in Table 3.1. In this section we will briefly review some 
important applications of extended OPF techniques in deregulated electricity markets. 
3.5.1 Spot Market Clearing and Pricing 
An electricity spot market requires an OPF for comparability and transparency, which 
encourages usage of systematic tools and procedures. Electricity spot market clearing is also 
an optimization problem with network constraints. But different from conventional OPF 
models, its objective function is to maximize total market profit based on bidding price 
instead of generation cost. Market clearing prices for different locations can be calculated 
from the Lagrangian multipliers of constraints in the OPF solution. 
New Zealand wholesale electricity market is using an extended OPF to implement a security-
constrained bid-clearing system, which includes DC network constraints, ramp-rate 
constraints and reserve-related constraints [103]. This problem is solved by Advanced Dual 
Simplex and Interior Point algorithm. The Interim New England Electricity Market is also 
employing an extended OPF technique to perform the joint energy and reserve dispatch [104]. 
Various fomls of OPF problems appeared in papers about pricing of real and reactive power 
[105-110]. 
3.5.2 Transmission Pricing 
In deregulated electricity markets, Short Run Marginal Pricing (SRMC) has been applied to 
transmission pricing since it was first proposed by Schweppe et al. [141] Under this scheme, 
the transmission price or wheeling rate is the difference between locations of seller and buyer. 
OPF can be used to produce the SRMC, thereby to be used in transmission pricing [111-115]. 
Farmer and Cory [142-143] proposed another novel approach by alleviating the inherent 
shortcomings of SRMC based pricing while Inaintaining the economic efficiency of the price 
signals. In their method, the objective of the optimal pricing problem is to maximize the 
'consumer net benefit' and contingency constraints are considered by DC approximation. 
3.5.3 Congestion Management 
In real-tinle, congestion managelnent actually is an optimal redispatch problem. Its objective 
function could be minimization of the cost of adjustnlent or nlinimization of bilateral 
transaction curtaihnent. Generators and consumers can subnlit linear increnlental and 
decremental bidding curves to the ISO. The constraints include all the network constraints, 
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plus contingency constraints and stability constraints. An extended OPF can solve this 
problem perfectly and produce a corresponding congestion price. 
In California power market, the interzonal congestion management is modeled with a DC 
OPF with market separation constraints while the intrazonal congestion management is 
modeled with an AC OPF considering voltage constraints [26]. Other OPF-based congestion 
management methods can be found in [33-36] 
3.5.4 ATC Evaluation 
ATC is the measure of the ability of interconnected power systems to reliably move or 
transfer power from one area to another over all transmission lines or paths between those 
areas under specified system conditions. There are at least three possible approaches for the 
calculation of TTC and A TC. The first one is based on distribution factors or sensitivity 
factors calculated from DC power flow [137]. The second one is called continuation power 
flow algorithm, which traces the power flow solution curve, starting at a base load, leading to 
the steady state voltage stability lin1it or the maximum loading point of the system [138]. The 
third one is based on OPF techniques [139-140]. During this analysis, all the security 
constraints and reserve constraints are included. Post-contingency constraints may also be 
considered into the model. 
A TC can be evaluated as a true optimization problem using a DC network together with linear 
programming. However, this level of modeling accuracy can be dubious, and since Vars and 
voltages often determine MW transfer lin1its, the results could be dangerously optimistic. An 
EPRI sponsored project evaluated ATC based on an AC modeled security constrained OPF 
(SCOPF) problen1. 
3.5.5 Ancillary Services Procurement 
Ancillary services include spinning reserves, non-spinning reserves, AGC, replacement 
reserves, voltage support and black start. For the ISO, there are two approaches to procure 
reserves. One approach is to simultaneously procure reserves and energy in a single combined 
auction and con1pensate the units providing reserves at their opportunity costs derived from 
energy auction. The other approach is to set up a separate auction for procuring reserves. Both 
approaches can be formulated as OPF problems. In the first approach the requirement of 
reserves is treated as a constraint while in the second approach the cost of reserves is the 
objective function. 
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3.5.6 Optimal Transmission Rights Allocation 
Transmission rights allocation or translnission capacity reservation is very important for 
trading electricity and congestion management. All the sold transmission rights must be 
simultaneously feasible. Usually, the ISO will run an auction to allocate transmission rights. 
Market participants can bid into the auction to buy or sell transmission rights. The Auction 
can be implemented by a modified OPF. Transmission Rights are modeled as pairs of power 
injections and withdrawals. The objective is to maximize revenues from transmission rights 
while keeping the system within limits when all transmission rights exist simultaneously in 
the system. The DC network model is often used here, because the auction of transmission 
rights are usually held long before the real-time operation and only active power is concerned. 
3.6 Interior Point Linear/Quadratic Programming and OPF 
3.6.1 Successive Linear Programming 
The nonlinear OPF problem in equation (3-1) can be solved as a succeSSIOn of linear 
approximation to this problem, i.e.: 
Minimize 
subject to: 
where: x 0 ,u 0 
L1x, L1u 
, h' g, 
initial values of x and u, 
shifts about the initial points, 
linear approximations to the original non-linear constraints. 
The basic steps required in the LP-based OPF algorithm are: 
1. Solve the AC power flow problem; 
(3-2) 
2. Linearize the OPF problem (express it in terms of changes about the current exact system 
operating point) by: 
A. piecewise linearizing the objective function, 
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B. contructing and factoring the network Jacobian matrix (unless it has not changed since 
last time), 
C. expressing the limits of monitored constraints as changes with respect to the values of 
these quantities, accurately calculated from power flow, 
D. expressing the incremental control variables Liu as changes about the current variable 
values. 
E. expressIng the incremental limits obtained In Step 2.B above In terms of the 
incremental control variables Liu . 
3. Solve the linearized OPF problem by a LP algorithm, computing the incremental control 
variables Liu ; 
4. Update the control variables u = u + Liu and solve the AC power flow problem again; 
5. If changes in control variables Liu were below user-defined tolerances, the solution has 
been reached. If not, go to Step 2 and continue the iteration. 
As shown in equation (3-2), the optimization problem that is solved at each iteration is a 
linear approximation to the actual optimization problem. Step 2 corresponds to forming the 
linear network model and expressing it in terms of changes about the initial operating points. 
The linearized network model may be derived using either a Jacobian-based coupled 
formulation or a decoupled formulation based on the modified P-Q decoupled power flow 
equations. Since the latter is used in most applications of LP-based OPF, the linear decoupled 
network model is described here. The modified P-Q decoupled power flow equations are: 
BllfJ =M' (3-3) 
(3-4) 
The active power model linearization is based on a linear incrementallossless network model 
in which the change in active power flow in branch I for bus ito} is the same at ends i and}. 
(3-5) 
Here, liB; and liB) are the bus voltage incremental angles, and XI is the branch reactance. 
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The reactive power model is derived from the simplified incremental branch flow equation: 
(3-6) 
where hi is the series admittance of the branch, tl is the transformer tap ratio, and yel is the 
total branch shunt susceptance. This model ignores changes in series reactive losses. 
3.6.2 Interior Point Linear Programming 
Karmarkar's algorithm is significantly different from Dantzig's simplex method in 1963, 
which solves a linear programming problem starting with one extreme point along the 
boundary of the feasible region and skips to a better neighboring extreme point along the 
boundary, finally stopping at an optimal extreme point. Karmarkar's interior point rarely 
visits too many extreme points before an optimal point is found. The IP method stays in the 
interior of the polytope and tries to position a current solution as the "center of the universe" 
in finding a better direction for the next move. By properly choosing the step lengths, an 
optimal solution is achieved after a number of iterations. Although this IP approach requires 
lTIOre computational time in finding a moving direction than the traditional simplex method, 
better moving direction is achieved resulting in fewer iterations. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates how the two methods, IP method and simplex method, reach an optimal 
solution. In this small problem, the projective scaling algorithm requires about the same 
number of iterations as the simplex method. But for a large problem this method would only 
require a small fraction of the number of iterations that the simplex method requires. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
x· 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
X3 
Simplex Method 
IP Method 
Figure 3.2 Con1parison between IP and simplex methods 
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As mentioned above, since Karmarkar's discovery of the interior point method and its 
reported speed advantage over the simplex method, many variants of the IP method have 
evolved in an attempt to solve linear programming problems. As one of the most efficient 
interior point approaches, a second order primal-dual predictor-corrector method, based on 
Mehrotra's method [89], is introduced here briefly. 
The linearized OPF problems in (3-2) can also be written as the following standard primal 
linear programming problem: 
Minimize c T x 
Subject to Ax=b (3-7) 
x+S=u 
x,S ~ 0 
where c,X,S,U E Rn ,b E Rm ,A E Rmxn • Its dual problem is: 
Maximize 
Subject to ATy+z-w=c (3-8) 
z, w~O 
where z, WE R n ,YE R m • 
The logarithmic barrier function is given by adding the nonnegativity of constraints in the 
primal formulation into the objective function as logarithmic barrier penalty items: 
11 n 
L(x,s,f.1) = cT x- f.1(l)nx j + Llns j ) (3-9) 
j=l j=l 
The first-order Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions for (3-9) are: 
Ax=b 
x+s=U 
ATy+z-w=c (3-10) 
XZe = f.1e 
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SWe = fle 
where X,S,Z,Ware diagonal matrices with the elements xi,si,zi' Wi' respectively, e is the 
n-vector of all ones, and fl is a barrier parameter. 
So the Newton's direction can be obtained by solving: 
A 0 0 0 0 L1x b-Ax 
I 0 I 0 0 L1y u-x-s 
0 AT 0 I -I L\s - c-ATy-z+w (3-11) 
Z 0 0 X 0 Liz fle-XZe 
0 0 W 0 S L1w fle-SWe 
Once (L1x,L1y,L\s,Liz,L1w) (denoted with L1 below) has been calculated, the maximum step 
sizes a p and aD' which maintain the ilonnegativity of variables in the primal and dual 
spaces, are found. Next, the variables are updated by: 
Xk+l = xk' + a oa pL1x 
Sk+l = Sk + aoapL\s 
yk+l = yk +aOa DL1y 
k+l k A_ Z = Z +aOa DL..l4 
Wk+1 = wk +aOa DL1w 
(3-12) 
where ao is the step-reduction factor. Then, the barrier parameter fl is updated and the 
iteration process is repeated. 
The factorizations of KKT matrix can take 60% to 90% of the total CPU time for solving a 
problem. So it is important to look for some way to reduce the number of iterations. 
Mehrotra's predictor-corrector technique [89] incorporates high-order information when 
approximating the central trajectory and computing the direction step. The second-order 
variant of this technique has been used widely and proved to be efficient. 
The predictor-corrector technique regards the direction step L1 as two parts: 
(3-13) 
where L1A is the affine-scaling component which is the predictor term and is responsible for 
optimization to reduce the primal and dual infeasibilities and the duality gap, L1e is the 
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centering component which is the corrector term and keeps the current iteration away fronl 
the boundary of feasible region (keeps it close to the central path ideally) . 
.1A is obtained by solving (3-11) with f.l = 0 . .1c is the solution of (3-11) with the right-hand 
side replaced by 
(0,0,0, f.le - XZe, f.le - SWe)T 
T T 
h 
° 
.. (x z+s w ~ . 
were f.l> 1S centenng parameter f.l = , lor example). The maXilllum stepsizes 
2n 
in the primal and in the dual spaces preserving the nonnegativity of (x,s) and (z, w), 
respectively, are determined, and the predicted complementarity gap 
is computed. It is then used to determine' the barrier parameter 
(3-14) 
where g = x T Z+ST W is the current cOlnple1nentarity gap. Next, the second-order component 
of the predictor-corrector is computed. 
(X + .1x )(Z + .1z) = f.le =? Z.1x + X.1z = - XZ + f.le ~ .1x.1z 
When solving (3-11) the second-order term .1x.1z is neglected. To obtain .1c' ilx& can be 
estimated using the affine-scaling direction .1x A.1z A. The sanle process is applied to the other 
second-order tenn .1s.1w. So for such a f.l in (3-14) the .1c can be calculated by solving: 
A 
° ° ° ° 
.1xc 
° I 
° 
1 
° ° 
.1Yc 
° 
° 
AT 
° 
1 -1 .1sc -
° 
(3-15) 
Z 
° ° 
X 
° 
.1zc f.le - .1X A.1Z A e 
° ° 
W 
° 
S .1wc f.le -.1S A.1WAe 
Finally, the direction .1 in (3-13) is determined. 
In the above method, a single iteration of the second-order predictor-corrector primal-dual 
method needs two solves of the same linear system with two different right hand sides. The 
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advantage of this method is that the barrier parameter 11 can be estimated very well and a 
high-order approximation is applied to the central path. 
One advantage of the primal-dual method is that it allows for separate step lengths in the 
primal and dual spaces as shown in (3-12). This has been proven highly efficient in practice, 
significantly reducing the number of iterations to converge. The step lengths (a p , aD) are 
determined in the following way that the nonnegativity conditions x,s ~ 0 and z, w ~ 0 are 
preserved, respectively. 
{
x. s. } a p = min 1, - _J_, - _J_, L1xj < 0, Lls j < 0 L1xj Lls j 
(3-16) 
{ 
z. w. } aD = min 1, __ J , __ J_, L\zj < 0, .1Wj < 0 
L\z. .1w. . 
J J 
(3-17) 
According to the experience in [95], the step-reduction factor ao in (3-12) can be initially set 
as a = 0.95 , then be increased to a = 0.9995 when the primal and dual infeasibility is less 
than a certain value (say 10-2). This will be far more efficient than using a constant value. 
The iteration terminates when the following feasibility and optimality conditions are all 
satisfied. 
• Primal feasibility: 
• Bound feasibility: 
• Dual feasibility: 
• Optimality: 
!lAx-b!l <£ 
l+llxll - f 
Ilx + s - ull < £ 
1 + Ilxll + Ilsll - f 
IIAT y - W + Z - ell < £ 
1 + IIYII + Ilwll + Ilzll - f 
IleT x-(b T y_u T w)11 
~-.,.,.-----:-:---"- < £0 
1 + lib T Y - U T wll -
where £ f and £0 are convergence tolerance for feasibility and optimality conditions, 
respectively. 
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3.6.2 Interior Point Quadratic Programming 
Quadratic Programming is similar to Linear programming but with quadratic objective 
function. The general convex quadratic problem with linear constraints can be written as: 
Minimize 
Subject to Ax=b (3-18) 
x+s=u 
x,S ~ 0 
where c,x,s,u E R n ,b E R m ,A E R mxn • The matrix Q E R nxn is positive semi-definite. Its dual 
problem is: 
Maximize TTl T b y-u w--x Qx 2 
Subject to AT Y + z - w - Qx = c (3-19) 
z, w~O 
where z, WE R n ,YE R m • 
After adding the logarithmic barrier function into primal and dual problems, the first order 
optimal conditions are: 
Ax=b 
x+s=u 
AT Y + z - w - Qx = c (3-20) 
XZe = Ile 
SWe = Ile 
So similarly to linear programming case, the Newton's direction can be obtained by solving: 
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A 0 0 0 0 Llx b-Ax 
1 0 1 0 0 .1y u-x-s 
-Q AT 0 1 -1 .1s - C-AT y-z+w+Qx (3-21) 
z 0 0 X 0 Liz J1e-XZe 
0 0 W 0 S .1w J1e-SWe 
There are two essential differences between the primal-dual method for linear and for 
quadratic programming: 
• Q appears in the left-hand side of system (3-21); 
• Qx appears in the right-hand side of(3-21). 
Except for these two differences, the rest of the process for quadratic programming is the 
same as the process for linear programming. 
3.7 Lagrangian Relaxation Decomposition Approach 
The Lagrangian Relaxation (LR) decomposition procedure, which will be used in Chapter 5 to 
solve multi-regional congestion management problem, is presented below. 
AssUlne that the primal problem has the structure below: 
Inmlmlzex I (x) 
Subject to 
a(x) = 0 
b(x) ~ 0 
c(x) = 0 
d(x) ~ 0 
(3-22) 
- n b C(x) .. RII ~ R C , d(x): RII ~ R d , where I(x): RII ~ R, a(x): R n ~ R a , b(x): R ~ R , 
and a , b , c and d are scalers. 
Constraints c(x) = 0 and d(x) ~ 0 are complex constraints, which should be relaxed to 
simplify the problem (3-22). Therefore, the Lagrangian function is defined as 
(3-23) 
where )., and J1 are Lagrange multiplier vectors. Under the local convexity assun1ptions 
(V:L(x· ,).,*) > 0) the dual function is defined as 
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</l(A,J1) = minimize x L(A,J1,x) 
subject to a(x) = 0 
b(x) ~ 0 
(3-24) 
The dual function is concave and in general non-differentiable. This is a fundamental fact in 
the algorithm stated below. The dual problem is then defined as 
maXImIZeA.,Jl </l (A, J1 ) (3-25) 
subj ect to J1 > 0 
The LR decomposition procedure will be attractive if problem (3-24) can be easily solved 
with fixed values of A and J1. The problem to be solved to evaluate the dual function for the 
given values X and 11 is the so-called relaxed primal problem, i.e. 
mInImIze x 
subject to 
L(X, 11, x) 
a(x) = 0 
hex) ~ 0 
(3-26) 
Problem (3-26) typically decomposes into the following sub-problems, which can be solved in 
parallel. The decomposition facilitates its solution, and normally allows physical and 
economical interpretations. 
n 
minimizexi.v;=l ..... n LL(X, 11, x) 
;=1 
subject to a;(xJ = 0, i = 1, ... ,n (3-27) 
bi(XJ~O, i=l, ... ,n 
Under local convexity assumptions, the local duality theorem says that 
(3-28) 
where x'" is the optimum for the primal problem and (A"', J1"') is the optimum for the dual 
problem. In the non-convex· case, given a feasible solution for the primal problem, x, and a 
feasible solution for the dual problem, (A, J1.), the weak duality theorem says that 
I(x) ~ </l(A,J1) (3-29) 
Therefore, in the convex case the solution of the dual problem provides the solution of the 
primal problen1 while in the non-convex case the objective function value at the optimal 
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solution of the dual problem provides a lower bound to the objective function value at the 
optimal solution of the primal problem. The difference between the objective function values 
of the primal and dual problems at their optimal solutions is called the duality gap. Once the 
solution of the dual problem is achieved, its associated primal problem solution could be 
unfeasible. So feasibility procedures are usually required. 
Lagrange multiplier updating is crucial to implement the LR decomposition procedure. The 
existing methods include subgradient method, cutting plane method, bundle method, 
dynamically constrained cutting plane method, and so on. The description of these methods 
can be found in [5]. 
3.8 Summary 
The background, existing algorithms, applications and new challenges in electricity market of 
OPF techniques are introduced and discussed in this chapter. Particularly, the LP-based OPF 
approach and the·· primal-dual predictor-corrector interior point Linear/Quadratic 
Prograrruning method are presented for the purposes of further illustrations and discussions in 
the following chapters. 
More and more economic concerns in deregulated power industry, together with system 
security constraints, place increasing demand on the extended OPF's modeling, algoritrunic, 
and implementation capabilities. All the existing OPF methodologies have their own peculiar 
limitations in terms of flexibility, adaptability and performance, and it is always difficult to 
identify the method with the best combination of properties. For applications of OPF in 
electricity markets, the robustness and feasibility have particular importance compared with 
its conventional applications. In addition, the bidding curves in various markets are often 
piecewise linear instead of the quadratic generation cost functions in traditional EMS 
applications. Therefore the well-known LP-based OPF approaches are showing more 
attraction than before and have been adopted by many ISOs in practice. 
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Chapter 4. Coordinated Real-time Optimal Dispatch 
through Balancing Mechanism 
4.1 Introduction 
With the deregulation of the power industry, the main services in power systems have been 
unbundled into several separate markets, such as the pool auction energy market where the 
schedule of generation can be arranged to meet the system load, the bilateral contract market 
where the generators and consumers can sell or buy electricity by themselves, and the 
ancillary services market where the ISO can procure the necessary services like system 
reserves and voltage support to maintain the system security. 
Same as the other commodities markets, an electricity market should also be fully open and 
encourage the competition among the participants. However, because electrical energy can 
not be stored in large amounts for a long time, the deregulated unbundled electricity markets 
need a centralized control, which is the ISO, to keep the power system operating in light of 
the criteria of security, economy, and reliability. The functions of the ISO have been 
presented in Chapter 1. The basic tasks of the ISO during real-time operation should include: 
• meeting the real-time in1balance between the actual and scheduled load and generation, 
• and mitigating any real-time network congestion due to unexpected contingencies. 
One of the solutions for the real-time dispatch of electricity markets is to establish a separate 
real-time balancing market and to encourage all the market participants to take part in the 
competition in this balancing market. This real-time balancing mechanism has been adopted 
by California [26] and appears as a key part in the New Electricity Trading Arrangement 
(NET A) in England and Wales [25]. 
Some research has been undertaken on the dispatch problems in electricity markets. In [32], F. 
F. Wu and P. Varaiya proposed a decentralized optimal dispatch method with the objective of 
maximizing social welfare under the coordinated Inultilateral trade model. In [33], H. Singh, 
S. Hao and A. Papalexopoulos made son1e comparisons between the approaches of 
translnission congestion management in pool model and bilateral model respectively. In [34-
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35], A.K. David and R.S. Fang provided some useful curtailment strategies based on the 
purpose of minimizing deviations from transaction requests made by market participants in a 
structure dominated by bilateral and multilateral contracts. H. Singh and A. Papalexopoulos 
introduced the basic idea of auction market for ancillary services in California in [144]. The 
dispatch of ancillary services and the interaction between the various markets are also 
discussed in this paper briefly. In [103] and [104], optimal scheduling methods were proposed 
for New Zealand market and New England market, where the procurement of necessary 
operating reserves is combined with the procurement of the energy Goint dispatch) while the 
network constraints are taken into account. 
However, the problem still remaining for an ISO to resolve is how to use all the possible 
resources during the real-time execution of various electricity commodity contracts efficiently 
and coordinately to ensure the system security. The main difficulties occurring in this real-
time coordinated dispatch problem could be: 
• how to dispatch the agreed system reserves contracts together with the supplemental 
energy bids in the balancing market; 
• with the trend that more and more bilateral contracts are used to trade electricity, how to 
eliminate network congestion if the resources in the balancing market are not enough; 
• to maintain the system security level, how to purchase replacement operating reserves if 
any of the pre-arranged operating reserves are called upon to provide energy for real-time 
system balancing or congestion management [26]. 
To resolve these difficulties, a new framework for real-time dispatch of unbundled electricity 
markets is proposed in this chapter. Under this framework, almost all the contracts in various 
markets can be dispatched and coordinated by submitting their adjustment bids to the 
balancing market. In particular, some bilateral contracts can be adjusted if the congestion of 
the network is very serious [36, 145]. Demand side participants are encouraged to play an 
active role in the competition of the real-time balancing market. A modified P-Q decoupled 
OPF is applied to solve this problem. The objective of the P sub-problem is to coordinate the 
dispatch among the pool auction contracts, the bilateral contracts and some operating reserve 
contracts, in accordance with the cost which is determined by the bids submitted by these 
contracts to the balancing n1arket. The spot pricing and the two possible settlen1ent 
methodologies are analyzed as well. A 5-bus test system and the IEEE 30-bus test system are 
studied to illustrate the proposed framework and its mathematical solution. 
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4.2 Framework of Real-Time Coordinated Dispatch 
In the proposed framework which is shown in Figure 4.1, there are four unbundled markets, 
which are Bilateral Contract Market (BCM), Pool Day-ahead Energy Auction Market 
(PEAM), Pool Ancillary Services Auction Market (P AAM) and Real-time Balancing Market 
(RBM), respectively. 
Bilateral 
Contract 
Market 
~-24h 
Generators 
Ancillary 
Services 
Market 
1 __ 
Consumers 
-24h ~ -lh 
-lh -7 Dh :> 
Figure 4.1 The proposed framework of real-time coordinated dispatch 
4.2.1 Bilateral Contract Market (BCM) 
In BCM, generators and consumers arrange physical electrical energy trades with each other 
based on their own financial interests. Instead of letting the ISO know the prices of their 
contracts, participants must report the quantities of their bilateral contracts to the ISO before 
the opening of the day-ahead energy auction market. 
4.2.2 Pool Day-ahead Energy Auction Market (PEAM) 
In PEAM all the contracts must be signed with the ISO, who receives energy bids from 
generators and conSUlners, and then selects cheapest generations to supply the demands in the 
whole system while all the network constraints must be satisfied. PEAM opens after BCM 
closes. It gives market participants another opportunity to buy or sell sufficient electricity to 
meet their requirelnent if they can not conclude all the necessary transactions in BCM. 
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4.2.3 Pool Ancillary Services Auction Market (P AAM) 
Instead of electrical energy, the ancillary services are the commodities traded in PAAM. The 
ISO can determine the amount of required ancillary services by the load forecast and the 
preferred schedule. The ancillary services traded here include regulation reserves (AGC), 
spinning reserves, non-spinning reserves and replacement reserves, which are shown in Figure 
4.2. The other two services, voltage support and black start can be procured in some special 
long-term markets. Each participant in P AAM must submit both a capacity bid and an energy 
bid for each service [144]. The energy bid will be used for real-time dispatch in RBM. The 
coordinated bid clearing strategies between PEAM and PAAM were given for New Zealand 
in [103] and for New England in [104]. Since the subject of this paper is real-time dispatch, 
only the operating reserves, which include AGC, spinning reserves and non-spinning reserves, 
are taken into account. 
Operating 
lReserves 
Non-spinning 
Reserves 
A Spinning Replacement G 
C Reserves Reserves 
... 
-10 Seconds 10 minutes 60 minutes 
Figure 4.2. Four types of reserves traded in PAAM 
4.2.4 Real-time Balancing Market and Coordinated Dispatch (RBM) 
RBM plays a key role in real-time operation of electricity markets. In RBM the ISO IS 
responsible for dispatching all the available resources to meet imbalances between actual and 
scheduled load and generation and alleviate network congestion. The ISO will select the least 
cost resources to meet these in1balances. In addition, the ISO may also need to purchase 
replacement ancillary services if any service arranged in advance are used to provide 
balancing energy [26]. The purpose of RBM is to establish a fully open market-based 
mechanism for all the market participants to take part in the real-time competition. In RBM, 
all the generators and consumers can subn1it to the ISO their incremental and decrelnental 
bids for providing balancing energy and their capacity bids for the replacement of operating 
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reserves which are used as balancing energy. In the NET A of the UK market, these 
incremental/decremental bids are called "pairs of offer and bid". 
Because the ISO does not know the price information of bilateral contracts and the 
modification of a bilateral contract could involve both sides of a contract, it is very difficult to 
find a proper way to change them for the purpose of reducing transmission congestion. One 
method is that both parties submit their own supplemental bids in RBM separately, just like 
the other participants in the pool. The ISO does not take into account the content of the 
bilateral contract during settlement. However, in the event of a high percentage of bilateral 
contracts not producing enough voluntary supplemental bids from them or both parties of a 
bilateral contract are willing to be curtailed by the same amount to simplify the settlement, 
other methods are needed. In the proposed framework, every bilateral contract should sublnit 
a sort of compensative price that both parties of the contract are willing to accept if the 
curtailment needs to be ilnposed by the ISO during congestion periods. In accordance with 
such information, the ISO can reduce the scheduled bilateral contract if the other available 
resources in RBM are not enough to eliminate the congestion. 
Pool 
Energy 
Auction 
Contracts 
Bilateral 
Contracts 
pmin 
I 
o 
b~n 
1 
'" b+ bRep i' i ~ 
b ~ ~r-R-e-a-I--ti-m-e-' 
I - ~ Balancing 
bY ... Market 
I ", 
Figure 4.3 Typical contracts associated with a generator at bus i and their adjustment 
bids to RBM 
In Figure 4.3, 
l,) Index of network buses. 
Scheduled MW generation of generator or MW load of consumer at bus i. 
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p/ Total MW amount of bilateral contracts between buses i and}. 
p;min ,p;max Low and high limit ofMW at bus i either for generator or for consumer. 
p;Res Operating reserves procured by ISO from participant at bus i in ancillary 
services market. 
f1P;+ ,f1P;- Incremental and decremental MW changes of participant at bus i in real-time 
balancing market. 
t1P,Res 
I 
t1P,Re p 
I 
Curtailment of bilateral contract between buses i and}. 
Operating reserves called upon by ISO in the real-time balancing market out of 
pRes. 
I 
Reserves at bus i procured by ISO in real-time balancing market to replace the 
used operating reserves. 
Incremental and decremental bidding prices of participant at bus i in RBM 
($/MW). 
b? Compensative price for the curtailment of bilateral contract between buses i and 
j ($/MW). 
biEn Bidding price of the energy output from p;Res ($/MW). 
bjRep Bidding price to provide L1P;Re p at bus i ($/MW). 
Some typical contracts of active power associated with a generator at bus i and their bids 
submitted to the ISO in RBM are shown in Figure 4.3, in which the adjustment of generation 
at bus i is divided into four separate parts based on three unbundled electricity contracts. 
One advantage of this framework is that the ISO can have more available real-time resources 
to dispatch in accordance with various adjustment bids in RBM to maintain the system 
security. The cost of real-time dispatch can be allocated to all the other market participants in 
light of real-time Locational Marginal Price (LMP) or through a system uplift. 
4.3 Mathematical Model of the Proposed Framework 
A lllodified P-Q decoupled OPF is applied to implement the proposed framework. Both P-
and Q sub-problems are presented, and the P sub-problem is analyzed in nl0re detail. Before 
80 
Chapter 4. Coordinated Real-time Optimal Dispatch through Balancing Mechanism 
the trade period, the schedules of unbundled markets should have been established. The 
principle of the balancing mechanism is to follow the schedules as close as possible and to 
minimize the cost of real-time dispatch. After linearization at the scheduled operating point, 
the model of real-time coordinated optimal dispatch can be written in following sections. 
4.3.1 P Sub-problem 
4.3.1.1 ObJective 
To make the settlement of unbundled markets clear and simple, the objective of real-time 
active power dispatch can be decomposed into four parts. 
Min: Cp = Cp ) + Cp2 + Cp3 + Cp4 (4-1) 
where 
Cp ) = L (bt dP/ + bi- dPi-) (4-2) 
iePEAM 
is the total cost for the adjustment of PEAM contracts whose supplemental bids are accepted 
in RBM. But for accepted decremental bids, the participants can not get any payment for this 
part of reduced energy from the ISO in PEAM settlement; 
C = ~ b~n !1pRes p2 L...i, , (4-3) 
iePAAM 
is the cost for calling upon energy from the agreed operating reserve contracts in RBM; 
Cp3 = L L(bt dP/) 
ieBCM jeBCM 
j<i 
(4-4) 
is the cost for curtailment of bilateral contracts in REM. This curtailment should be done at 
the both sides of bilateral contract; and 
C = ~(b.Rep t1P. Rep ) 
p4 L...i' , 
(4-5) 
ieRBM 
is the cost of reserves re-procured by ISO in RBM to replace the used operating reserves. In 
the event of an unscheduled increase in system load, the ISO will be required to purchase 
additional reserves. In addition, if any of the pre-arranged operating reserves are used to Ineet 
a real-time in1balance, the ISO will be required to purchase replacen1ent operating reserves. 
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The reserve market and the balancing energy market will be still settled separately. 
Embedding the cost of replacement of operating reserves in the objective function of real-time 
dispatch is to find a global optimal solution. It can be regarded as the real-time joint dispatch 
of energy and reserves. 
Obviously, the objective is to minimize the modification on all the scheduled contracts in 
light of the associated dispatch cost. ~+, ~- ,~ij ,~ReS and~Rep are treated as 
independent control variables during the optimization process. But their upper/lower limits 
are coupled with each other. All the bidding curves could be multi-step. The incremental 
bidding price is higher than decremental bidding price while the curtailment price of bilateral 
contracts is much higher than the other two. The reason is that increasing output needs more 
fuel cost and the curtailment to a bilateral contract will affect the financial interests of both 
parties. 
4.3.1.2 Equality Constraints 
The equation below is the nodal active power flow balance equation of bus i: 
/1 
(-1)fJ[~+ _~- - L(~ij)]+~Res + LB~L1ej _~LOSS = ° (4-6) 
jeBCM j=l 
j~j j~s 
f3 = 0, if i E G; f3 -:- 1, if i E C. 
where G is the set of buses connected with generators, C is the set of buses connected with 
consumers, n is the total number of network buses, s is the index of the slack bus, B ~ is an 
element of matrix B / which is the inverse reactance of branch ij. ~LOSS is the summed 
change of losses on branches that are connected to bus i and flows on the branches are 
flowing to bus i. Using the piece-wise linear loss model, ~L()SS can be written as 
iJP.Luss = ~ LF .. (iJP..). e. is the set of buses which have branches connected with bus i and 
I L...J IJ IJ I 
je8; 
flows on the branches are flowing to bus i. 
The requirenlent of re-procurement to replace used operating reserves is given by 
L~Rep =a L~Res (4-7) 
ieRBM iePAAM 
where a is decided by the ISO according to how many new operating reserves are procured 
to compensate for the used reserves in real-time dispatch. ° ~ a ~ 1. 
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4.3.1.3 Inequality Constraints 
The changing ranges of the various control variables are given by 
o < L1P.+ + L1P. Re p :::;; .1p'+,max = pmax _ pO _ pRes 
I I I Iii
n 
o <M;- :::;; M;-,max = p;O - max(Lp;iJ ,p;min) 
)=1 
)*n 
n n 
o :::;; M;iJ :::;; P;iJ , 0 :::;; L M;iJ < min(L P;iJ ,p;min ) 
)=1 )=1 
)*i )*; 
whilst 
_ pmax _ pO _ A nmin < AD < A Dmax _ pmax _ pO 
/ / - LlF/ _ LlF/ _ LlF/ - / / 
is the constraint for real power flow change on branch I. 
4.3.1.4 Pricing for Real-Time Active Power Dispatch 
From (4-6), we can have the system active power balance equation as: 
n 
LM; - jjpLoss = 0 
i=1 
(4-8) 
(4-9) 
(4-10) 
(4-11) 
(4-12) 
(4-13) 
where M; is the total change of active power at bus i and jjpLosS is the total change of active 
n 
power losses. jjpLoss = L M;Loss . So the Lagrangian function of the primal optimization 
;=1 
problem is: 
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n 
L = e p - A(I L1P; - ;jpLoss) 
;=1 
- 11 Re p ( I L1P; Re p - a L ~Res ) 
ieRBM iePAAM 
+ IIl;(L1P;+ +~Rep _~+,max) 
iePEAM (4-14) 
iePEAM 
+ III iRe S (L1P; Re S - p; Re s ) + III f (;jp/ - p/ ) 
iePAAM ieBCM 
+ Illlmin(~min _~) + Llllmax(~ _~max) 
~B ~B 
According to the KKT first order conditions, we have: 
. de d;jpLoss ;jp, 
----',_J _ (-1)/3 A(l- ) + ,,+ + ~(II max _ II min )_1 = 0 
d A D+ . dM+ /"""1 L.J /"""1 /"""1 ;jp.+ L..JIi i leB 1 
(4-15) 
(4-16) 
de d;jp Loss . ;jp, 
------,'=----J .. + (-1) /3 A .. +" ~ + ~ (11 max - 11 mm ) -~. = 0 
d A DIJ d A DIJ /"""1 L.J I I MIJ L..JIi L..JIi leB 1 
(4-17) 
(4-18) 
+ ~ (II max _ II min) ~ = 0 L.J /"",,1 /""", MRes 
~B i 
(4-19) 
It is obvious that 
(4-20) 
and 
(4-21) 
84 
Chapter 4. Coordinated Real-time Optimal Dispatch through Balancing Mechanism 
Using the theory of spot pricing [1, 108], the LMP of a participant (either a generator or a 
consumer) at bus i is: 
(4-22) 
Shown in equation (4-22), the real-time spot price at bus i can be decomposed into three parts: 
the system lambda, the active power losses and the congestion management cost. 
From equations (4-15 to 4-18), we can have different forms of p t at bus i at which the 
participant has made some contribution to the real-time dispatch. 
(4-23) 
Although the adjustment on the contracts of a participant is divided into four independent 
control variables (two increasing ones and two decreasing ones), at the optimal point only one 
of them could be active (on adjustment). From equation (4-23) we can fmd out the effects of 
the costs and the changing ranges of these control variables on A. 
From equations (4-17) and (4-23), it is noticed that the curtailment of bilateral contracts has 
little effect on the system A. It is due to the item &/, which exists in two nodal active 
power balance equations with different sign, but does not appear in the system balance 
equation (4-13). The various cases of bilateral contract curtailment and its pricing will be 
discussed in the following section. 
4.3.1.5 Meeting Real-Time Imbalance of Market under Normal Operating Conditions 
Providing there is no serious contingency, the operating reserves and the supplemental energy 
in RBM should be enough to follow the system load fluctuation. The curtailment of bilateral 
contracts and load shedding are not necessary in this case. To model this problem, the 
objective in (4-1) should be rewritten as: 
(4-24) 
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and all the constraints of ~ij should be removed. 
Given the system load fluctuation L1P sYS, the bus load change can be expressed as: 
BL. = Tl.L1Psys 
I • , I (4-25) 
where 17; is bus load allocation factors, I 17; = 1 . 
;EC 
To meet this system imbalance, the right hand side of equation (4-6) changes to BL; from O. 
Considering that rapid response generation units are enough to meet the normal system 
imbalance, to reduce the number of control variables, the nodal active power balance 
equations (4-6) for pure load buses can be rewritten as: 
n 
~ B~.L1(}. - L1PLoss = BL. ~ lj ) I I 
j=l 
I:¢:.s 
and the system balance equation (4-13) can be changed to: 
n L LiP; - L1P Los.y = L1P sys 
;=1 
Without any branch limit violation, the LMP at bus i is: 
dL1PLoss 
P: = .1- A 
I di1P 
I 
4.3.1.6 Replacement of Operating Reserves 
From equation (4-19), the marginal price of the replacement of operating reserves is: 
p Re p = J1 Re p + J1t 
(4-26) 
(4-27) 
(4-28) 
(4-29) 
The cost of replacement of operating reserves affects the LMPs through the item 
aJ1 Rep instead of appearing in the equation (4-22) or (4-28) directly. 
Calling up energy from operating reserves during real-time dispatch, the ISO must pay for not 
only the energy but also the procurement of the reserve replacement. Therefore, if the 
supplemental energy in RBM is fast and cheap enough, the reserve contracts signed in P AAM 
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could be left unchanged. As a result, the real-time balancing mechanism expands the concept 
of operating reserves and gives market participants more competitive opportunities. 
4.3.1.7 Curtailment of Bilateral Contracts 
According to the characteristics of bilateral contract, the curtailment should be done to both 
parties of the contract as has been discussed above. However, the problem in pricing is that 
the system A and the LMPs can not reflect the cost of the curtailment of bilateral contracts. 
During the settlement of RBM, the ISO should pay the owners of a bilateral contract its 
bidding price while the ISO will allocate this cost to all the other participants by uplift or 
according to the ratios decided by equation (4-22). 
But sometimes the load in a bilateral contract is too important to be curtailed or the response 
of the generation unit in a bilateral con'tract is not fast enough to decrease its output to 
mitigate the network congestion. In these two cases, the energy imbalance caused by single 
side curtailment will be taken by the other available resources in RBM. Here, the partner of a 
bilateral contract without curtailment will not get the compensation payment from the ISO. 
On the contrary, this participant lnust pay for the dispatch cost for this imbalance. Because 
one M/ has been removed from the nodal power balance equation (4-6), equation (4-17) 
changes to: 
ac aL1P Lou , ;jp, 
--,p'--.. + (-1) fJ ,1(1 + .. ) + J..t¥ + ~ (J..l max - J..l mill) _I,. = 0 
a A nY a A nY I £..J I I L1PY ~; ~; leB I 
(4-30) 
Then the equation (4-23) has another form as: 
fJ 1 ae .. P ~ = (-1) + ( p .. + J.1~) 
I aMY I 
I 
(4-31) 
In these two cases, the LMPs can reflect the curtailment of this bilateral contract. 
4.3.2 Q Sub-problem 
The Q Sub-problem of real-time coordinated optimal dispatch can be formulated as: 
n T 
Minimize: L (w; LiQ; + w;-LiQ;-) + Lrk (Lit; + Lit;) 
;=1 k=1 
(4-32) 
Subject to: 
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(4-33) 
o <L1Q: < Q~ax _QO 0 < L1Q~ < QO _Qmin 
I I I' - 1-; ; (4-34) 
O < L1t+ < t max - to 0 < At- < to _ t min 
- k-k k' _Ll k - k k (4-35) 
( 4-36) 
where ow; and w; are the reactive power incremental and decremental bidding prices of 
participant i in RBM respectively, L1Q; and L1Q;- are its increasing output and decreasing 
output of reactive power respectively, Q;o, Q;min, Qjmax are its current reactive power output 
or load, minimum reactive power and maximum reactive power respectively. T is the number 
of transformers, whose tap positions are adjustable, in the system. L1t; and L1t; are the 
increasing tap ratio and the decreasing tap ratio of transformer k. rk is the bidding price for 
the adjustment of tap positions of transformer k if there are any independent transmission 
companies and the transmission sector is also competitive. t Z , t ;in , t ;ax are the current tap 
ratio, the minimum and maximum tap ratios of transformer k, respectively. L1V; is the change 
of the voltage magnitude at bus i, V; ° , V; min, and V; max are its current value, lower limit and 
upper limit. B; is an element of the matrix B H • 
The Q sub-problem looks similar to the P sub-problem. Because the reactive power can not be 
sent through a long distance, there is no bilateral contract for it. The first item in the objective 
represents all the controllable reactive power injections, such as generators, capacitors, 
reactors, ST A TCOM, SVC and so on. These devices may belong to generation companies, 
transmission companies, distribution companies or large consumers. The second item in the 
objective is the cost for adjusting the taps of controllable transformers which belong to the 
transmission or distribution companies. Equation (4-33) is the nodal reactive power balancing 
equation of bus i. The constraints of control variables of reactive power are given in Formulae 
(4-34) and (4-35). Fom1ula (4-36) is the voltage constraint of bus i. 
4.4 Imbalance Settlement Methodologies 
Basically, the imbalance settlement should be a post-event of limited volumes and mandatory 
for most market participants. There are two possible methods to settle the dispatch cost in 
RBM: 
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Pay as bid. The ISO pays the participants, whose bids have been accepted in RBM, for 
their measured adjustment according to their bidding prices. Generators, whose 
decremental bids have been accepted by the ISO, will get payment in RBM, but these 
reduced outputs should not be included in the settlement of PEAM. On the other hand , 
the ISO will allocate the dispatch cost to those participants whose have caused the system 
imbalance. The advantage of this method is its simplicity while the disadvantage is that 
all the participants are treated equally even though they have very different effects on 
network congestion or the change of system loss; 
• Pay as LMPs. The ISO will use the obtained LMPs to make the payment as well as to 
collect the dispatch cost. The principle of this method is to settle the cost in RBM in 
accordance with the participants' contribution to network congestion and system loss, as 
analyzed in section 4.3. Because the settlement ofRBM should use the ex post pricing, the 
proposed coordinated dispatch method should be run again after the ISO obtains the 
measurement from SCADA to provide the exact LMPs for the settlement. 
4.5 Implementation 
To solve the problem fast and reliably, an AC Power Flow and a Primal-dual Interior Point 
(IP) Linear Programming (LP) are used to implement the above OPF algorithm as described 
in Chapter 3. 
There have been some discussions in Chapter 3 on the point at which method is more suitable 
for OPF, LP-based, Newton-based method, or other methods. Regarding the real-time o.ptimal 
dispatch problem in electricity market, LP seems to have very good prospects due to the 
following reasons: 
• Multi-step bidding price curves instead of second order cost curves are used to form the 
objective function. Linearizing the objective function, which is one of the main problems 
of LP-based OPF [13][14], does not exist any longer. 
• LP-based OPF is more reliable than Newton-based OPF. LP-based OPF can detect an 
infeasible problem quickly and deal with any sort of constraints easily. These features are 
very important to the real-time dispatching of the electricity market. 
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• The new development in IP method makes the LP-based OPF much faster than before 
when solving large-scale problems and more suitable for the real-time application. 
• The LMPs can be obtained from the shadow prices of nodal equation constraints, which 
are the by-products of Prime-Dual LP-based OPF. 
The procedure of the decoupled OPF implemented in this chapter is as follows: 
Step 1: Run the AC Power Flow to get the initial state of power system; 
Step2: Compute the necessary sensitivities and linearize the constraints; 
Step3: Select the control variables of LP according to the bids in RBM. Decide if the bilateral 
contract curtailment is needed and which curtailment strategy should be used; 
Step4: Run LP to solve P sub-problem; 
Step5: Run LP to solve Q sub-problem; 
Step6: Correct the control variables, then run AC Power Flow to get the new state of power 
system; 
Step7: Check if all the constraints have been satisfied. If yes, continue; if no, go tostep2; 
Step8: Obtain the optimal coordinated dispatch strategy. 
4.6 Test Results 
Two test systems are studied to illustrate the proposed method. First, a 5-bus test system is 
analyzed to demonstrate the proposed congestion management approach through the Real-
time Balancing Market, particularly the curtailment of bilateral contracts in case of very 
serious translnission congestion. Then, the IEEE 30-bus test system is studied to show how 
the real-time coordinated optimal dispatch works and the LMPs obtained from it. Finally, a 
computational comparison between the Simplex LP method and Interior Point LP method is 
performed to show the efficiency of the latter. 
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4.6.1 5-bus Test System 
The network structure and the power flow in base case are shown in Figure 4.4. In this system 
there are two generators which are G 1 at bus 4 and G2 at bus 5 and three consumers which are 
L1 at bus 1, L2 at bus 2 and L3 at bus 3. One bilateral contract, which is 300MW, is signed 
between Gland L3 in BCM. All the other electricity supplies in this system are arranged by 
ISO in PEAM. In RBM, G 1, G2 and L3 submit their incremental and decremental bids to the 
ISO to take part in the real-time dispatching competition. The bilateral contract p34 also 
submits a curtailment price b34 to ISO. From these bidding prices, it can be found easily that 
the prices for adjustment of loads is higher than generators, because the latter are much more 
flexible to adjust. The curtailment price of bilateral contract is prohibitively high because both 
sides of the contract do not want any curtailment at all. So the control strategy given by (4-1 
to 4-12) is to curtail bilateral contract only if the network congestion is so serious that the 
available resources in RBM can not mitigate it efficiently. 
4 
500MW 
500MW 
__ >~ 2142MW 
L2 
200MW 
b: = 15$1 MW bi = 5$1 MW 
b; = 20$1 MW b; = 8$1 MW 
b; = 30$1 MW b~ = 10$1 MW 
p34 = 300MW b 34 = 50$1 MW 
128MW 
L1160MW 
3 258MW 
< 
L3 
370MW 
5 
Figure 4.4 The base case power flows of the 5-bus test system 
258MW 
Case 1: Congestion management without changing bilateral contracts. Assume that the MW 
limit on line 2-3 is reduced to 100MW due to SOlne reason. To mitigate this congestion, the 
cheapest solution is to decrease the output of G 1 to 440.60MW and to increase the output of 
G2 to 308MW. As a result, the active power flow of line 2-3 at bus 2 is reduced to 99.67MW. 
The total cost of this re-dispatch is $1497. In this case, no balancing resources of consumers 
are used· although L2 has highest sensitivity to active power flow of line 2-3, because the 
bidding prices of L2 are much higher than generators. The bilateral contract p34 is carried out 
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without curtailment because the available resources of G 1 in RBM are enough to eliminate 
the congestion. 
Case 2: Congestion management with changing bilateral contracts. Assume that the MW limit 
on transformer 4-2 is reduced to 250MW. Obviously, the output of G 1 should be reduced to 
250MW. But because 300MW of the output of G1 belong to the bilateral contract p34 
between G 1 and L3, the curtailment to p34 must be done in this case. The optimal controls to 
solve this problem are as follow: 
• Reducing 200MW from the output ofG1 in RBM; 
• Curtailing 50MW from bilateral contract p34, which means both G 1 and L3 will be 
reduced by 50 MW; 
• Increasing the output of G2 to 444MW. 
The total cost of the re-dispatch in this case is $7200. 
4.6.2 IEEE 30-bus system 
Figure 4.5 IEEE 30-bus test system 
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The IEEE 30-bus system, shown in Figure 4.5, is used here to illustrate the proposed 
coordinated dispatch method. The network parameters and injection data can be found in 
Table B.l and Table B.2 in Appendix B.1. 
Table 4.1 The bids of participants in RBM 
Partici Supplemental bids Operating Reserves Base MAX MIN 
-pants Incr. Bids Deer. Bids Cap. Bids En. Bids Amount Point MW (S/MWb) (S/MWb) (SMW) (S/MWh) (MW) (MW) MW 
0-1 35 15 3.5 35 / 138.53 200 50 
0-2 15 8 2.5 15 / 57.56 100 20 
0-5 15 8 1.5 15 / 24.56 100 10 
0-8 30 12 1.5 15 30 35.00 65 10 
0-11 25 10 2.5 25 / 17.93 50 10 
0-13 15 5 1.5 15 / 16.91 50 5 
C-24 / 40 / / / 8.70 15 3 
Bilateral contract From . To Contract Amount Curtailment Bids (MW) ($/MW) 
Bl 0-13 C-30 10.6 50 
The various bids of participants, including generators, consumers and bilateral contracts, are 
given in Table 4.1, in which 0-1 means generator at bus 1 and C-24 means consumer at bus 
24. 
4.6.2.1 Coordinated Dispatch without Network Congestion 
Assulne that there is a 100MW increase on system load, which has been distributed to 
individual buses according to their current load shares. Set a = 1 , then the obtained optimal 
dispatch strategy to meet this load fluctuation is shown in Table 4.2. Figure 4.6 reveals the 
two components of LMPs under normal operating conditions, which are system lambda and 
network losses. 
Table 4.2 The optimal dispatch strategy to meet the load fluctuation 
Partici PEAM contracts 
Calling Upon Replacement of 
-pants Increase Decrease 
PAAM Operating 
(MW) (MW) contracts (MW) Reserves (MW) 
0-5 75.44 0 0 0 
0-8 0 0 24.72 0 
0-13 0 0 0 24.72 
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Figure 4.6 Components of spot prices under normal operating condition 
The cost of replacement of used operating reserves is not a component of LMPs in Equation 
(4-28). However, it can affect the value of system lambda. Figure 4.7 demonstrates the change 
of LMPs under different replacement procuren1ent of used operating reserves by giving 
a=O,a = O.5,a=1. 
16 ~-----------------------------------------------, 
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Figure 4.7 Effects of different replacement procurement of operating reserves on 
LMPs 
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4.6.2.2 Coordinated Dispatch with Network Congestion 
Case 1: Based on the same load fluctuation and the same operating reserves replacement level 
(a = 1) as those in last section, the active power flow on line 36 (from bus-28 to bus-27) is 
24.79MW. Now reduce the limit of active power flow on this line to 24MW, the optimal 
dispatch strategy to eliminate this light congestion with meeting the given load change is 
shown in Table 4.3. In this case, three components of the LMP given in Equation (4-22), 
which are system lambda, network losses and congestion management, are illustrated in 
Figure 4.8. 
Table 4.3 The optimal dispatch strategy with active power flow violation on line 36. 
Partici PEAM contracts Calling Upon Replacement of 
-pants Increase Decrease PAAM Operating (MW) (MW) contracts (MW) Reserves (MW) 
0-5 75.44 0 0 0 
0-8 0 0 13.22 0 
0-13 11.63 0 0 13.22 
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Figure 4.8 Components of spot prices with network congestion 
Con1pared with Figure 4.6, the spot prices in Figure 4.8 have not changed a lot at n10st buses 
except buses 25-27, 29-30. That n1eans these several buses have higher sensitivity to the 
congested line 36 than the other buses. In other word, the conSU111ers at these buses should pay 
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most of the cost caused by network congestion. Because the congestion is very slight, the 
associated Lagrangian multiplier l1~ax = -2.21 is not terribly big. 
Case 2: Based on the same operating condition as in case 1, but the congestion branch in this 
case is line 18 (from bus-12 to bus-15), whose base active power flow is 22.67MW. Now 
reduce the limit of active power flow on this line to 19MW because of an unexpected 
contingency, the optitnal dispatch strategy to eliminate this congestion with Ineeting the given 
load change is shown in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 The optimal dispatch strategy with active power flow violation on line 18. 
Partici PEAM contracts Calling Upon Curtailment of Replacement of 
Increase Decrease PAAM contracts Bilateral Operating 
-pants (MW) (MW) (MW) Contracts iMJYl Reserves (MW) 
G-5 45.50 0 0 / 15.60 
G-8 0 0 30.00 / 0 
G-11 32.07 0 0 / 0 
G-13 0 6.31 0 1.50 14.40 
C-30 / / / 1.50 / 
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Figure 4.9 Spot prices for congestion management with bilateral contract curtailment 
From Table 4.4 it can be noticed that this network congestion is so serious that the 
decrelnental bids of G-13 is still not enough to eliminate it. Son1e transaction in bilateral 
contract B 1 has to be curtailed. However, according to the discussion in section 4.3.1.7, the 
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cost of this curtailment can not be embedded into the defined spot prices. It must be allocated 
to market participants separately. 
To demonstrate it, we change the curtaillnent strategy of bilateral contract to only decreasing 
the generation while keeping the load supplied by other available resources in REM. The 
comparison of spot prices between these two situations is given in Figure 4.9. Compared with 
Figure 4.8 the fluctuation of spot prices in Figure 4.9 is very large, which means the 
congestion in this case is very serious. The price at bus 15 is prohibitively high because the 
consumer at bus 15 is the main cause of this congestion. Another phenomenon that should be 
noticed in Figure 4.9 is that the spot prices at buses 12 and 13 are negative. Negative price at 
bus-13 means that decremental or bilateral curtailment bids from 0-13 must have been 
accepted by the ISO to eliminate the network congestion. Negative price at bus-12 implies 
that L-12 can get payment in REM from increasing its load since this action could be helpful 
to alleviate the congestion. 
Case 3: Voltage limit violation. Change the active load at bus 26 from 3.5 MW to 33.5 MW. 
As a result, the voltage at bus 26 decreases to 0.82 p.u. and violates the lower lilnit 0.85 p.u. 
Reactive congestion management is run to eliminate the voltage violation. Figure 4.10 shows 
the nodal prices of reactive power, which are the shadow prices of the nodal reactive power 
balancing equality constraints of the Q sub-problem. It is obvious that the reactive power 
price at bus 6 is prohibitively high. This penalty is reasonable, because the voltage violation is 
caused by the heavy active load at bus 26. This price signal also implies a planning 
requirement that some reactive power compensation devices should be installed at or near this 
spot. 35 
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Figure 4.10 Effects of voltage violation on nodal prices 
4.6.3 The Comparison Between the RSLP and PDIPLP 
Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12 exhibit the iteration number and the CPU time of linear 
programming to solve the real-time dispatch problem in 5-bus, IEEE 30-bus, IEEE 57-bus and 
IEEE-118 bus test systems using the Primal-Dual Interior Point Linear Programming 
(PDIPLP) and the Revised Simplex Linear Pprogramming (RSLP). Both algorithms have 
been coded in Visual FORTRAN 6.0 and implemented on a PII/400 PC. The advantages of 
PDIPLP can be seen clearly from these two figures. With increasing the size of the problem, 
the iteration number of RSLP increases very quickly while the iteration number of PDIPLP 
almost keeps unchanged. The CPU time of PDIPLP is also much less than that of RSLP. The 
bigger the system is, the better performance PDIPLP will show than RSLP. Therefore, 
applying PDIPLP to real-time dispatch of electricity market can meet its time requirement 
very well. 
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Figure 4.12 Comparison between PDIPLP and RSLP on CPU time 
4.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter, a coordinated real-time optimal dispatch method for unbundled electricity 
markets has been proposed. The main features of this method are the following: 
• Three types of electricity contracts, which are bilateral energy contract, Pool energy 
auction contract and ancillary services contract, have been taken into account in the 
coordinated dispatch; 
• Balancing mechanism plays the key role in the proposed framework, where the ISO can 
meet the system in1balance and n1itigate the network congestion by using various bids; 
• The adjustment of bus injection has been divided into several independent control 
variables according to unbundled contracts to embed all the possible bids in RBM into the 
objective of active power optimization; 
• The curtailment strategies of bilateral contracts have been integrated into the proposed 
method; 
• The economical meaning of Lagrangian multipliers, which decide the LMPs of real-time 
dispatch, has been analyzed in detail. 
Test results demonstrate that the proposed coordinated dispatch method implemented with a 
modified OPF can deal with the system imbalance and network congestion simultaneously 
and successfully. The comparison between PDIPLP and RSLP shows that the PDIPLP is 
much more efficient to deal with large systems with a huge number of control variables. 
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Chapter 5. Real-time Congestion Management 
across Interconnected Regions 
5.1 Introduction 
In the emerging competitive environment, congestion management is one of the n10st 
important functions of any Independent System Operator (ISO), which is required to ensure 
the delivery of all the transactions without any violation on the operating limits of the 
transmission system. The physical redispatch and real-time balancing mechanism have been 
applied to some electricity markets in the world successfully to relieve the transmission 
congestion within a separated region. 
Coordination of activities among regions is a significant element in maintaining a reliable 
bulk transmission system and for the development of competitive markets. FERC Order 2000 
[27] has mandated the formation of Regional Transmission Organisations (RTO), which will 
accelerate interregional transaction and increase the burden of interregional transmission. The 
Association of European Transmission System Operators (ETSO), founded in July 1999, has 
been investigating congestion management methods for cross-border transmission between 
European countries [28]. However, problems are still unsolved for the coordinated congestion 
management across multiple interconnected regions. Since each regional ISO cannot obtain 
the network operating data of other regions, one of the main difficulties to meet the 
requirement presented in [27-28] is how to implement coordinated congestion management 
without a huge amount of information exchange between regions. 
In this chapter a new approach has been proposed to decompose an optimal power flow (OPF) 
problem by applying Augmented Lagrangian Relaxation (LR) in order to implement the 
multi-regional active power congestion management. The LR algorithm has been applied to 
many aspects of power systems successfully, especially to solving problems of unit 
commitment, hydro-thermal coordination and OPF. Compared with existing methods for 
regional decomposition OPF (a brief review on regional decomposition OPF can be found in 
Section 3.3.7 of Chapter 3), neither fictitious buses, generators, or loads are added nor the 
model of transmission line is modified to decouple interconnecting lines in the proposed 
method. Using this approach, the multi-regional active power congestion management can be 
100 
Chapter 5. Real-time Congestion Management across Interconnected Regions 
implemented as an iterative procedure. The ISO of each region does not need to know any 
infonnation of other regions but for the corresponding Lagrangian multipliers of the tie-lines 
between regions, thus the dispatching independence of the ISO is preserved. Optimal 
transaction prices on all the interconnecting lines are the by-product of the multi-regional 
congestion management. Finally, the IEEE RTS-96 with three interconnected regions and 73 
buses is studied to illustrate the proposed decomposition approach to the congestion 
management across interconnected regions. 
5.2 The Proposed Method for Regional Decomposition OPF 
The original motivation to decompose a large-scale OPF problem into several smaller 
problems by regions is to improve the computation speed. In the last decade, some 
mathematical decomposition methods have been applied to regional decomposition OPF 
successfully. In [126], Deeb and Shahidephour applied Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition method 
to solve the multi-area reactive power optimization problem. Kim and Baldick presented a 
Lagrangian Relaxation based "auxilliary problem principle" approach to parallelizing OPF for 
very large inter-connected power systems in [128]. In [129], a Lagrangian Relaxation 
decomposition procedure was used by Conejo and Aguado to achieve a multi-area 
decentralized DC nonlinear OPF. Furthennore, in [130] Nogales, Prieto, and Conejo proposed 
a decomposition approach, which did not require the solution of sub-problems in each 
iteration, to solve a multi-area AC OPF problem. 
Since in this chapter the main purpose of a regional decOlnposition OPF is to give regional 
ISOs the capability to dispatch the interconnected network coordinately without knowing 
operating data of other regions and to obtain the optimal prices of inter-region transactions, 
the Lagrangian Relaxation decomposition is applied. 
In order to decompose a system into regions by LR decomposition, the key point is to find 
proper coupling constraints between regions and then to relax them into the objective 
function. To obtain such coupling constraints, a dummy bus is defined at the border for each 
interconnecting line and then duplicated into two dummy generators in [128] while one or two 
fictitious buses are added per interconnecting line and the model of the interconnecting line is 
modified in [129]. Authors of [130] mentioned that their method is based on the 
decomposition of the set of optimal conditions for a nonlinear progran1ll1ing problem without 
modifying the original problem, but they did not give any further physical explanation about 
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this and the sub-problem for each area. In the research of this thesis, a new decomposition 
scheme is presented to achieve the regional decomposition OPF without any modification on 
the original network model. 
The general OPF problem, which has been described in Chapter 3, can also be formulated as 
Minimize: 
Subject to: h (P ,Q ,V ,fJ ) = 0 (5-1) 
g (P ,Q ,V ,fJ ) ~ 0 
where C j (p;) active power cost or bidding function of generator at bus i, 
h ( ) matrix of equality constraints, 
g ( ) matrix of inequality constraints, 
V matrix of bus voltage magnitudes, 
fJ matrix of bus voltage angles, 
P matrix of active power injections, 
Q matrix of reactive power injections, 
set of buses in the whole system. 
The proposed regional decomposition scheme is shown in Figure 5.1. In the case of a system 
with two interconnected regions A and B, the tie-line ij and bus j in region B will be reserved 
in the computation of region A while the tie-line ij and bus i in region A will be reserved in 
the computation of region B. Therefore, the following coupling equation constraints should be 
added into the original problem. 
(5-2) 
h A [A A A A ]t T B - [v B () B B B ]t . f . t t' were T = V. () p. Q.., . . p. Q.. are matnces 0 In erconnec lng I I IJ IJ I I I} I} 
variables in region A and region B, respectively. V., O. are not included in these matrices 
J J 
because they can be obtained by knowing Vj , OJ and Pij' Qij' The nodal power balance 
equations of bus jA and bus iB are not necessary to be included in the regional sub-problems, 
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where the voltages of bus jA and bus / appear only in the nodal power balance equations of 
bus iA and busjB and they are constrained by the branch power flow constraints of Pij and Qij. 
Therefore, no dummy generators or loads are added at bus jA in the region A sub-problem and 
at bus iB in the region B sub-problem. 
~~----------~r 
o 
P B 'Q B ij +] ij 
iB --. 
v:.A e·A } } 
Figure 5.1 The proposed region decomposition scheme 
After the regional coupling constraints have been relaxed into the objective function, the dual 
function is obtained as 
(/J(l ) = Minimize: I Cj (P;) +1 t (T A - T B) 
je.Q 
Subject to: (5-3.a) 
where 1 is the matrix of multipliers of coupling constraints. Then the dual problem is 
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Maximize A: f/J(1) (5-3.b) 
The LR solution can be obtained by solving problem (3.a) at a fixed 1 and then updating 1 to 
increase the dual objective function until the dual objective function and 1 do not change 
significantly. Therefore, the decomposed sub-problem of region A can be formulated as 
Minimize: LC;(P;)+l tTA 
ienA 
Subject to: (5-4) 
where h A () matrix of equality constraints in Region A, 
g A () matrix of inequality constraints in Region A, 
matrix of voltage Inagnitudes of buses in region A and directly adjacent buses 
to Region A, 
matrix of voltage angles of buses in region A and directly adjacent buses to 
Region A, 
Inatrix of active power injections, 
matrix of reactive power injections, 
QA set of buses in region A. 
In (5-3) and (5-4), it can be seen that the coupling constraints forcing the interconnecting 
variables to match on both regions of a tie-line are dualized and this decomposes the OPF 
problem into separate regional OPF problems. The Lagrangian multipliers are updated 
iteratively as follows by simply applying sub-gradient method until the interconnecting 
variables on both interconnected regions match. 
1 k+! =1 k + aCT A,k+! - T B,k+l) (5-5) 
where k is the index of iteration. The values of Lagrangian multipliers are the costs to 
maintain the regional coupling equation constraints. Especially, the economic explanations of 
the multipliers for active and reactive power flows between two interconnected regions are the 
optimal prices of inter-regional transactions. 
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Because some of the coupling constraints (Pij and Qij) are nonlinear, relaxing them to the 
objective function could affect its convexity. To ensure local convexity, the augmented 
Lagrangian decomposition should be used and the augmented Lagrangian function of problem 
(5-1) can be written as 
(5-6) 
If f3 is big enough the quadratic term can keep good local convexity of (5-6). However, this 
new quadratic term makes the relaxed primal problem non-decomposable. To make (5-6) 
decomposable again, the following iterative form (so-called Alternating Direction Method 
[147]) is adopted, in which the variables not in the analysing region are fixed to the values of 
the previous iteration. 
(T A,k+l , T B,k+l) = argmin (5-7) 
The stopping criteria for solving the decomposed regional OPFs is when the maximum 
mismatch between coupling variables is smaller than a preset threshold value. 
liT A,k -T B,kll ~ E (5-8) 
It is worth noting that the proposed method can solve all the regional sub-problems in parallel. 
The only infornlation needed to exchange between regions is the LR multipliers of coupling 
constraints. 
5.3 Application of the Proposed Method to Congestion Management 
across Interconnected Regions 
A large electric network with multiple interconnected regions requires coordination of all the 
regional ISOs to have good inherent use of the grid within its secure capacity. Particularly in 
the deregulated environment, with the introduction of competition and greater interregional 
trading, a new efficient coordination mechanism should be developed to manage the 
transmission congestion situation across multiple interconnected regions. The general 
principles with which the coordinating congestion management across interconnected regions 
should be in line are as follows. 
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• System reliability is preserved based on market bids; 
• Avoid any unnecessary information exchange between regional IS0s and any unnecessary 
network reduction; 
• The whole procedure should be simple, robust and priced correctly. 
Cadwalader, Harvey, Hogan, and Pope proposed a LR-based approach [148] to decompose 
the global congestion management problem into sub-problems corresponding to different 
regions. But full information of the whole system is still needed for every regional sub-
problem. Moreover, some other drawbacks of this method have been pointed out by Oren and 
Ross in [149], such as convexity problem. 
The real-time balancing mechanism has been adopted broadly for congestion management in 
recent years. A framework of congestion management through real-time balancing Inarket 
(RBM) has been proposed in Chapter 4. To achieve the coordination between regions, the 
proposed regional decomposition OPF method is applied under the framework presented in 
Chapter 4. 
5.3.1 Mathematical Model 
Assume that a preferred schedule has been made through the bilateral contract market and the 
day-ahead auction market, all the generators and consumers are encouraged to submit their 
incremental and decremental bids to the ISO in the balancing market for the requirement of 
system balancing and congestion management. Ignoring the curtailment of bilateral contracts 
and operating reserves in the model of (4-1 to 4-12), the problem of active power congestion 
management can be simplified as: 
Minimize: Let (&;+ ) + L c; (&;- ) 
ien A ien A 
Subject to: &;+ - &;- - LB;/LiO/ - LiPLoss ,i = 0 tii E QA (5-9) 
/en 
LiP min < LiP = B' (LiO - LiO) < LiPmax tim,n E Q,' m *- n mn - mil mn 111 11 - mil 
After applying the proposed regional decon1position OPF method, the active power 
congestion management in region A can be formulated as: 
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Subject to: L1P;+ - L1P;- - LB;IL161 - IB~L16: - L1P;Lms = 0 'Vi E QA 
lenA. jeBA. 
(4-10) 
LiPmin ~ LiP = LiP + - LiP.- < LiP. min 'V i E Q A , , , ,-,
The objective of congestion management is to follow the schedule as closely as possible and 
to minimize the cost of real-time dispatch. ct (L1P;+) and Cj- (L1P;-) are the cost functions of 
incremental and decremental adjustment at bus i, respectively. They can be either quadratic 
functions or linear. functions. QA is the set of buses in region A, and SA is the set of buses 
which have direct connection with buses in region A. 
The adjustment of active power flows of tie lines has been relaxed into the objective function 
by augmented Lagrangian Relaxation method. The first set of constraints stands for the 
linearized nodal active power flow balance equations of all the buses in region A. As 
mentioned in Chapter 4, L1P;Loss is the summed change of losses on branches that are 
connected to bus i and flows on the branches are flowing to bus i. The second set of 
constraints represents the changing ranges of active power flow on branches within region A 
or connected to region A. The third set of constraints is the changing ranges of nodal 
injections in region A. 
5.3.2 Sequential Solution versus Parallel Solution 
According to the analysis in section 5.2, there should be some items in the objective function 
of (5-10) for the relaxed coupling constraint L16jA = L16jB • Since the change of voltage angle is 
a relative value, this coupling constraint can be maintained by adjusting the voltage angle of 
slack bus in each region. Therefore items for this constraint have been removed from the 
obj ective function. 
This algorithm can be implemented either sequentially or in parallel, depending whether 
single or multiple slack buses are used in the whole system. If the slack bus in region A is the 
unique slack bus in the whole system, L16jA which is the result of the sub-problem of region A 
is needed for the solution of the sub-problem of region B in order to maintain the coupling 
constraint L16/ = L16jB • In other words, the sub-problem of region B can not be solved until 
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the solution of region A is obtained. So with the unique slack bus, the presented algorithm can 
only be implemented sequentially. 
In case each region has its own slack bus, as mentioned in [128], at each iteration the voltage 
angles of slack buses are chosen so that the average of the changes of border angles in region 
A equals the average of changes of border angles in region B. As a result, all the regional sub-
problems can be solved in parallel. 
5.3.3 Global Congestion Management versus Two-Level Congestion 
Management 
Using this decomposition model, ISOs in all the regIOns can relieve the transmission 
congestion in a global way without exchanginga huge amount of information between each 
other. The global optimal solution can be obtained by solving sub-problem (5-10) for each 
region iteratively, which is the same as solving the problem of the whole system. However, all 
the regional ISOs must take part in the procedure, no matter whether there is any congestion 
in their regions or not. A regional ISO may prefer to relieve intra-regional congestion 
management independently rather than to always perfonn the calculation together with all the 
other regional ISOs. 
To keep this independence of intra-regional dispatching, the other option, which is the two-
level inter/intra-regional congestion managen1ent, is required. To eliminate inter-regional 
congestion, all the available adjustment bids in the Real-time Balancing Market in all regions 
are regarded as control variables and all the regional ISOs must act together coordinately, so 
model (5-10) is still used here. In the event of intra-regional congestion, the control variables 
only include all the submitted adjustment bids within the congested region and no additional 
inter-regional transactions should be made. Although a regional ISO wants to keep the 
independence for the intra-regional congestion management, it might still need help from the 
adjacent regions if the internal violation can not be relieved by local resources. To model this 
situation, the objective of problem (5-10) should be modified to 
Minimize ~C:(L1Po+)+ ~C~(L1P-)+ ~ (y+ L1P~,+ +y- L1Po~'-) L..J I I L..J I I L..J BOO I) BOO I) 
o nA 0 nA 0 nA 0 -A I) I) ~ ~ ~ JE~ 
(5-11) 
where Y~ij and Y~ij are the pre-negotiated coefficients for the active power interchange 
incremental adjustment and decren1ental adjustment, which should be big enough to keep the 
additional inter-regional transactions as the last control option to eliminate the intra-regional 
congestion. 
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5.4 Test Results 
The IEEE RTS-96 test system shown in Figure 5.2, which has 3 interconnected regions, 96 
generators, 119 lines and 73 buses, has been used to demonstrate the performance of the 
proposed algorithm. The system power flow data and full one-line diagram of the IEEE RTS-
96 test system can be found in Appendix B.2. To simplify the demonstration of multi-regional 
congestion management, it is assumed that all the participants in the Real-time Balancing 
Market of each region submit uniform incremental bidding price and uniform decremental 
bidding price, which are shown in Table 5.1. Obviously, region 1 has the most expensive real-
time adjustable resources and Region 2 has the cheapest ones. 
Region 3 
Bus 217 
Region 1 Region 2 
Bus 113 ..1--+------+--1 Bus 215 
Figure 5.2 IEEE RTS-96 test system 
To illustrate how to apply the proposed LR regional decomposition algorithm to relieve the 
inter-regional transmission congestion and intra-regional transmission congestion, two cases 
have been studied and their results are analyzed in the following sections. 
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Table 5.1 The incremental and decremental bidding prices in each region 
Incre. Prices Decre. Prices 
Regions 
(p.u'/MW) (p.u'/MW) 
1 1.1 0.5 
2 0.5 0.3 
3 0.9 0.5 
5.4.1 Case 1: The Inter-regional Congestion Management 
Assumed that there is an unexpected contingency, which causes the operation MW lilnit of 
tie-line 113-215 between region 1 and region 2 reducing from 400MW to 160MW. Since the 
base MW flow on line 113-215 is 197MW, an inter-regional transmission congestion occurs. 
Using the presented regional decOlnposition congestion management algorithm, the cheapest 
and the most efficient resources in the Real-time Balancing Market are called upon to 
eliminate this congestion. Here all the initial values of LR multipliers are set to 0, i.e. flat 
start. The initial points of LR multipliers will not affect convergence, however, good initial 
points can reduce iteration times significantly. 
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Figure 5.3 The evolution of the redispatching cost of each region in case 1 
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Figure 5.4 The evolution of MW changes of tie-lines obtained from the solutions of 
different regional sub-problems in case 1 
The evolution of the total redispatching cost of the inter-regional congestion management, 
which is 'the sum of three regional costs, is shown in Figure 5.3. The evolution ofMW change 
of all the other four tie-lines except for the congested one from the results of sub-problems of 
regions on both sides are shown in Figure 5.4. Figure 5.5 shows the evolution of the inter-
regional transaction prices of all the five tie-lines as functions of iteration numbers. Fron1 
these three figures, it can be seen that the convergence is reached smoothly in 15 iterations. 
As the violated tie-line power flow constraint will be fixed at its upper or lower limit if the 
problem is feasible, the corresponding coupling constraint is satisfied automatically. This is 
why the Lagrangian multiplier corresponding to tie-line 113-215 is 0 all the time in Figure 
5.5. As a result, in the objective function of problem (5-10) the relaxed items, which are 
related to the violated interconnected constraint, can be ren10ved. 
The updating process of Lagrangian multiplier corresponding to tie-line 123-217 and the 
evolution of tie-line active power flow change on both sides are shown together in Figure 5.6 
to delTIOnstrate how the Lagrangian multiplier is updated in accordance with the MW 
n1ismatch of the correspondent inter-regional coupling constraint in every iteration and how 
the iterative process drives ~~3-217 and ~;3-217 together. 
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5.4.2 Case 2: The Intra-regional Congestion Management 
The base MW flow on line 113-123 is 245MW. Now the reduction of the operation MW limit 
of line 113-123 from 400MW to 200MW will cause an intra-regional transmission congestion 
in Region 1. 
The evolution ofMW change of tie-line 108-203, tie-line 113-215 and tie-line 123-217 from 
the results of both sub-problem of Region 1 and sub-problem of Region 2 as functions of 
iteration numbers are shown in Figure 5.7. Figure 5.8 shows the evolution of the Lagrangian 
multipliers of all the three tie lines between Region 1 and Region 2 as functions of iteration 
numbers. From these two figures, it can be seen that the iteration is just like sellers and buyers 
haggling over the inter-regional transaction prices. Because the initial prices of additional 
interchange between regions are 0, the ISO in Region 1 certainly prefers buying as many 
incrementalldecremental resources as possible from other adjacent regions to using its own 
resources. On the other hand, the 1S0s in other regions without any congestion do not want to 
accept this deal because the prices of interregional transactions are too low. With the iterative 
process going on, they increase or decrease the amount of interchange in light of the change 
of prices, and finally the optimal solution is reached, which can be accepted by both sides. 
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Figure 5.7 The evolution of MW changes of tie-lines between region 1 and region2 
from the results of both region 1 sub-problem and region 2 sub-problem in 
case 2 
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Figure 5.8 The evolution of the Lag'rangian multipliers of three tie-lines between 
region 1 and region 2 in case 2 
Table 5.2 Comparing the test results of case 2 by using the global way and the two-
level way 
Global Way Two-level Way 
(MW) (MW) 
i1P108-203 -17.40 0.00 
i1PI13-215 -45.28 0.00 
i1PI23-217 -80.07 0.00 
i1P317-223 4.43 0.00 
i1P323-121 -4.56 0.00 
i1P 101 2.16 84.94 
i1P 102 20.00 20.00 
i1P 107 0.00 17.40 
i1P 123 -165.81 -116.98 
i1P213 148.02 0.00 
Total cost 181.29 p.u. 193.06 p.u. 
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In case the ISO in region 1 prefers using his own regional resources first, although the bidding 
prices in other regions are much cheaper, none of the interchange has been made to relieve 
this congestion and other regional ISOs do not participate in this procedure. Table 5.2 
compares the test results of case 2 by the global way with the test results by the two-level 
way. It is easy to find out that the total cost of the global way is lower than the two-level way. 
The reason is that the result using global way is a global optimal solution and cheaper 
incremental resource ~P213 in region 2 has been purchased. 
5.4.3 Parameters Selection and Discussion 
Two parameters a and f3 in the LR decomposition method are important to keep the 
objective as a convex function and they have significant impacts on the total iteration times. 
Here they can be experimentally set to a = 1 and fJ = 2. The impact of fJ on the total 
iteration number is shown in Figure 5.9. The iteration times in case 2 are more sensitive to the 
value of fJ than in case 1. Different systems might need to tune a and fJ to improve 
convergence. According to the analysis in the appendix of [128], the convergence was reliable 
with the choice of fJ = 2a , which gave us a guideline to tune a and fJ for different systems. 
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Figure 5.9 The effect of fJ on the total iteration times (a = 1 ) 
The tolerance of mismatch of tie-line power flow is set to c = O.OlMW. From the test results 
of case 1 and case 2, it can be noted that convergence is smoothly attained but the presented 
Inethod has bad tail behaviour. The mismatch is reduced significantly in the first several 
iterations, but it takes n1any more iterations to drive the mismatch smaller than the pre-set 
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tolerance. Although the main purpose of the regional decOlTIposition here is not to improve the 
computing speed, it is still very important to reduce the iteration times to be of use to the 
industry. The strategy to update LR mUltipliers is very important to reduce the tail behaviour. 
In this chapter, a simple way is used to update LR multipliers as shown in (5-5), but some 
more research should be done to find a more advanced method. Even an ad hoc approach to 
update LR multipliers more efficiently could be useful. 
5.5 Conclusions 
A new scheme for an augmented LR based region-decomposition OPF has been presented in 
this chapter. Comparing with some existing algorithms, neither fictitious buses, generators, 
loads are added nor the model of transmission line is modified to decouple interconnecting 
lines in the proposed algorithm. All the regional sub-problems can be solved in parallel. 
Applying this region-decomposition OPF algorithm to the active power congestion 
management across interconnected regions through the Real-time Balancing Mechanism, an 
efficient redispatch way is developed to relieve the interlintra-regional congestion without 
exchanging too much information between regional ISOs. The iteration process is like sellers 
and buyers haggling over prices and when the convergence is reached the optimal 
interchanges and prices can be obtained. 
The proposed method is of particular interest to a lTIulti-utility or a multi-country 
interconnected system, such as the USA and the Europe, where the regional dispatching 
independence should be retained. Case studies based on the three-region IEEE RTS-96 are 
presented to illustrate the proposed n1ethod. 
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Chapter 6. Optimal Dispatch of Spot Market with 
Individual Revenue Adequacy Constraints 
for Congestion and Risk Management 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapters 4 and 5, congestion management in the real-time operation of electricity markets 
has been discussed. A framework has been proposed and implemented, in which the ISOs can 
balance their systems and relieve transmission congestion coordinated and efficiently through 
a real-time balancing market. This chapter is about how to avoid and manage transmission 
congestion during short-term (day-ahead to hour-ahead) scheduling of electricity markets. 
Traditional approaches to transmission access and pricing have focused on "contract path" 
and cost-recovery-based transmission tariffs, which ignore the economic and physical realities 
of a power grid. Locational Marginal Pricing, developed by Schweppe, et al [1], provides a 
more economic way to transmission pricing and congestion management. Furthermore, 
Hogan elaborated this theory and proposed a market model including well-defined point-to-
point Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) supported by a spot market [13]. Application of 
LMP and FTR to multi-zonal congestion management was illustrated by Alomoush and 
Shahidepour in [153]. 
Despite of the advantages of LMP, it can also create temporal and locational price risks. 
However, these risks can be hedged through some pure financial instruments such as 
Contracts for Differences (CfDs) and FTRs. Bushnell and Stoft have explained how it works 
for long-run electric grid investment [154]. 
A fully open electricity market should encourage more bilateral contracts and give market 
participants more freedom to arrange their own transactions. However, due to the special 
characteristics of power energy commodity, a bid-based spot market is still needed to balance 
the system and eliminate potential transn1ission congestion. How to redispatch all the bilateral 
contracts, when required, has always been the main problem facing the ISO who runs the spot 
market. Some of the physical approaches to curtail bilateral contracts have been presented by 
Fang and David in [156]. 
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Bilateral contracts can be modelled as physical bilateral contracts or CfDs. CfDs are more 
flexible than physical bilateral contracts. Bilateral contracts are encouraged to buy FTRs in 
order to reserve transmission capacity and maintain their revenue adequacy. Bilateral 
contracts without protection of FTRs may face serious congestion charges and may not be 
able to make enough profit. Therefore, managing bilateral contracts in light of their revenue is 
a very natural and straightforward way to congestion management in a spot market. 
In this chapter, some new individual revenue adequacy constraints are introduced into the 
typical spot market dispatch model to produce a more reasonable result for bilateral contracts 
delivery under transmission congestion situation. In Section 6.2, the basic model of optimal 
dispatch in the stop market and the fundamental of Locational Marginal Pricing theory are 
presented. In particular, the impact of limits of bus generation and load on nodal prices are 
emphasized from the analysis of different forms of nodal price. Section 6.3 introduces the 
basic concepts of CfDs and FTRs and how they have been used to hedge against price risks. 
In Section 6.4, a new dispatch model with individual revenue adequacy constraints is 
presented to improve congestion management in a spot market with bilateral contracts. This 
complex problem with dual variables in constraints can be solved by an iterative procedure. 
Finally, a 5-bus system and the IEEE 3D-bus system are analysed to illustrate the proposed 
approach. 
6.2 Impacts of Operating Limits on Locational Marginal Prices 
6.2.1 Spot Market Dispatch Model 
The spot market dispatch model can be formulated as a bid-based DC Optimal Power Flow 
(OPF) problem, whose objective is to maximise the social welfare. 
IBlPd)- IClPg) 
iEND iENO 
Subject to: (6-1) 
III 
P g,IIIin ~ P g ~ P g,lIIax II g.min' II g,max 
Pd . ~ Pd ~ Pd Illax , 111111 , II d,min' )l d,max 
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where C() is the active power offer functions of generators in the spot market, 
B( ) is the active power bid functions of consun1ers in the spot market, 
N D is the set of the set of demand buses , 
N G is the set of generation buses, 
B' is the linearized active power Jacobian matrix, 
H is the matrix of branch power flow constraint coefficient, 
o is the matrix of bus voltage angles, 
Pg is the matrix of generators' MWoutputs, 
Pdis the matrix of Consumers' MW loads, 
PI is the matrix of branch MW power flows, 
;. is the matrix of shadow prices ( dual variables) of nodal power balancing equality 
constraints, 
}l is the matrix of shadow prices (dual variables) of inequality constraints. 
According to the spot price theory, the LMP at bus i is 
(6-2) 
where A.
s 
is the system lambda (shadow pnce of the nodal power balancing equality 
constraint of the slack bus), N/ is the set of branches. From (6-2), it seems that when losses are 
ignored, locational marginal price is only decided by the system lambda and transmission 
congestion charge. This has been well known since Schweppe's spot pricing theory. In fact, 
there are some other important factors which can also have important effects on LMPs. 
6.2.2 Operating Limits and LMPs 
Baughman and Siddiqi pointed out the impacts of generation limits on nodal prices in [105]. 
As they stated, at a generation bus the price of active power is equal to the marginal cost of 
production until the generating capability limits are reached. In this chapter, both generation 
and demand are treated as control variables (i.e. the demand elasticity is fully taken into 
account by consumers' submitted bidding curves to the ISO), thus from the KKT first order 
conditions the LMP can have the following alternative forn1s for generation buses and 
demand buses, respectively. 
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(JB(Pd,i) 
Pi = - (JP. + J.1di,min - J.1di ,max i END 
d,l 
(6-3) 
(JC(Pg,i ) 
Pi = (JP. - f.1 gi,min + f.1 gi,max i ENG 
g,l 
(6-4) 
Here, it can be noticed that not only transmission congestion, but also upper/lower limits of 
market participants can have significant impacts on LMP. In fact, if we neglect the last two 
inequality constraints in problem (6-1) and assume all the consumers submit quadratic benefit 
curves to the ISO, there will never be any real risk of high spot prices caused by congestion. 
Without minimum load level limit, consumers can reduce their loads down to zero in 
accordance with their bidding curves when they suffer from high congestion charge. In other 
words, congestion can not do any real harm (i.e. negative profit) to consumers if they can 
always decrease their demand against raising prices. However, in the real world few 
consumers can reduce their loads down to very low level. 
A bilateral contract can be modelled as one generation at the supply bus and the same amount 
of load at the demand bus when the losses are ignored. Bilateral contracts are traded in 
bilateral market instead of spot market, so injections from bilateral contracts cannot be 
regarded as control variables in problem (6-1). They should be treated as base load and 
expressed by lower limits of the offers and bids from generators and consumers in the spot 
market. These lower limits may bring prohibitively high nodal spot prices to consumers in 
case of transmission congestion. 
6.3 Description of CfD and FTR 
Electricity prices in a competitive power market will fluctuate temporally and 10cationally. 
This could create high price risks. Two types of pure financial instruments, Contracts for 
Differences (CfDs) and Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) have been proposed for dealing 
with these price risks. 
Two Parties conducting a bilateral contract in a spot market face two types of price 
uncertainty: temporal uncertainty and locational uncertainty. In spite of the fact that the two 
parties to a bilateral contract are forced to trade directly with the grid at fluctuating spot 
prices, they can completely insulate themselves from these fluctuations provided that they 
face the same spot price. This can be done by the use of a cm. If spot prices are different 
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locationally due to transmission congestion, new price risk is created. This locational price 
risk can be managed by an FTR. In this section, we will present the mathematical models of 
these two financial contracts, and then describe how they work together to hedge against 
market price risks. 
6.3.1 Contracts for Differences 
Bilateral contracts take many forms, and in theory can include any provisions agreed to by the 
contracting parties. In order to have a simple standard of comparison for CfDs we define a 
typical bilateral contract that the parties can make direct physical trades as a Physical Bilateral 
Contract (PBC). Two major characteristics of such a contract are a price and a quantity. 
Although quantity may be specified, it is recognized that if either party does not comply there 
will be no way to force compliance. Consequently financial penalties are generally specified 
along with the target quantity. For instance it is common to require the demander to pay for 
electricity that is not "taken", and to penalize the supplier for electricity that is not supplied. 
These penalties are said to enforce "physical performance" of the contract. For simplicity, it is 
assumed that the contract specifies a penalty for reduced consumption, and a penalty for 
reduced supply. In summary, a PBC specifies requirements for both financial performance, 
and physical performance. 
In the presence of a pool-based spot market, cm is a fom1 of long-term financial bilateral 
power supply contract to hedge against temporal price risks. In describing cms below, we 
assume a uniform locational spot price for market participants. Imagine a generator at node i 
and a consumer at node j who wish to trade CjD ij units of power at a future time at which the 
unknown universal spot price will be p. However, the traders wish to trade a negotiated 
strike price p~. This can be achieved indirectly by writing a cm, which is now defined as: 
Under a CjD, the consumer will pay the generator (p~ - p)CjDij' where p~ is the contract 
price, CjD ij is the contract quantity and p is the market spot price. 
Notice that there is no specification of quantities delivered or received because quantity 
transactions are carried out in the spot n1arket. Once such a contract is in place either party 
can assure itself of the trade that is specified by the analogous PBC, by simply trading the 
specified quantity. 
• If the consumer buys CjDij' his net cost will be p CjDij + (p~ - p)CjDij' independent of 
the generator's actions. 
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If the consumer sells CjD ij , his net income will be P CjD ij + (p ~ - P )CjD ij' independent 
of the generator's actions. 
The importance of specifying only financial performance cannot be seen as long as both 
parties actually do perfonn physically in line with the contract's nominal quantity. It is only 
when traders fail to supply or consume the contracted quantity that the potential benefit of the 
CfD becomes apparent. 
Table 6.1 Benefit of a CfD when its parties fail to trade the specified quantity 
p < cost of generation p> value of use 
CfD Reward = (p~ - p) Trade = CjDij 
Generator 
PEC Possible Penalty Trade = CjDij 
CfD Trade = CjDij Reward = (p~ - p) 
Consumer 
PEC Trade = CjDij Possible Penalty 
Table 6.1 shows that since their trade of CjD ij is actually with the spot market, either party 
may decide to modify CjDij' This does not effect the payment of (p~ - p)CjDij from buyer 
to seller. Generally if the spot price is very low, the generator will find it more profitable to 
stop generating, while if the spot price is very high, the demander will find it beneficial to 
stop demanding. This behavior is consistent with economic rationality and the parties capture 
the benefits of this rational behavior. This is in spite of the fact that they always have the 
contract's fixed price available to them. Under a PEC, the pmiicipants' benefits from 
fluctuations in the spot price may be n10re limited. For this reason combining a CfD with the 
spot market produces a synthetic bilateral contract which can offer short-term advantages over 
PEC. The scale of these advantages will depend on the degree to which performance penalties 
and transactions costs limit the ability of parties holding bilateral contracts to take advantage 
of favorable spot market prices. 
However, if the spot prices at nodes i and j differ sometimes in case of transn1ission 
congestion, the whole transaction could still be exposed to the locational price risk. In the spot 
market, given the locational spot prices Pi and p j' there is a spectrum of CfDs. At one 
extreme the generator's LMP is used, in which case the consumer pays the congestion charge, 
while at the other extreme, the consumer's LMP is used and the generator pays the congestion 
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charge. If the two parties split the payment of congestion charge, the payments of the cm to 
the generator and the consumer are (p~ - p .. )Cm .. and - (p~ - p .. )Cm .. respectively 
Ij Ij './L/Ij Ij Ij './L/Ij' , 
where p ij = (Pi + P j ) / 2. In any case, the transaction will suffer a marginal congestion 
charge which equals the difference between the nodal prices. So another financial instrument 
is needed to hedge the locational price risk. 
6.3.2 Financial Transmission Rights 
Before analyzing FTRs and their effect on congestion management, we need to define and 
describe the need for such an instrument. A FTR is essentially an indirect way of conferring a 
property right for transmission. As mentioned in Chapter 2, generally speaking there are two 
approaches to defining property rights to the transmission network: physical rights and 
financial rights. The physical right is obviously the strongest form of ownership, which can 
affect usage on the entire system. The function of financial rights is to allocate the economic 
rents that should accrue to portions of the network. 
A physical translnission right means the control of its usage: to be able to transmit electricity 
along that transmission link whenever one wants to. However, exercising (or not exercising) 
control of a link can affect the ability of others to exercise the control of their links. In fact 
within the meshed part of a network, power transmitted between any two nodes actually flows 
on every linle The rigidity introduced by defining transmission property in this way will 
further limit the ability of dispatchers to adjust to fluctuating demand and generation 
conditions in an efficient manner. 
Financial rights of transmission can have two varieties: Link-based Transmission Rights 
(LTR) and Financial Transmission Rights. LTR associates the ownership with the right to 
collect rent accrued by the link in the network. For example, the owner of LTRij' the right to a 
link connecting node i and node j, would collect the price difference between those two nodes 
times the actual power flow on that link. However the most telling criticism of this approach 
is the possibility of providing the wrong signal to grid construction. The classic example of 
this is the construction of a line from i to j with low capacity and high admittance relative to 
an existing path from i to j. Such an addition to the network can easily reduce the total 
capacity from i to j. Thus, rewarding an expansion with a LTR can encourage extremely 
harmful improvements. 
FTR, also known as Transmission Congestion Contracts (TCC), was developed by W. Hogan. 
Like L TR, FTR pays the right holder the price difference between the two nodes specified by 
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that right. The two approaches differ in that the quantity, which is multiplied by this price 
difference, is defined by the right itself, rather than by the actual flow on a specific linle FTR 
can be defined as: 
FTR is a financial instrument that entitles holder to receive compensation for Transmission 
Congestion Charges that arise when the transmission grid is congested in the spot market and 
differences in Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs) results from the dispatch of generators out 
of merit order to relieve the congestion. 
In the spot market, given the LMPs Pi and P j' under an FTR with magnitude FTRij from i 
to j would pay its owner (p j - Pi )FTRij' which can be shared equally by both parties, no 
matter how much power flows between node i and j. This is exactly the Inarginal loss the 
transaction could suffer under congestion. One very important implication of this fact is that 
FTRs, unlike LTRs, need not be limited to existing physical links. This allows FTRs to be 
applied to any bilateral transaction between two nodes anywhere on the network. The 
evolution of defmitions of transmission rights is shown in Figure 6.1. 
Physical 
Transmission Rights 
Contract path fiction 
Link-based 
Translnission Rights 
Too many links 
Financial 
Transmission Rights 
..,..--, 
...... " 
,.,,.,,, " 
'" , , 
\ 
-.,...--..~ 
Flows implicit 
Figure 6.1 Evolution of definitions of transmission rights 
Basically, FTR is defined as a point-to-point contract. However, it can have a form of 
network, which is from multiple points to multiple points. FTR could be option (one-sided) or 
obligation (two-sided). In this thesis we treat FTR as an obligation. 
• Option FTR: inCOlne = max {O, (p j - Pi )FTRij}; 
• Obligation FTR: income = (p j - pJFTRij' When Pj > Pi' income> 0; when Pj < P" 
income < 0. 
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FTRs provide long-term transmission rights that can be different from the actual dispatch of 
, 
the system. Although it is impossible to maintain a perfect match of long-term rights and the 
actual dispatch, it is possible to guarantee the financial payments to the FTR holders as long 
as the outstanding FTRs continue to pass the simultaneous feasibility test. FTRs can be 
initially obtained through an auction, which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, and 
can be exchanged in a decentralized secondary market. 
6.3.3 Combined Application of CfD and FTR 
Through the combined application of a cm and a matching FTR, both the consumer and the 
generator can hedge against temporal and locational price uncertainties. Even in the absence 
of cms, FTRs can remove spot price risk on an aggregate level when the injections of system 
are matched by consolidation of all FTRs. The payment relationship between the ISO, 
generators and consumers is given in Figure 6.2. 
~ r (p i-Pi )FTRij/2 
, I (p i-Pi )-FTRij/2 ~ r 
Generator ~ ~ Consumer 
at bus i ....... ISO ....... at bus i PiPgi PiPdj \. 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
p~CFD .. lj lj 
p .. CFD .. 
lj lj 
Figure 6.2 The cash flows between the ISO and market participants 
6.4 The Proposed Approach 
6.4.1 Formulation of Individual Revenue Adequacy Constraints 
With spot market and two financial instrunlents analyzed above, a bilateral contract could 
have four forms: 
• physical bilateral contract without a matching FTR, 
• physical bilateral contract with a Inatching FTR, 
• cm without a matching FTR, 
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• CfD with a match FTR. 
As shown in Figure 4.1 of Chapter 4, before a market participant enters the day-ahead spot 
market, it may have signed some bilateral contracts with other participants. To take signed 
bilateral contracts into account, they can be treated as the fixed parts of their output/load. 
Therefore the bids of a participant submitted to the ISO should include two major types of 
data: the bidding prices and the upper/lower limits. The lower limit is not only decided by the 
physical operating lin1it, but also decided by the amount of bilateral contracts the participant 
has signed. 
Bidding lower limit = Max (physical operating limit, I bilateral contracts) 
As discussed in section 6.2, these bidding limits in spot market may cause high congestion 
price risks. And the LMPs in spot market can be changed by participants adjusting not only 
their bidding prices but also their bidding limits. 
To calculate the revenue- of a market participant, we must know its generation cost or 
consumption benefit. The revenue associated with the energy traded in the spot market can be 
directly obtained with participant's bidding curve. For a CfD, since the energy is actually 
traded in spot market, the bidding curve can also be used. However for a physical bilateral 
contract, it is difficult to obtain its revenue, because the ISO does not know its price 
information. Here we take the participant's bidding curve as a true reflection of its cost or 
benefit and use the extended bidding curve to calculate its total revenue. In some sense, 
another benefit of doing so is to prevent market participants from "gaming" during their 
bidding. 
With full consideration of risk hedging financial instruments, a consumer's profit can be 
formulated as below: 
Rdj = Bj(Pdj)-PjPdj - L((p~ -Pij)CjDij) + L((pj -pi)FTRij/2) (6-5) 
~N ~N 
In (5) the first item is the value of the power purchased; the second item is the cost of power; 
the third item is the payment from signed CfDs; the fourth item is the payn1ent from FTRs. 
Similarly, a generator's profit can be formulated as below: 
Rg; = PiPg; - Ci (Pg;) + L ((p~ - Pij )CjDij) + L ((p j - Pi )FTRij /2) (6-6) 
~N ~N 
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For a physical bilateral contract from bus i to bus j, the profit of this contract can be 
formulated as: 
(6-7) 
The profit of physical bilateral contract can be equally shared by the two parties. To keep the 
incentive of a market participant for implementing its transactions, its profit should be bigger 
than a minimum profit level. This minimum revenue requirement may include some operation 
cost and the cost for purchase of FTRs. In this chapter it is called individual revenue adequacy 
constraint given by: 
Rdj (+ L Rpij / 2) ~ Rdj,min 
ieN 
Rgi (+ L R piJ /2) > Rgi,min 
jeN 
(6-8) 
(6-9) 
Obviously, without the hedge of CfDs and FTRs, a participant could -be exposed directly to 
the risk of high LMP caused by congestion and could lose money from the delivery of its 
bilateral contracts. Under this circumstance, the participant should be willing .to adjust its 
original transaction without any force from the ISO. 
6.4.2 Implementation 
Although the financial instruments like FTRs should be separated from the delivery of 
physical transactions and their owners should not have any scheduling priority, they may still 
be able to provide economic incentives to individual market participants for congestion 
management. The reason is that the original purpose to purchase FTRs is to reserve enough 
transmission capacity for physical delivery while the matching of financial rights with 
network usage can mitigate the risk of congestion charge most economically. 
In order to utilize the economic incentives of individual participants to transmission 
congestion management, individual revenue constraints should be embedded into the spot 
market dispatch problem (6-1). In other words, participants will be willing to curtail some of 
their transactions to meet their n1inimum revenue requirements if they are losing money due 
to the high congestion prices. However, the LMPs in (6-5 to 6-9) are functions of the dual 
variables of the primal problem (6-1), so it is impossible to add these new constraints directly 
into problem (6-1). To avoid this obstacle, an iterative procedure, which is similar to the 
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"two-level" approach used in [105, 155], is applied to solve the problem of optimal dispatch 
with individual revenue adequacy constraints. 
Bid and Offer curves 
in spot market 
k=0 
Physical Bilateral 
Contracts 
Set P (0), P (0), 
d,mm' g,mm 
Solve problem (6-1); Get optimal 
values of p t) , P jk) and LMPs p (k) • 
k=k+1 
Reduce P g,rrrin and P d,min 
p (k) P (k) to get g,rrrin d,min 
Final 
Solution 
Figure 6.3 The iterative procedure to solve optimal dispatch problem with individual 
revenue adequacy constraints 
This iterative procedure is shown in Figure 6.3. First set the lower MW limits of all the 
_generators and consumers in light of their physical operation limits and existing bilateral 
transactions. Then solve the problem (6-1) by Interior Point Primal-Dual Quadratic 
Progralnming to get optimal generation, denland and nodal prices. Check individual revenue 
adequacy constraints of all the participants. If any of these constraints can not be satisfied, 
reduce associated participants' lower MW limits (i.e. curtail its bilateral contracts) and then 
solve the problem (6-1) again. Do this iterative procedure until all the constraints are satisfied. 
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There are at least two ways to update the lower MW limit of a participant. The first one is to 
reduce the lower MW limit by a proper step (a certain ratio of the current value) in each 
iteration. By this way the procedure can reach convergence smoothly but might be a bit slow. 
The second way is to solve (6-8) or (6-9) to obtain the minimum value of P. or P . that can 
dl gl 
make (6-8) or (6-9) satisfied, then update lower MW limits with these values. By this method, 
the procedure can converge faster but some transactions can be over-curtailed. If the 
minimum profit of a participant is too high for some reasons that (6-8) or (6-9) can not be 
satisfied even when Pd(/·k ) > Pd(·k) . or p(.k) > p(.k). (i.e. J1d(~). = 0 or J1 (~). = 0) the revenue I,mm gl gl,mm I,mm gl,mm' 
adequacy constraint of this participant will be removed from the iterative procedure. 
Without unpredictable contingencies, the minimum feasible solution set of the optimal 
dispatch of spot market will equal to the set of sold FTRs, which has passed the simultaneous 
feasible test during the FTR auction. In this sense, the bilateral contracts which hold matching 
FTRs will be guaranteed to deliver. 
6.5 Test Results 
The proposed approach will be tested on two test systems: a 5-bus system and the modified 
IEEE 30-bus system. In the first system, a simple case is studied in detail to illustrate how the 
proposed approach works. In the second system, a more complicated case is studied to show 
how the LMPs are affected by an unreasonable bilateral transaction and how to eliminate this 
bad impact using the natural incentive of market participants. 
6.5.1 System I: 5-bus System 
A 5-bus test system is shown in Figure 6.4. Generators' offer curves and consumers' bid 
curves in the spot market are given at the left-bottom comer in Figure 6.4. Bilateral contracts 
traded in the bilateral market and their associated financial instruments are listed in Table 6.2. 
Based on these bilateral contracts, the lower MW limits for all the participants entering spot 
market are set at the right-bottom comer in Figure 6.4. The congested branch is Line 1-3, 
whose thermal limit is assumed as 80MW. Under the given conditions, the optimal solution of 
problem (6-1) and the nodal spot prices are also shown in Figure 6.4. In this case, the nodal 
price at bus 1 is very high due to the congestion of Line 1-3 while the nodal prices at bus 3 
and 5 are very low since D3 must increase its load level to absorb some part of the minimUlTI 
output of G2. As you can see, the ISO won't be happy with this result which may bring about 
serious market power. 
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P4=18.42$/MW P2=18.42$/MW 
4 )0.15 2 
336MW 
Cg1 =O.02xP g12+5xP gl 
Cg2=O.OlxPg22+ lOxP g2 
Bdl=-O.04xPdI2+30xPdl 
Bd2=-O.04xPd22+3oxPd2 
Bd3=-O.04xP d32+30xP d3 
D2 
200MW 
)0.30 
Pl=33.04$/MW 
Figure 6.4 The 5-bus test system 
P3=3.14$/MW Ps=3.14$/MW 
16MW 
D1 200MW 
3 )0.03 5 
D3 
336MW 
P13,max=80MW 
400MW 
Pg1 ,min=200MW 
P g2,min=400MW 
P dl,min=200MW 
P d2,min=200MW 
P d3,min=200MW 
Table 6.2. Bilateral contracts and associated financial instruments 
Transaction Transaction Amount of Strike Price Amount of 
Transaction 
Amount From/To CfD ofCfD FTR 
Participants (MW) Buses (MW) ($/MW) (MW) 
G2-7D2 200 5-72 200 17 200 
G2-7D1 100 5-71 100 17 100 
Gl-7D3 100 4-73 100 17 100 
Gl-7D1 100 4-71 a a a 
G2-7D3 100 5-73 0 a a 
Given the minimum profit levels for D1 and G2 as $1,800 and $2,000 respectively, their 
individual revenue adequacy constraints can not be satisfied under this situation because they 
have transactions exposed directly to locational price risk. So they should be willing to reduce 
their transactions to make enough profits. Applying the iterative procedure presented in last 
section, we reduce the lower MW limits of D 1 and G2 at a step of 10MW per iteration. In 
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every iteration a new set of nodal prices are produced by solving problem (6-1) with updated 
PDJ,min, P 02,min , and then check if all the individual revenue adequacy constraints have been 
satisfied. If not, repeat this iterative procedure again. 
The change of the nodal prices and total profits of D 1 and 02 against the reduction of their 
lower MW limit is given in Figure 6.5. The impact of lower MW limits on nodal prices is 
very clear. When the lower MW limit ofD1 is reduced to 160MW and the lower MW limit of 
02 is reduced to 360 MW, the nodal price at bus 1 goes down to 20.51$/MW and the nodal 
prices at bus 3,5 go up to 9 A$/MW. Therefore, their revenue adequacy constraints can be 
satisfied. Meanwhile, the spot market produces much more reasonable nodal prices. 
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Figure 6.5 D1 and G2's feedback to nodal spot prices on their total profits and lower 
MW li·mits 
6.5.2 System II: IEEE 30-bus System 
The standard IEEE 30-bus test systelTI is lTIodified here to test the proposed n1ethod. The 
systen1 data can be found in Section 7.6.2 and Appendix B.l. The network branch parameters 
are given in Table B.2 and their thermal limits can be found in Table 7.9. A feasible FTRs set 
can be found in Table 7.6 (FTRs in the base case) and Table 7.8 (FTRs in the auction result); 
the system one-line diagram is shown as Figure 7.9. Here, it is assUlTIed that each defined FTR 
has a ll1atched CfD. In other words all the participants have full hedge against both tell1poral 
and locational price risks. The lower MW limits of all the generators and consun1ers are set 
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according to their holding CfDs. To simplify the description of the test results, in the spot 
market all the generators' offer functions are set as C(P) = 0.02p 2 + SP and all the 
g g g 
consumers' bid functions are set as B(Pd ) = -O.OlP} + 10Pd . As the result of optimal dispatch 
of the spot market, the limit binding branches include Lines 6-10, 9-10, lS-18, 18-19,21-22 
and 2S-27. The nodal prices of this case are shown in Figure 6.6 as the curve of "Base Case". 
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-K=O -K=1 
---A- K=2 ...... )( .... . K=3 
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Figure 6.6 The change of nodal prices in the IEEE 30-bus system during the iterative 
procedure of the proposed approach 
Now we add an additional transaction T\3-19 with an mTIount of 11MW above the base case. 
This transaction is not holding any financial instrument to hedge against price risks. The nodal 
prices for this case are given in Figure 6.6 as the curve of "K=O", in which the prices at bus 
10,17,19,20,21 are very high due to the congestion charge. These abnormal high prices may 
prevent participants from trading energy in the spot market and may imply serious market 
power. On the other hand, the consumer at bus 19 will not be willing to continue the 
trmlsaction of T \3-19 at such a high price, because its revenue adequacy constraints can not be 
satisfied without the protection of the associated financial instruments. The proposed iterative 
procedure is applied by reducing the lower MW linlit of this consumer with a step of 1 MW 
per iteration. The decrease o'f nodal prices with the developnlent of iteration is also shown in 
Figure 6.6. When T\3-19 is curtailed to SMW after 6 iterations, the nodal price at bus 19 has 
gone down enough to satisfy the local consumer's revenue adequacy constraint. As a result 
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the iterative procedure stops. Not only the consumer at bus 19 but also all the other 
participants including the ISO can benefit from this more sensible dispatch result. 
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Figure 6.7 The evolution of profit components of consumer at bus 19 against iteration 
numbers 
Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8 illustrate the evolution of profit components of consumer at bus 19 
and consumer at bus 21 against iteration numbers, respectively. As analyzed in Section 6.4.1, 
the total profit of a market participant, either a generator or a consumer, can be divided into 
two parts, which are the profit ean1ed in spot market and the profit earned from financial 
instruments. From Figure 6.7 it can be seen that the total profit is negative at k-O, which 
means that its profit from financial instruments can not cover the huge congestion charge in 
spot market. With the iteration going on, the profit from financial instrument decreases while 
the profit in spot market increases, and eventually the total profit increases to reach the 
minimum profit requirement. The reason is the nodal price at bus 19 is decreasing 
dramatically with the curtailment of bilateral transaction T 13-19 • In Figure 6.8, the total profit 
of the consumer at bus 21, who is also suffering from a very high nodal spot price, can keep 
constant, although its two components both change a lot during iteration. The explanation for 
this phenomenon is the consumer at bus 21 has bought enough financial instruments to fully 
hedge against price risks. Consequently, its income from CfDs and FTRs can always cover its 
loss of profit in spot market exactly no matter how much its nodal price changes. 
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Figure 6.8 The evolution of profit components of consumer at bus 21 against iteration 
numbers 
In the proposed approach, the ISO needs to lmow the information about price and amount of 
CfDs and FTRs to mitigate congestion while in some previous methods bilateral contracts 
must submit some price signals like "willing to pay" to the ISO for curtailment in the spot 
market. It would be possible and harmless for the ISO knowing the price information about 
bilateral financial instruments like CfDs, if the ISO is a just and non-profit organization. The 
presented formulae can also be applied to model the problem of optimal individual bidding 
strategy. 
6.6 Conclusions 
To hedge against the temporal and locational price risks, two pure financial instrun1ents, CfDs 
and FTRs, are described. The cashflows between the ISO,' generators, and consumers are 
analyzed after CfDs and FTRs being combined together to manage the congestion and price 
risks. This chapter presents a new optimal dispatch method for the spot Inarket with bilateral 
contracts, which takes into account the total revenue of an individual participant not only from 
its payment in the spot n1arket but also the payment from its signed financial instruments. The 
aim of this approach is to elilninate transmission congestion and to avoid prohibitively high 
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nodal spot prices by utilizing the natural profitable incentive of individual market participants. 
To implement this approach, individual revenue adequacy constraints should be involved in 
the original dispatch problem. An iterative procedure is applied to solve this special 
optimization problem with both primal and dual variables in its constraints. 
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Chapter 7. Optimal Financial Transmission Rights 
Auction with FACTS Devices 
7.1 Introduction 
Financial Transmission Rights (FTR) , supported by a spot market and the Locational 
Marginal Pricing method, has been presented in Chapter 6 as an effective approach to manage 
transmission congestion and high price risks. It has also been mentioned that the initial 
allocation of FTRs can be implemented through an auction as an approach to long-run 
congestion management and then they can be exchanged in the decentralized secondary 
market. Market participants can submit their bids for purchase and sale of FTRs in a separated 
auction market conducted by the ISO, whose objective is to maximise revenues from FTRs 
while to keep all the FTRs simultaneously feasible [159, 160]. An FTR auction has been put 
into practice in PJM since May 1999 [161] and has been running efficiently. 
Since the concept of Flexible AC Transmission Systems (FACTS) was first proposed in 1988 
[162], n1any various FACTS devices have been utilised to meet a growing demand of transfer 
capabilities due to increasing wheeling transactions in the deregulation environment. Some 
interesting applications of FACTS devices to Economic Dispatch (ED), AC/DC Optimal 
Power Flow (OPF), Optimal Power Delivery, Contract-Path based electricity trading, and 
Transmission Congestion Management can be found in [164-169]. Besides all the well 
known advantages brought by FACTS devices, they can offer new opportunities for the ISO 
to run a more efficient FTR auction to make the full use of the existing power grid. 
A new method is proposed in this chapter to incorporate some FACTS devices into the FTR 
optimal auction model. A point-to-point FTR is modelled as an injection at one node and an 
extraction at another node. To purchase a certain FTR in the auction, a bidder should provide 
the maximum amount of FTR MW he is willing to pay, bid price and points of injection and 
extraction. The obj ective of this auction model is to maximise the revenues from transmission 
grid use. To make the sold FTRs simultaneously feasible, nodal power balance equations and 
inequality constraints for system operational limits are considered. Since the FTR auction is 
usually run monthly and only concerns active power, the DC power flow model is used here. 
Therefore, two types of series FACTS devices, which are thyristor controlled series 
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compensators (TCSC) and thyristor controlled phase shifters (TCPS) are modelled into the 
proposed FTR auction. Here the so-called Power Injection Model is used to model FACTS 
devices. This can give some participants more chances to win their bids for FTRs. Interior 
Point Linear Programming is applied to solve this optimisation problem. The solution of this 
FTR optimal auction consists of the feasible sold FTRs and their prices and the optimal 
control parameters of FACTS devices. An 8-bus test system and the modified IEEE 30-bus 
system are studied to illustrate the proposed method. The comparison between cases with 
F ACTS devices and without FACTS devices shows that appropriate FACTS devices can 
improve the result of FTR auctions significantly. 
7.2 Optimal FTR Auction 
As described in Chapter 6, FTR is a system of transmission usage pricing and congestion risk 
management based on LMP approach. Based on bids and actual dispatch in the day-
ahead/hour-ahead spot market, the ISO determines LMPs and charges locational differences 
on these prices for transmission services of power delivery from one location to another. Total 
congestion payments collected by the ISO (congestion charge) for the actual use of 
transmission system would always be at least as large as congestion payments to FTR holders 
(congestion credit) to make adequate system revenues [37, 159]. 
FTR FTRs Bids Energy Bids Power 
Auction Spot 
Market Auction Market 
Results Congestion 
Charge 
FTR 
LMP 
Holders 
Congestion 
Exchange Credit Congestion 
FTR Credit From 
Secondary FTRs 
Market FTRs 
Figure 7.1 FTR's purchase and its role in congestion management 
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With the well-defined Financial Transmission Rights, it is natural to have an auction for 
allocation of part or all of the FTRs to provide open access to the grid through a market 
mechanism. An OPF dispatch model can be adapted to provide a formulation of an FTR 
auction model for selecting the long-term capacity awards based on the willing-to-pay 
principle. The power flow equations embedded into the FTR auction make it straightforward 
to identify which FTRs are available by characterizing all possible rights and selecting a set of 
feasible rights that would provide the highest valued use of the network. The market clearing 
price (MCP) for each FTR in the auction is based on the lowest winning bid for that FTR. The 
auction provides market participants with the opportunities to purchase FTRs which would 
not be able to get through bilateral transactions in a secondary market. A secondary market 
provides a contractual mechanism for long-term pricing of the transnlission grid. A long-term 
(yearly or monthly) auction can be used to initially allocate FTRs to transmission users. A 
short-term auction (weekly or daily) can be regarded as a short-term reshaping of FTRs. 
FTR's purchase and its role in congestion management are given in Figure 7.1. The objective 
of the ISO is to maximize the profit from FTR auction while keeping all existing FTRs 
simultaneously feasible without violating any operation limits. Each FTR can be either from 
single bus to single bus or from multiple buses to multiple buses. According to the contents of 
[159-161], with DC model the optimal FTR auction can be formulated as the following linear 
progranuning problem. 
Max(b FTR) t FTR 
Subject to: 
B'o -M FTR -M BPB = 0 (7-1) 
FTR min < FTR ~ FTR max 
p/ min < HfJ ~ p/max 
where FTR is the matrix of winning FTR bids (MW), bFTR is the matrix of bidding prices of 
FTR bidders, PB is the matrix of FTR injections in the base case, B' is the linearized active 
power Jacobian matrix, His the matrix of branch power flow constraint coefficients, fJ is the 
matrix of bus voltage angles, p/ rnin and p/max are the matrix of the lower and upper MW flow 
limits of branches, FTR min and FTR max are the matrix of minimum and maximum amount of 
FTR MW value the bidders are willing to pay for, MB is the nodal injection nlapping matrix of 
FTRs in the base case, M is the nodal injection mapping matrix of FTRs in the auction. M is a 
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N x Nbidder Matrix. N is the total number of buses while Nbidder is total number of the 
bidders in the auction. 
FTRI 
bus 1 mll , 
M = bus 2 m 1,2 
bus N m1,N 
FTR2 
m 21 , 
m 2,2 
m 2N , 
FTRNbidder 
mNbidder,1 
mNbidder,2 
mNbidder,N 
(7-2) 
The control variables in problem (7-1) are the nodal injections associated with the MW values 
of FTRs submitted to the auction. A FTR can have either positive or negative depending on 
whether it is an FTR to be purchased or a FTR to be sold. To insure the final FTRs set is 
simultaneously feasible, the FTRs not entering the auction should be treated as base case 
loads and generations in nodal power balancing equality constraints. 
To enter the auction, bidders should submit their data to the ISO. These data include the bid 
prices, points of injection and extraction, minimum and maximum MW values of FTRs. After 
running the FTR auction, the output includes an optimal set of winning bids of FTRs and the 
Market Clearing Prices (MCPs) of winning FTRs. The MCP of a FTR is defined by the 
opportunity cost of that FTR in the auction, i.e. the difference of market prices between the 
both sides of the FTR. A purchaser of FTR will pay MCP and a seller of FTR will be paid 
MCP. The revenue from the FTR auction will be allocated to the Transmission Owners (TO) 
to compensate for their investment on improving the power grid. 
7.3 Parallel Flow and Loop Flow 
In Section 2.2.2 of Chapter 2, the physical limits of transmission system are analyzed and the 
Available Transfer Capability (ATC) is defined to be a measure of transfer capability 
relnaining in the physical transmission network. In fact, the capability of the transmission 
system cannot be described by a single number --- the transmission system does not have a 
fixed "capacity". At any time, a transn1ission system has transfer capabilities between any two 
nodes or any two areas. Transfer capability is the amount of power that can be transferred 
between the two selected points or areas and still be able to withstand various system 
contingencies involving the loss of generators, transmission lines or transformers. 
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Since with very few exceptions, the flow of power over the various lines in an AC network 
cannot be controlled, this leads to the result that portions of one system's power flowed 
through other systems' lines. The distribution of power flows over all parts of an 
interconnected transmission system results in two phenomena. 
One is parallel path flow or parallel flow, which is shown in Figure 7.2. Parallel flow occurs 
when one utility delivers power to another utility. Because of the laws of physics, some of 
that power flows through the transmission system of the neighboring utilities which parallel 
the transmission systems of the utilities involved in the transaction. Parallel flows may appear 
on another utility's system without that utility having any knowledge of the circumstances 
that gave rise o"f it. Such parallel flows may easily interfere with the neighboring utility's 
operation of their own system. On the other hand, a weak parallel link will significantly 
reduce the transfer capability between two areas. The total transfer capability of a 
transmission interface does not simply equal to the sigma of the transfer capability of each 
parallel link in this interface. 
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The second phenomenon is loop flow which is shown in Figure 7.3. Loop flow involves two 
or more utilities. Each is supplying its own loads from its own sources. But the actual flows 
on the system from the combined operations result in the use of transmission in other systems 
in such a way that there is apparent circulating power flow around a closed loop. Obviously 
this loop flow is unwanted and will have bad effect on the transfer capability. 
Both parallel flow and loop flow make it difficult to define A TC and may even reduce the 
transfer capabilities of the existing transmission system. One of the most efficient remedies 
for the problems of parallel flow and loop flow is the application of FACTS devices to 
transmission system control. 
7.4 FACTS Devices and Power Injection Model 
7.4.1 Role of FACTS Devices in ElectriCity Markets 
Flexible AC transmission System (FACTS) is defined by the IEEE as "Alternating current 
transmission systems incorporating power electronic-based and other static controllers to 
enhance controllability and increase power transfer capacity". The significance of the power 
electronics and other static controllers is that they have high-speed response and there is no 
limit to the number of operations. Power devices such as thyristors lead to a variety of FACTS 
controllers and HVDC converters. These controllers can dynamically control line impedance, 
line voltage, active power flow and reactive power flow. They can absorb or supply reactive 
power and when storage becomes economically viable they can supply and absorb active 
power as well. 
There are three basic kinds of FACTS controllers. One kind can be characterized as injection 
of voltage in series with the line, the second kind as injection of current in shunt and the third 
kind is a combination of voltage injection in series and current injection in shunt. Then there 
are controllers based on conventional thyristors (without gate turn-off capability) and those 
based on gate turn-off thyristors. Basically there are two types of shunt controllers for 
injection of reactive current, the conventional thyristor based Static VAR Compensator 
(SVC), and tum-off thyristor based Static Conlpensator (STATCOM). Their primary function 
is dynamic voltage control. Sinlilarly there are two types of series controllers for injection of 
reactive voltage in series, the Thyristor Controlled Series Capacitor (TCSC) and Static 
Synchronous Series Capacitor (SSSC), whose primary function is dynamic current flow 
control. Another series controller for phase angle is the Thyristor Controlled Phase Shifter 
141 
Chapter 7. Optimal Financial Transmission Rights Auction with FACTS Devices 
(TCPS). Then there is one Shunt-Series combined Controller, the Unified Power Flow 
Controller (UPFC), whose primary function is power flow control. There are also several 
other controllers which can be found in detail in [4]. 
The main idea of FACTS devices is to use the network parameters as control variables to 
direct power flows and eliminate problems caused by unwanted loop flows or parallel flows. 
The potential benefits brought from this new technology have been found on many aspects, 
such as congestion management reducing system operation cost, reducing transmission 
investment, increasing the Available Transmission Capabilities (ATC), and improving system 
stability and reliability, etc. As discussed in the previous section, the revenue from the FTR 
auction is limited by the existing network transfer capability. Considering the control of 
installed FACTS devices in the network during the FTR auction can make better use of the 
current grid properties, which can bring benefits not only to TOs but also to other market 
participants. 
7.4.2 Power Injection Model of Series FACTS Devices 
Generally speaking, there are two types of models of FACTS devices for static power flow 
control and calculation. The first model is Voltage Source Model (VSM), which is formed in 
light with the physical operating principles of FACTS devices [170]. VSM is straightforward 
but will destroy the symmetric characteristics of the network admittance matrix. The second 
FACTS-model is called as Power Injection Model (PIM), which results from the VSM by 
interpreting the power inj ections of the shunt and series converters as real and reactive node 
injections [165,167,171]. With PIM, FACTS devices can be embedded into power flow 
equations even without any modification of network admittance matrix and Jacobian matrix 
[172]. As the DC model is used in this chapter, only two types of series FACTS devices, 
which are TCSC and TCPS, are discussed here. 
7.4.2.1 TCSC (Thyristor Controlled Series Compensator) 
...... ·:x .......... 1 TCSC 
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Figure 7.4 Equivalent circuit of TCSC 
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A transmission line compensated by a TCSC is shown in Figure 7.4, in which the reactance of 
the line is xi) and the reactance of the TCSC is -XC' The total susceptance between bus i and 
bus} is formulated as: 
(7-3) 
Based on the DC power flow model, the active power flow along the line ij with a TCSC can 
·be formulated as: 
P. = b .. ((). - () .) 
I} I} I } (7-4) 
7.4.2.2 TCPS (Thyristor Controlled Phase Shifter) 
o UT TCPS 0 b c=)~-+ ____ -r-Xl-ij~ ______ ~6 
ViLei i~ I VjLej 
: .......... T ............. . 
Figure 7.5 Equivalent circuit of TCPS 
The equivalent circuit of a transmission line with a TCPS is shown in Figure 7.5. Given the 
susceptance of the line bi} = 1\ .. and the voltage shift angle If! of the TCPS, the active power 
/ xI} 
flow along this line is: 
P. =b .. ((}.-(}.+JIF) 
I} I} I } 'f' (7-5) 
7.4.2.3 Power Injection Model 
Zo V.LO, 1 1 ] 0 V.LO. j j j 
PF ' ,j 
t PF , ,l 
Figure 7.6 Power injection model of TCSC and TCPS 
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The equivalent circuit of the general PIM of the transmission line with series FACTS devices 
under the DC assumption is shown in Figure 7.6, in which components associated with 
FACTS devices have been replaced with two power injections on both sides of the 
transmission line. The formulae of power injections are different for different FACTS 
devices. For a TCSC, the power injection can be derived as: 
-x 
P F,; = -PF,j =c (OJ -OJ) 
x .. (x .. -x ) 
Ij Ij C 
(7-6) 
For a TCPS, the power injection can be formulated as: 
PF . = -PF . = -b .. J/F ,1 ,J Ij 'f" (7-7) 
Here it should be noted that the value of power injections for a TCSC is a function of not only 
its reactance but also the difference of voltage angles between two ends of the transmission 
line. On the other hand, the power injections for TCPS have nothing to do with the state 
variables of the system. 
7.5 The Proposed FTR Auction Model with Series FACTS Devices 
The proposed FTR auction model can be seen as an extension of the general FTR auction 
model presented in Section 7.2, where two additional types of control variables are 
introduced: 
• Angle ofTCPS; 
• Reactance of TCSC. 
In [164-165] where DC power flow model was adopted too, phase shifter angle is replaced by 
compensation power injection at end buses while series compensation is modelled as variation 
in circuit reactance. The PIM of TCPS is proved to be no problem but treating circuit 
reactance as control variable turns the corresponding nodal power balance constraints into 
non-linear equations. To make the problem still solvable by Linear Programming, a 
decomposition approach based on Benders decomposition scheme is applied in [164] while in 
[165] the non-linear power flow control with FACTS devices was solved in a separate sub-
problem. 
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In this chapter a uniform PIM is adopted to represent both TCSC and TCPS to keep the 
problem linear and to simplify the programming. The mathematical model of the proposed 
method is formulated based on problem (7-1): 
Max(b FTR)t FTR 
Subject to: 
(7-8) 
FTR min < FTR < FTR max 
P min < p < p max F - F - F 
Comparing with problem (7-1), power injections associated with FACTS devices have been 
added into nodal power balance constraints. MF is the connection matrix for FACTS devices, 
in which the elements are 1 or -1. The last inequality constraint set is the operating limits for 
power injections of FACTS devices. To make this model practical, constraints of FACTS 
internal parameters must be involved. For TCPS, the limits of power injections can be easily 
derived froin the limits of phase shifter angle. 
P min = -b J/E max F,i ij r , 
p~x = _b .. J/Emin 
F,I IJ r (7-9) 
But for TCSC, the limits of power injections are more complex as shown in (7-6). Since there 
are no fixed litnits for power injections of TCSC (though there are fixed limits for xc), its 
operating constraints can be formulated as: 
max 
PF . + Xc (8. - e . ) ~ 0 
,I ( max) I J 
Xij Xij - Xc 
(7-10) 
and 
min 
PF . + Xc . (e,. - eJ.) < 0 
,I ( min) 
Xij Xij - Xc 
(7-11) 
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After the optimal solution of this problem is obtained, the optimal control parameters of 
FACTS devices are given in (7-12) and (7-13) for TCSC and TCPS, respectively. 
2 * 
* x .. PF · Ij ,I 
XC = '" * '" 
- (OJ - OJ.) + x .. PF . Ij ,I (7-12) 
'" 
'" PF · VI =_,_' 
- bij (7-13) 
The proposed FTR optimal auction model with senes FACTS devices can be actually 
represented by problem (7-8) plus internal operating constraints of FACTS devices (7-9 to 7-
11). This is a typical linear programming problem, which can be solved easily by the Interior 
Point Primal-Dual Linear Programming presented in Chapter 3. 
7.6 Test Results 
To illustrate the proposed FTR optimal auction model, two test systems, which are an 8-bus 
system and the modified IEEE 3D-bus system, are studied. 
7.6.1 System I: 8-bus Test System 
An 8-bus system, which is modification based on the first test system in [157], is studied to 
illustrate the proposed FTR auction model. Its network configuration and the FTRs of base 
case and bidding into the auction are shown in Figure 7.7. The branch parameters and limits 
and the bid prices of 6 bidders in the FTR auction are given in Tables 7.1 and 7.2. In addition, 
there are a TCPS installed on Line 6 and a TCSC installed on Line 2. From Figure 7.7 it can 
be seen that basically the system can be divided into Left zone including buses 1, 5 and 6 and 
Right zone including the rest buses. The Left zone is generation zone while the Right zone is 
demand zone. The tie lines between these two zones are Lines 1, 2 and 6. 
To demonstrate the impacts of different series FACTS devices on the results of the optimal 
FTR auction. 4 cases are analysed here: 
Case I: FTR auction without FACTS devices; 
Case II: FTR auction with a TCSC on Line 2; 
Case III: FTR auction with a TCPS on Line 6; 
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Case VI: FTR auction with both TCSC on Line 2 and TCPS on Line 6. 
1.0 FTRI -.'t----""-:------___ ~ , 
80MW 
6 
1 
, 
5 
\ 
\ 
Left \ 
/ 
.......,.----t-.... 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Right 4 
3 ~ ........ ...,.._ 
, 4 1.0 FTR5 
1.0 FTR3 0.4 FTR 
1.0 FTR3 0.6 FTR4 
-. FTRs in auction .. Base case FTRs 
Figure 7.7. The 8-bus test system 
Table 7.1 Branch data of the 8-bus system 
Line From Bus To Bus Reactance Limit (MW) 
1 1 2 0.0300 150 
2 1 4 0.0300 340 
3 1 5 0.0065 380 
4 2 3 0.0100 120 
5 3 4 0.0300 230 
6 4 5 0.0300 150 
7 5 6 0.0200 300 
8 6 1 0.0250 250 
9 7 4 0.0150 350 
10 7 8 0.0220 340 
1 1 8 3 0.0180 240 
7 
8 
1.0 FTR5 
80MW 
0.5 FTRI 
1.0 FTR6 
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Table 7.2 Bid prices in FTR auction 
Bidder 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Bid Price 
12.0 10.0 12.0 11.0 9.0 8.0 ($/MW) 
FTRmin 0 0 0 0 (MW) 0 0 
FTRmax 200 300 100 175 120 (MW) 200 
The line flows in the results of the FTR auction in 4 cases are shown in Table 7.3. The 
revenues from FTR auction in 4 cases are given in Figure 7.8. The operating limits and the 
optimal control parameters of FACTS devices and their corresponding power injection values 
in Cases II, III, and VI are listed in Table 7.4. In Case I, because of the bottleneck between 
Left zone and Right zone, not all the FTR bids can be satisfied and the revenue from FTR 
auction is limited. In Table 7.3, it can be noted that MW flow constraints of Line 1 and Line 6 
are bound while Line 2 still has nearly two thirds of its transfer capacity left. To improve the 
transmission capability between Left zone and Right zone, the TCSC on Line 2 is controllable 
in Case II while the TCPS on Line 6 is controllable in Case III. The results of both cases are 
better than Case I. However the TCSC on Line 2, which increases the power flow on Line 2 to 
296.58MW from the value of 123.69MW in Case I, has better impact on the FTR auction than 
the TCPS on Line 6. The reason is that in case III a new binding constraint of line flow (Line 
4) occurs. 
In Case VI, both installed FACTS devices are controllable in the FTR auction. Obviously this 
is the best result out of the four cases. From Table 7.3, it can be seen that all the three tie lines 
have reached their thermal limits in this case. In other words, the total transmission capability 
between Left zone and Right zone has been fully utilised with the help from both FACTS 
devices. Compared with Case II, the reactance of TCSC also reaches its maximum value but 
its power injection value is different from Case II. The reason is that the power injection of 
TCSC is also a function of voltage angle difference between bus 1 and bus 4, which varies in 
each case. The results show that the coordination between the two installed FACTS devices 
works very well. It is due to directly embedding the power injection models of FACTS 
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devices into the linear progratnming problem instead of solving the control sub-problems of 
FACTS devices separately. 
Table 7.3 Line flows in 4 cases 
Line Line Flow Line Flow Line Flow Line Flow Limit 
in Case I in Case II in Case in Case (MW) 
(MW) (MW) III (MW) VI (MW) 
1 150.00 . 150:00 150.00 150.00 150 
3 -121.44 -236.03 -266.57 -311.98 380 
4 50.85 96.64 120.00 52.60 120 
5 -43.26 -82.35 30.63 -54.20 230 
6 '-150.00 -150.00 -150.00 -150.00 150 
7 26.90 -10.35 -5.94 0.62 300 
8 53.10 69.65 74.06 80.62 250 
9 -258.16 -288.56 -195.94 -273.20 350 
10 58.16 88.55 -4.06 73.20 340 
11 -214.11 -211.44 -209.37 -226.80 240 
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-c: 
0 
.. 6000 0 
:::I 
11:1 5000 0:: 
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LL 4000 
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Figure 7.8 Revenue from FTR auction in 4 cases 
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Table 7.4 Optimal control parameters of the FACTS devices 
Optimal Min Max 
Value Value Value 
Xc of the TCSC 0.02 0.00 0.02 
Case II Power Injection 
-197.72 
-197.72 0.00 at Bus 1 (MW) 
If1 of the TCPS 0.0384 -0.10 0.10 
Case III Power Injection 
-128.38 -333.33 333.33 
at Bus 5 (MW) 
XC of the TCSC 0.02 0.00 0.02 
Power Injection 
of the TCSC at -226.67 -226.67 0.00 
Bus 1 (MW) 
Case VI 
If1 of the TCPS 0.0093 -0.10 0.10 
Power Injection 
of the TCPS at -30.93 -333.33 333.33 
Bus 5 (MW) 
7.6.2 System II: 30-bus Test System 
The IEEE 30-bus test system is modified to give further illustration of the proposed FTR 
auction approach and its application to a bigger network. The bus and branch data are given in 
Appendix C. The layout of the system as well as injection and extraction points of FTRs for 
purchases and sales of different bidders are shown in Figure 7.9. The data of bidders who take 
part in the FTR auction are given in Table 7.5. Table 7.7 shows detailed base case FTR data 
of the existing FTR holders who will not participate in the FTR auction. 
As shown in Figure 7.9, there are three series FACTS devices installed in the system. They 
are one TCSC installed on Line 5 (Bus 2 to Bus 5), two TCPSs installed on Line 18 (Bus 12 
to Bus 15) and Line 27 (Bus 10 to Bus 21). 
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Figure 7.9 The modified IEEE 3D-bus system and bidders in FTR auction 
Table 7.5 Bidders data in IEEE 3D-bus test system 
Bidder 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Bid Price 
13.0 10.0 12.0 11.0 9.0 12.5 10.5 
($/MW) 
FTRmin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (MW) 
FTRmax 100 75 120 90 80 70 100 (MW) 
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Table 7.6 Base case FTRs data in IEEE 3D-bus system 
From Bus To Bus FTR Value (MW) 
1 3 95 
1 20 5 
2 14 30 
2 15 30 
2 18 20 
13 21 20 
22 12 34 
22 16 6 
22 19 10 
23 7 30 
23 10 20 
27 8 5 
27 10 15 
To demonstrate the impacts of the FACTS devices on FTR auction, two cases will be studied 
here: 
• Case I: FTR auction without any FACTS devices; 
• Case II: FTR auction with all the FACTS devices. 
The auction results in the two cases, as obtained by solving the auction optimization problems 
(7-1) and (7-8) respectively, are given in Table 7.7 and Table 7.8. Table 7.7 shows the 
distribution of FTRs in tenns of bidders. Table 7.8 shows detailed FTRs in terms of pairs of 
injection and withdraw points. Obviously, the auction result of case II is much better than the 
result of case I, since more FTRs have been traded (purchased or sold) in case II with the help 
of the three series FACTS devices. 
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Table 7.7 Auction results in IEEE 3D-bus system 
Bidder FTR value in FTR VALUE FTRmax(MW) Case I (MW) FTR Type IN CASE II 
(MW) 
1 27.0 45.6 100 purchase 
2 16.1 11.9 75 purchase 
3 120 120.0 120 purchase 
4 0.0 85.4 90 purchase 
5 0.0 0.0 80 purchase 
6 58.5 56.3 70 sale 
7 4.3 30 100 sale 
Table 7.8 Auction results in IEEE 3D-bus system in terms of injection and withdraw 
points 
To Bus FTR value in FTR value in Bidder From Bus Case I (MW) Case II (MW) 
2 25 5.4 9.12 1 
2 27 10.8 18.24 1 
2 30 10.8 18.24 1 
8 29 16.1 11.9 2 
1 5 60.0 60.0 3 
2 23 60.0 60.0 3 
3 10 0.0 85.4 4 
14 13 0.0 0.0 5 
14 20 0.0 0.0 5 
1 15 58.5 56.3 6 
1 22 4.3 30.0 7 
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Table 7.9 Branch flows of FTR auction results of IEEE 3D-bus system 
Branch From To MW Flow in MW Flow in MW Flow 
No. Bus Bus Case I Case II Limit 
1 1 2 28.15 47.89 130 
2 1 3 73.32 55.83 130 
3 2 4 64.13 53.75 65 
4 3 
-21.68 46.19 130 
~~,~, ~, t,,~, ~-+~,~~~~ +, ~. ~, ~, ~. _6_6_.0_0+1 ' "~=T~;&. -------1-3~0 
6 ,:,~* 65.00 «', ';,~ 65.00 ,", 65 
5 2 
4 
5 
,6 Y ..•. ' 2 " 
.f.' . ~ . 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
4 
5 
6 
6 
9 
6 
9 
9 
12 
12 
12 
12 
19 12 
20 ' 14 
21 16 
6 
7 
7 
8 
6 
10 
11 
10 
4 
13 
14 
15 
16 
15 
17 
22 15 i 18 
23 18 19 
24 19 20 
25 10 20 
26 10 17 
27 10 21 
28 10 22 
29 21 22 
30 15 23 
31 22 24 
32 23 24 
33 24 25 
7.74 51.28 90 
6.00 54.74 70 
28.34 5.26 130 
-5.73 0.82 32 
-22.97 -53.39 65 
13.14 30.54 32 
0.00 0.00 65 
22.97 53.39 65 
-34.71 -48.66 65 
-20.00 -20.00 65 
14.62 -'-"""'~.~----3--t2 
5.24 -14.78 32 
0.85 17.44 32 
-15.38 2.00 16 
-5.15 11.44 16 
16.00 /. 16 
-4.00 -4.00 16 
-14.00 -14.00 32 
19.00 19.00 32 
5.15 -11.44 32 
-12.00 -12.00 32 
-11.03 . :I.'~ .~ .. .. 32.00 
~'« " .~ ~ 
32 
-32.00 -32.00 32 
2.38 -2 .49 16 
11 .30 16.00 16 
-7.62 -1 2.49 16 
3.69 3.51 16 
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Branch From To MW Flow in MW Flow in MW Flow No. Bus Bus Case I Case II Limit 
34 25 26 0.00 0.00 16 
35 25 27 
-1.71 
-5.61 16 
36 28 27 19.42 33.97 65 
37 27 29 16.00 16.00 . 16 'Z , 
38 27 30 10.92 14.12 16 
39 29 30 
-0.13 4.12 16 
40 8 28 5.40 7.70 32 
41 6 28 14.02 26.28 32 
100 -.-------------------------------------~ 
--+-- Case I (w/o FACTS) 
80 - --- Case II(w FACTS) 
~ 60 - I---------------------I---'~----------I 
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Figure 7.10 Nodal MCPs in the results of two cases 
Table 7.10 MCPs of all the feasible FTRs in two cases 
"~ . ~'07~;"'"" " ' '!Ji ~ .. , .. ~ 'k ,,> .'! .. . ill, .'~ " Case 1 4,i" ''": .. " 
'.' 
''''CastfIl 
FTR FTR From To ' '<' , 
No. Bus Bus MCPj 
MCPof MCP j MCPj 
MCPof TYPE MCP j FTR FTR 
I 1 3 9.737 16.919 7.182 13.067 14.232 1.165 Basecase 
2 1 2 9.737 7.507 -2.23 13.067 12.705 -0.362 Basecase 
3 2 14 7.507 1.757 -5.75 12.705 21.645 8.94 Basecase 
4 2 15 7.507 -2.763 -10.27 12.705 0.567 -12.138 Basecase 
5 2 18 7.507 87.485 79.978 12.705 95.984 83.279 Basecase 
6 13 21 7.578 48.283 40.705 0.567 25.232 24.665 Basecase 
7 22 12 10.354 7.578 -2.776 5.337 0.567 -4.77 Basecase 
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